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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines whether ownership concentration, board of directors, audit
committee and ethnicity of directors affect conservative accounting. Additionally,
this thesis examines whether the impact of firms’ governance on conservatism is
moderated by ownership concentration. Previous evidence has suggested that
conservative accounting controls the agency problem, but so far, there is no
evidence that it is applicable in Malaysian firms, as firms are closely held by the
controlling shareholders.

This thesis employs panel data on Malaysian listed companies observed over
seven years from 2001 to 2007.

Malaysian firms are chosen as the sample

because they provide a useful setting for the study of ownership concentration and
enable us to identify whether strong governance attributes in firms with
controlling shareholders function effectively.

Conservatism is measured using two approaches: (a) an accrual-based method
from Givoly and Hayn (2000) and (b) asymmetric timeliness from Basu (1997).
Substantial shareholders are used to proxy for ownership concentration, and are
classified into: (a) inside shareholders who are executive and non-executive
directors, and (b) outside shareholders who are not involved with the
management. Four characteristics of the board of directors are identified: board
composition, board size, board skill (proxied by board tenure, board financial
expertise and multiple directorships) and CEO duality. Three characteristics of
the audit committee are specified: audit committee composition, financial
expertise and audit committee meeting. This thesis focuses on two ethnic groups:
Malay (Bumiputera) and Chinese directors, who sit on the board of directors and
the audit committee.

The empirical results show that the existence of controlling shareholders can lead
to significantly lower accrual-based conservatism, but they do not influence
asymmetric timeliness.

In contrast, none of the board and audit committee

attributes appear to determine accrual-based conservatism; but board composition,
ii

board financial expertise, audit committee composition, audit committee financial
expertise and audit committee meeting are significantly associated with
asymmetric timeliness. Results in this thesis surprisingly show that, independent
directors on the audit committee are associated with lower asymmetric timeliness
and this finding remains after using alternative measures. This thesis provide no
evidence that board size, board skill (proxied by directors’ tenure and multiple
directorships) or CEO duality are associated with conservatism.

The ethnic

groups influence conservatism but the evidence is mixed, implying that there
could be other factors that explained the directors’ behaviour than their ethnicity
per se. The analysis of the moderating effect confirms that firms’ governance has
positive influence on conservatism.
negatively

moderates

the

However, ownership concentration

relationship

between

firms’

governance

and

conservatism.

The implication from these findings is that the great power that the controlling
owners exert may diminish the role of financial reports in controlling and
monitoring the management.

The merits of conservatism as a governance

mechanism do not seem to function appropriately when its application is
determined by the controlling parties, who are supposed to be subject to its
control. Policy makers and regulatory bodies should interpret this evidence as
motivation for them to strengthen their enforcement of legal shareholder
protection.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1.

Introduction

Financial Accounting Standards Board (1980) SFAC No.2 notes that assets and
liabilities are frequently measured in the context of significant uncertainties.
Managers are allowed to use their own discretion in providing accounting
estimates as not all aspects of accounting are covered by professional standards
(Chung, Firth, & Jeong-Bon, 2003). For instance, the Malaysian Accounting
Standards Board (MASB) does not provide detailed rules on financial reporting
principles, thus allowing flexibility for managers to use their discretion in
determining reported earnings (Saleh, Iskandar, & Rahmat, 2005). The estimation
made could be neutral, aggressive or conservative.

This thesis focuses on

conservative accounting because empirical studies showed that it has a significant
role in reducing agency conflict.

Conservatism is traditionally defined as accounting practices that “anticipate no
profit but anticipate all losses” (Bliss, 1924). Basu (1997) depicts conservatism as
the asymmetric timeliness of earnings which require higher verification to
recognise good news as gain than to recognise bad news as losses. Givoly and
Hayn (2000, p. 292) define conservatism as ‘a selection criterion between
accounting principles that leads to the minimisation of cumulative reported
earnings by slower revenue recognition, faster expense recognition, lower asset
valuation and higher liability valuation’. All of these definitions acknowledge
that earnings reported under conservative accounting are understated rather than
overstated.

Empirical studies have documented that conservatism reduces agency conflict as
it limits over payment of incentive to managers (Kwon, Newman, & Suh, 2001),
allows for early detection of negative net present value projects as it immediately
recognises expected losses (Ball, 2001, p. 127), limits managers’ opportunistic
behaviour (W. D. Brown, He, & Teitel, 2006; Q. Chen, Hemmer, & Zhang, 2007;
1

Watts, 2003) and reduces information asymmetry between managers and outside
shareholders (LaFond & Watts, 2008). Further, conservatism is more useful in
controlling the cost of suboptimal managerial decisions than if the earnings were
measured neutrally or liberally (Kwon, 2005). The benefits of conservatism in the
agency relationship, ultimately improve the usefulness of financial statements
(Ball & Shivakumar, 2006) and increase firm value (Watts, 2003).

It has long been recognised that contracting parties use accounting numbers to
reduce agency costs (e.g.: Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). In the Malaysian context,
conservatism may be useful in reducing agency conflict between the majority
shareholders and minority shareholders. The traditional agency conflict between
managers and shareholders is not relevant in Malaysian firms because their
ownership is highly concentrated in the hands of the large shareholders
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; M. H. Lim, 1981; Tam & Tan, 2007;
Zhuang, Webb, Edwards, & Capulong, 2001). According to Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), the power of controlling shareholders in East Asian economies deprive the
minority shareholders of their rights and become indisputable in an environment
of a weak legal system and ineffective corporate governance. In Malaysia, this
phenomenon is most likely to occur as it has weak enforcement of the legal
shareholder protection (Krishnamurti, Sevic, & Sevic, 2005). Debt financing
could monitor management (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996) but in Malaysia,
disciplining managers through debt financing is ineffective due to its immature
financial market (Suto, 2003; Tam & Tan, 2007). Moreover, the role of the
hostile takeovers to discipline opportunistic managers is almost non-existent in
Malaysia because the ‘large shareholder’ group often includes the CEO or the
group has an affiliation with top management (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). As the
abovementioned mechanisms fail to reduce agency conflict in Malaysian firms,
this thesis is interested in identifying if it is possible to employ accounting
conservatism to this effect.

Evidence on ownership concentration is inconclusive but weak shareholder
protection, ineffective monitoring via debt financing and the absence of hostile
takeovers allow the controlling shareholders to make decisions that provide
personal benefit. Though evidence exists to show that conservatism is effective in
2

reducing agency conflict, less is known about its applicability in Malaysia. The
application of conservative accounting is within the discretion of the controlling
shareholders and can be explained from two competing arguments. The first
argument relates to the entrenchment effect, whereby controlling owners use their
power to extract firm wealth for personal benefit.

Hence, the controlling

shareholders may choose not to employ more conservatism so that they can
conceal their expropriation activities.

The second argument relates to the

substitution effect, where the controlling shareholders, having closely monitored
the management of the firm, do not require conservatism to monitor management.
Under both effects, controlling shareholders favour less conservatism.

Consistent with other countries, Malaysia encourages listed firms to follow the
best practices of corporate governance. Two important governance mechanisms
discussed in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance are board of directors
and audit committee, consistent with their significant role in overseeing the
financial reporting process (Yatim, Kent, & Clarkson, 2006). This thesis expects
the board of directors and audit committee to demand more conservatism because
it assists them in the governance role. However, previous studies claimed that the
controlling shareholders are the cause for the ineffective corporate governance
system in Asian countries. It was argued that the controlling shareholders may
change the conduct of the board of directors and audit committee. For instance,
the dominant power of controlling shareholders in Malaysia would determine the
setting of the firms’ internal governance such as to appoint outside directors who
are in favour of the controlling shareholders. To investigate the adverse effect of
ownership concentration on the firms’ governance structure, this thesis examines
whether the controlling shareholders impede the effectiveness of the firms’
internal governance mechanisms in employing more conservatism. This is done
by examining the moderating effect of ownership concentration on the
relationship between firms’ governance and conservatism.

In addition to the corporate governance effects on conservatism, this thesis also
examines ethnicity of the directors, following Gray’s (1988) proposition that the
concept of individualism and uncertainty avoidance determine conservatism.
Previous studies have examined these concepts in relation to Malay and Chinese
3

groups in Malaysia; and hence the outcomes of the studies are used as a reference
for this thesis.

The next section presents the objectives, the motivations and significance of this
thesis. The structure of this thesis is presented in the final section.

1.2.

Objectives of this thesis

It is the aim of this thesis to identify the relationship between corporate
governance and conservative accounting. Additionally, ethnicity of the members
of the board and audit committee is examined following Tsakumis (2007) who
claimed that culture impacts on the judgement that applies to the choice of
accounting rules. Further, this thesis is interested in identifying if concentrated
owners limit the effectiveness of firms’ governance.

In order to fulfil the above objectives, this thesis addresses the following research
question,

“What are the factors that influence accounting conservatism in Malaysian firms?

In addressing the primary question, this thesis examines the following factors in
detail:

1.

Does ownership concentration influence conservative accounting?

2.

Do the board of directors and audit committee influence conservative
accounting?

3.

Does ethnicity influence conservative accounting?

4.

Does ownership concentration influence the effect of firms’ governance on
conservative accounting?

4

1.3.

Motivation for this thesis

This thesis is pursued for several reasons that highlight the need to examine
conservatism practices in Malaysian firms. The motivation factors are discussed
as follows:

1.

Accounting Conservatism and Agency Conflict

This thesis is motivated by the results from previous studies that accounting
conservatism can control moral hazard problems resulting from agency conflict.
Since the agency problem in Malaysia is high (Kallunki, Sahlstrom, & Zerni,
2007), and Malaysian firms practise high earnings management (Rahman & Ali,
2006) and high insider trading (Ameer & Othman, 2008), it is important to
examine the level of conservatism practices in Malaysian listed firms. Previous
studies documented that various mechanisms implemented to deter the
opportunistic behaviour of the controlling shareholders are ineffective. La Porta,
Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) reported that Malaysia is ranked
relatively highly on anti-director rights, which is a measure of the strength of the
legal system in favour of minority shareholders against managers or dominant
shareholders in the decision making processes. However, the existence of strong
legal protection of shareholders does not resolve the agency problem as
Krishnamurti et al. (2005) stated that the enforcement of the system is poor.

According to Satkunasingam and Shanmugam (2006), many mechanisms
implemented in Malaysia to monitor the controlling shareholders are not working
soundly. Minority shareholders cannot rely on the board of directors because the
majority of Malaysian firms’ board are dominated by the large shareholders. The
large institutional shareholders are unable to protect the minority shareholders’
interests because they are often subject to political pressure. For instance, the
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) was established as a channel for
the minority shareholders to report their concern. Its effectiveness is however,
questionable because the founding members are institutional shareholders in
government link agencies (GLC) which are subject to political interference.

5

Satkunasingam and Shanmugam (2006) further noted that the board of directors
of the MSWG who are from these founding members, may not take action against
the company that appointed them to the MSWG.

The lack of an effective agency tool motivates this thesis to investigate whether
conservatism is useful to reduce the agency conflict in Malaysian firms. This is
done by examining factors that determine conservative accounting in Malaysian
financial statements.

2.

Determinant Factors

It is important to understand factors that influence conservatism so that firms can
assess the significance of those factors on the firm’s financial reports.

The

following empirical evidence encouraged this thesis to investigate the determinant
factors of conservative accounting in Malaysian firms.

Ball, Robin and Wu

(2003) found that Malaysian managers and auditors have low incentives for
transparent reporting especially for losses. Among four common law countries
that they examined from 1984 to 1996; Malaysia was ranked third in terms of
transparency. They argued that the result is inconsistent with the common law
system where accounting standards promote transparency through its shareholderbased model that resolves asymmetric information by way of public disclosure.
Similar results were reported by Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2003) who
examined uninformative or opaque earnings among 34 countries including
Malaysia. One of the proxies used in their study is the opposite measure of
conservatism, namely earnings aggressiveness. The study showed that Malaysian
firms are ranked amongst countries that have aggressive earnings and Malaysia
ranked in 9th place, as having severe earnings opacity. Whilst the above studies
implied that Malaysian financial reports are less conservative, a recent study
carried out by Vichitsarawong, Eng and Meek (2010) showed that conservatism in
Malaysian financial reports increased after the post Asian financial crisis (19992004) as compared to the pre-crisis period (1995-1996). They suggested that
corporate governance reform after the financial crisis may have had a positive
influence on the conservatism. This thesis complements the above studies by
investigating factors that influence conservatism in Malaysian firms.
6

3.

Ownership Concentration

Previous studies showed that ownership structure in Malaysian firms is highly
concentrated (Claessens et al., 2000; M. H. Lim, 1981; Tam & Tan, 2007; Zhuang
et al., 2001). Although closely held firms suffer less agency conflict between the
managers and shareholders; they deal with greater conflict between the majority
and minority shareholders. The use of ownership structure to reduce agency
conflict suggested by agency theory ultimately does not solve the agency conflict.
Positive accounting theory suggests conservative accounting to control the
opportunistic behaviour of the managers including the controlling shareholders.
However, there is concern that controlling shareholders in Malaysian firms may
apply less conservatism as Tam and Tan (2007) noted that major shareholders in
Malaysian firms are entrenched. It is unlikely that controlling shareholders, who
have decision making power in the firms, employ a mechanism that can limit or
disclose their opportunistic behaviour. Dargenidou, McLeay and Raonic (2007)
argued that when agency conflict is controlled through close monitoring by large
shareholders, these shareholders put less reliance on the financial reports, and thus
adopt less conservative accounting.

If the predicted effect is proven, then it implies that majority shareholders can
expropriate firms’ wealth and delay reporting or even conceal their activities from
the financial reports. This condition could adversely affect the interests of the
minority shareholders. The results from this thesis provide empirical evidence on
the effect of ownership concentration on conservatism, so far not investigated by
other studies on Malaysian firms.

Additionally, previous studies argued that corporate governance in Asian
countries generally, is not effective due to the influence of controlling
shareholders.

Very few studies have directly tested the adverse effect of

controlling shareholders on the firms’ governance, such as reported by Cho and
Kim (2007). To our best knowledge, no study for Malaysian samples has directly
tested the moderating effect of ownership concentration on the effectiveness of the
firms’ governance. This thesis, therefore, will fill this gap and contributes to the
literature.
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4.

Internal Governance Mechanisms

Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) highlighted that the reliability of the financial
reporting process depends on corporate governance and management control
philosophy. Specifically, an absence of appropriate supervision from the board of
directors and audit committee will encourage management to employ earnings
manipulation techniques. This thesis examines board of directors because they
are responsible for reviewing the adequacy and integrity of the financial reporting
system and are accountable to the stakeholders for firm performance. The audit
committee is considered as one of the pillars of accountability because it supports
the boards’ role to oversee the financial reporting process.

Conservatism is an important tool in agency conflict and if it is applied
effectively, can increase firm value, and hence protect the interests of the minority
shareholders (Watts, 2003).

Board of directors and audit committee

characteristics that lead to higher conservatism indicate that good governance
practices lead to better monitoring and produce transparent financial reporting.
Most studies that assess the effectiveness of the board of directors or audit
committee on financial reporting relate to earnings management, firm
performance, financial distress status and disclosure on corporate social
responsibility. None so far has assessed the internal governance structure of
Malaysian firms with conservative accounting. A survey study carried out by
Ismail and Abdullah (1999), examined the perception of financial analysts on
accounting conservatism. The study reported that 73% of the financial analysts
agreed that conservatism improves earnings quality and perceived that the audit
committee influences conservatism. However, the study did not provide empirical
evidence on the association between audit committees and conservatism.

5.

Existing Evidence

Empirical evidence on the link between corporate governance and conservative
accounting mostly is available in developed countries. For instance, UK studies
was performed by Beekes, Pope and Young (2004) who focused on the board
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composition. Several studies examined the effect of corporate governance on
conservatism of US firm: A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) examined the
characteristics of the board of directors, G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008)
focused on the financial expertise in the audit committees but include other
attributes of the board of directors and audit committee as well, LaFond and
Roychowdhury (2008) focused on the managerial ownership and Lara, Osma and
Neophytou (2009) employed an aggregate measure of the board characteristics.
Spanish study was carried out by Lara, Osma and Penalva (2007) who examined
the effect of aggregate measure of board characteristics on conservatism. Shuto
and Takada (2010) examined managerial ownership and conservatism of Japanese
firms whilst Kung, Cheng and James (2010) examined concentrated ownership
and conservatism of Chinese firms.

This thesis is motivated to identify whether the results of UK and US studies hold
in Malaysia since they have dispersed ownership as opposed to the highly
concentrated ownership in Malaysian firms. Particularly, a majority of the board
of Malaysian listed firms are dominated by the inside substantial shareholders
who may influence the behaviour of the rest of the board members.

6.

Ethnicity

Tsakumis, Campbell and Doupnik (2009) stated that national culture directly
influences conservatism as this accounting practice involves judgement. Malaysia
is a multiracial country, where its economy has clearly distinct capital segments
divided along ethnic lines (Jesudason, 1989). Different aspects of culture (i.e.,
ethnicity and demography) could influence business and accounting disclosure
practices and audit services (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Malaysia’s population of
26.75 million is composed of Malays 54.2%, Chinese 25.3%, Indians 7.5% and
others 13% (Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010). Malays and the indigenous group
in Sabah and Sarawak are collectively known as Bumiputera. Different ethnic
groups in Malaysia, therefore, may have different interpretations of the accounting
rules especially when this involves their own judgement. Hence, the common set
of financial reporting rules across countries is not sufficient to ensure international
comparability of financial statements.
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Rees (2004) emphasised that the study of accounting differences and identifying
causes for the difference is a valid focus for academic study. So far, there is no
evidence in Malaysia on the relationship between ethnicity and conservatism.
This finding will have significant implications for the global harmonisation of
accounting (Tsakumis, 2007).

1.4.

Significance of this thesis

1.4.1. Contribution to Theory
Agency theory suggests that conflict between managers and shareholders could be
reduced through managerial ownership and good structure of governance
mechanism.

Many corporate governance studies, which centred on agency

theory, do not find conclusive evidence to support the theory.

Hence,

complementary theories were developed in the literature to explain evidence not
consistent with the agency theory, namely stewardship theory, resource
dependence theory and managerial hegemony theory.

Findings from this thesis will strengthen our understanding of the relevance of the
abovementioned theories in explaining the behaviour of the governance practices
and financial reporting in the Malaysian business environment. Additionally, this
thesis offers evidence consistent with positive accounting theory which suggests
that conservative accounting as a useful tool to reduce agency conflict. Many
studies only focused on assessing the effectiveness of corporate governance
structure in reducing agency conflict, by examining firm performance, earnings
management and disclosure.

In addition, to evaluate the effectiveness of

governance structure in Malaysian firms, the main outcome from this thesis will
show whether the existing governance structure is effective in promoting another
agency tool that is, accounting conservatism.

Evidence from US and UK are supportive of the positive accounting theory as
firms with good governance structure employ more conservative accounting. The
outcome of this thesis will reduce the gap on corporate governance literature and
10

provide evidence whether the same tool can be employed in emerging economies
like Malaysia.

1.4.2. Contribution to Policy Makers and Regulatory Agencies
The Malaysian code on corporate governance largely follows the UK code which
emphasises sound governance principles for the prosperity and accountability in
the business. In 2007, the code had been revised to strengthen the roles and
responsibilities of the board of directors and audit committee. Among others, it
highlights the composition of the board and the importance for the independent
non-executive directors to have an independent oversight function. Despite the
effort to promote best governance practices in Malaysian firms, many scholars
argued whether the same standard of governance in developed countries can
function effectively in a country which has a different legal system, business
culture and corporate structure. Particularly, Malaysian business ownerships are
dominated by large shareholders who always have influence on the management
of the firms. Due to poor enforcement of legal protection on shareholders and
ineffective market discipline in Malaysia, the controlling shareholders are free to
act in their own best interest rather than for the company as a whole.

Results from this thesis become an input for the relevant authorities to plan and
design policies that are most suitable for Malaysian business culture.

Bank

Negara Malaysia, Securities Commission, Bursa Malaysia and the Malaysian
Institute of Corporate Governance, or other regulatory bodies, will benefit from
the findings of this thesis, as the findings promote understanding the effect of
concentrated ownership on the quality of the financial statements. This will help
the authorities to evaluate the current listing requirements and assess the existing
ownership structure in Malaysian firms. Additionally, this thesis will provide an
understanding and awareness to the relevant parties of whether the current
governance practices produce the expected outcome. Understanding the effect of
internal governance structures on conservatism also allows the authorities to
assess the effectiveness of the firms’ governance structure. Findings from this
thesis will be an eye-opener for the authorities to understand the status of agency
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conflict in Malaysia, and hence initiate and formulate an effective, yet powerful,
tool to overcome agency conflict created by the controlling shareholders. The
authorities will be able to emphasise suitable methods to overcome any loophole
within the system.

1.4.3. Contributions to Researchers
Many previous studies examined the link between corporate governance and
financial reports on a short term basis. The benefit of panel data methodology
explained and employed in this thesis will motivate researchers to examine a more
extensive period so that the results can be generalised and provide meaningful
interpretations. Additionally, ownership concentration is a unique factor in Asian
countries like Malaysia, but studies which have investigated Malaysian firms did
not incorporate ownership concentration into their studies. The outcome from this
thesis may highlight the influence of the concentrated owners on the financial
reports and the corporate governance mechanisms employed by the firm.

The outcome of this thesis will benefit researchers because it provides empirical
evidence relating to agency conflicts in developing countries such as Malaysia.
The unique setting of Malaysia provides additional knowledge on the effect of
concentrated ownership and ethnicity on conservative accounting. This thesis
contributes to the literature on corporate governance studies and may encourage
more studies on corporate governance and conservative accounting.

1.4.4. Contribution to Users of the financial statements
Financial information is used to assess the firm’s financial position in order to
forecast the firm’s future prospects. The users of financial statements include
financial analysts, investors, creditors, managers and executives who will use the
outcome from their analysis in decision making.

Understanding factors that

influence the financial statements will moderate dependence on financial
statement figures and build confidence in decision making.
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Financial analysts: Financial analysts who help businesses to make investment
decisions, would analyse the financial reports and follow up with interviews with
the firm’s representatives to gain better insight into the firm’s prospect and
managerial effectiveness. Therefore, the results of this thesis are significantly
important to them as the results will highlight factors that contribute to the
conservatism practices of the firm and help them to assess the financial report
effectively.

Investors: Empirical evidence showed that Malaysian firms practice earnings
management (Rahman & Ali, 2006) and perform insider trading (Ameer &
Othman, 2008).

Haat, Rahman and Sakthi (2008) claimed that there is an

expectation gap between the information disclosed in the financial reports and the
way the information is used by investors for decision making. This reflects the
loss of confidence in the truthfulness of information provided by the firm when
the shareholders use other reliable sources of information instead of the annual
report. Therefore, it is important to explore the influence of corporate governance
on accounting conservatism; since conservatism has been associated with reliable
financial information as it controls managers’ expropriation activities.

Findings on the effect of ethnicity on conservative accounting provide insight as
to whether financial reports in Malaysian firms are comparable to those in other
countries. The result will guide investors to decide whether financial statements
in different countries are comparable and help them to decide whether that
country is worth the investment.

Creditors: Creditors will also benefit from this thesis because the results may
provide a basis for assessing their client. Since previous studies showed that
creditors demand higher conservatism, they may become more alert to firms
which may possess characteristics contributing to lower conservatism.

Managers and Auditors: The results of this thesis are useful to management who
are concerned with the financial reporting quality and corporate governance
practices in their firms. The concentrated owners and management should learn
from this thesis that their impact on conservative accounting is recognised by
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other users; hence this should discourage them from expropriating firms’ wealth
for their own use.
Knowing the effect of concentrated owners and internal governance mechanisms
on conservatism would be an advantage to the auditors. The auditors will be able
to plan the audit task and to focus on accounting figures that are within the
discretion of the management.

1.5.

Study Design

This thesis uses two measures of conservatism: one is accrual-based and the other
is asymmetric timeliness, and examines if ownership concentration, board of
directors, audit committee and ethnicity impact conservatism practices in
Malaysian firms. Additionally, this thesis investigates if ownership concentration
moderates the effect of firms’ governance on conservatism. The sample for this
thesis is Malaysian listed firms observed over seven years from 2001 to 2007.
Accordingly, this thesis employs a panel data regression model that is suitable to
analyse longitudinal data. Data used in this thesis were obtained from Datastream
and online annual reports. The outcome from the analysis provides evidence on
the relationships between the explanatory variables and conservatism.

1.6.

Definitions of Term

Throughout this thesis, the term conservatism is used interchangeably with
accounting conservatism, conservative accounting and conservative financial
reports. Further, since this thesis uses accrual based conservatism and asymmetric
timeliness as measures of conservatism, they are used in place of conservatism to
correspond with the results obtained in this thesis.

1.7.

Structure of this thesis

The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews previous
evidence on conservatism, ownership structure, board of directors, audit
committee, ethnicity and moderating relationship.
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Chapter 3 presents the

conceptual framework of this thesis and hypotheses development. Chapter 4
presents the methodology, which explains the sample used in this thesis and
measurements of the variables. Chapter 5 presents the descriptive analysis and
main findings.

Finally, chapter 6 presents the discussion on the results, the

conclusions, the implications and limitations of the study followed by suggestions
for future research.

1.8.

Summary

This chapter provides an overview of the roles of accounting conservatism in the
agency relationship and briefly explains the relation of conservatism with the
corporate governance mechanisms examined in this thesis, namely concentrated
ownership, board of directors and audit committee as well as ethnicity of
directors.

Further, this chapter presents the objectives, motivations and

significance of this thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.

Introduction

Agency theory argues that an increase in share ownership may reduce agency
conflict.

Initiated from agency theory, many studies have investigated the

influence of corporate ownership on firms’ economic activities and financial
reporting. Additionally, board of directors and audit committee are important
governance mechanisms to control managers’ opportunistic behaviour. Whilst it
is expected that these mechanisms reduce agency conflict, it is not as effective as
those in developed countries.

This chapter reviews extensive research works on ownership structure, internal
governance and financial reporting. This chapter begins with the overview of
corporate governance in Malaysia. Next, it discusses theories underlying the
studies followed by the previous empirical evidence on accounting conservatism.
The reviews were further extended to the ownership concentration, characteristics
of the board of directors and audit committee and ethnicity of directors in relation
to their effect on firm performance and financial reporting.

The review on

moderating relationship was presented in the end of the chapter.

2.2.

Corporate Governance in Malaysia

The Asian financial crisis in 1997 imposed pressure on the Malaysian government
to strengthen its corporate governance system.

It was argued that highly

concentrated ownership and weak boards of directors were the cause of the crisis.
The presence of concentrated ownership in Malaysia however, is not a surprise as
it had long been acknowledged by M. H. Lim (1981).

In 1998, Finance

Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) and Malaysian Institute of
Corporate Governance were formed, to review and reform corporate governance
system in Malaysia.

Subsequently, FCCG produced the Malaysian Code on
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Corporate Governance in March 2000. The code covers four areas relating to
board of directors, director’s remuneration, shareholders and accountability, but is
principally directed at increasing the efficiency and accountability of the board of
directors. Even though compliance with the code initially was voluntary, in 2001
it was made mandatory by the Bursa Malaysia for listed firms to disclose the
extent of their compliance (or justification for non-compliance) with the code.
Figure 2.1 displays the Malaysian Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework.

Figure 2.1: Malaysian Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework
Source:
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/regulation/corporate_governance/framework.
html

The Malaysian High Level Finance Committee defines corporate governance as,
“the process and structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of
the company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability
with the ultimate objective of realising long term shareholders value, whilst taking
into account the interests of other stakeholders”.

Corporate governance is

important from both economic and finance perspectives. The economic aspect
views that efficient corporate governance structure is able to allocate scarce funds
to investment projects with the highest returns. The finance aspect views its
importance in protecting invested funds and in generating returns. Ultimately,
effective corporate governance should result in reliable financial reports from
which investment decisions can be made that yield adequate returns (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997).
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The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance is largely modelled on the UK
code which recognised the importance of sound governance principles for
business prosperity and accountability. Following the Anglo-American approach,
the model is commonly referred to as the “shareholder model” or “market model”.
This model displays the unitary system where the board of directors is the highest
governing body in the company. Under this system, the individual (outside)
shareholders do not generally influence the direction of the firm (Keasey &
Wright, 1993) but require independent outside directors to monitor the
management including the CEOs. To be considered independent, the directors
must pass the general test of independent as stated in Para 1.01 of Bursa Malaysia
Listing requirements: “independent of management and free from any business or
other relationships which could interfere with the exercise of independent
judgment or the ability to act in the best interests of the company as well as not
related to relatives, major shareholders or executive directors of the company and
not the professional advisers, nominees of directors, officers within the last two
years or certain parties contracting with the company”.

The Malaysian firms’ board were largely independent from the management as
indicated by the ratio of the independent directors on the board and the separation
of role between the CEO and the board chairman (S. N. Abdullah, 2004, 2006a).
In fact, board independence was a practice of some companies even before the
code on best practices was introduced. S. N. Abdullah (2004) reported that about
20% of Malaysian companies during 1994-1996 sample period combined the roles
of chairman and CEO.

Saleh et al. (2005) reported for year 2001, 45% of

Malaysian listed companies combined the roles which was lower than the 80%
reported for US companies. Though the studies suggest that the Malaysian board
is independent from management, the effectiveness of the independent directors in
Asian countries to ensure sound corporate governance, is still in doubt, because
controlling shareholders appoint the entire board of directors (Allen, 2000).
Hence, the requirement in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance that
firms should appoint at least one third of independent non-executive directors on
the board, which is aimed to balance the board composition and to avoid any
dominant group of members, does not warrant board independence. It was argued
that over a longer period, the independent judgment of the non-executive directors
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may be diminished because they are bonded to the insiders, making them more
sympathetic, or having interests closely aligned with the insiders. Tan Sri Zarinah
Anwar, who was then the Chairman of Securities Commission Malaysia, stated
that the appointment of the independent directors is “substance over form” as
shown by the persistent failure to detect wrongdoing in firms (Pascoe &
Rachagan, 2005).

Empirical studies showed that independent directors had no impact on the firms’
outcome. S. N. Abdullah (2004) examined data in 1994-1996 and found that
independent directors on the board had no influence on firm performance. S. N.
Abdullah (2006b) examined data in 1998-2000 and reported that non executive
directors were only effective during financial crisis because in that period,
investors expected them to produce timely financial reports. Saleh et al. (2005)
who observed 2001 data, found that a greater proportion of independent directors
on the board could not limit earnings management. Rahman and Ali (2006)
focused on the period 2002-2003, after the introduction of the Malaysia Code on
Corporate Governance, and found that only board size had a significant influence
on earnings management, with no influence attributable to board and audit
committee independence, CEO duality, tenure, members’ financial expertise and
number of audit committee meetings.

Due to the strategic roles of the board of directors, the best practice of corporate
governance allows some specific tasks to be delegated to its committees. One of
them is the audit committee to assist the board in monitoring the firm’s financial
position. The formation of the audit committee has been made mandatory for all
listed companies since 1993, but a one year grace period (1994) was allowed for
listed companies to comply. A survey carried out by Sori, Mohmad and Hamid
(2001) found that in 1994, only 56% and 24% of the sample on the main board
and second board companies respectively, complied with the requirement.
Further, the compliance by all sample firms was only achieved in 1998. Bursa
Malaysia emphasises the quality of the audit committee members: Para
15.09(1)(b) of the listing requirements require that a majority of independent
directors must sit on the audit committee and Para 15.09(1)(c) requires that at
least one member is financially literate. Based on 2002 data, Haron, Jantan and
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Pheng (2005) showed that some companies violated this requirements where 9%
of companies’ audit committees did not have members with financial expertise
and 13% of the companies did not have a majority of independent directors in
their audit committee. The results suggest that lack or delay in complying with
the regulation is a clear indication of weak enforcement.

Malaysian firms are obliged to follow the Bursa Malaysia listing requirements,
but evidence suggests that not all elements emphasising on the audit committee
have significant impact on the firms’ outcome. Al-Murisi and Abdullah (1997)
found that length of formation and independent directors on the committee did not
improve the committee effectiveness. Instead, the presence of accountants on the
committee was found to be of the utmost importance. Supporting the evidence,
Rahmat, Iskandar and Saleh (2009) found that financial expertise on the audit
committee was inversely related to the firm’s financial distress status. Audit
committee size and members’ independence; however, were not significantly
different from the non financial distressed firms. Hence, the results support the
guideline in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and Bursa Malaysia
listing requirements that firms must appoint financial expertise on its audit
committee; but more needs to be done to strengthen the independent element of
the board and its committee.

Since the creation of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, corporate
governance standards in Malaysia are perceived have been improved following
the outcome from the Malaysian Corporate Governance Survey in 2002 (Shim,
2006). The results of the survey among others showed that most of the Malaysian
private limited companies (PLCs) had segregated the CEO and chairman roles;
and the PLCs recognised that transparency and disclosure in the capital market
enhance the confidence of investors. Vichitsarawong et al. (2010) noted that
corporate governance reforms in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand
might have contributed to higher conservatism in the countries, after the 1997
Asian financial crisis relative to the pre-crisis period. However, Tuan Abdul Alim
Abdullah, the former CEO of Companies Commission of Malaysia stated that
compliance on the best guidelines was still at a low level as firms still experience
corporate abuses, conflicts of interest, failure in maintaining proper accounting
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records and reporting false information (Pascoe & Rachagan, 2005).

The

perception that corporate governance in Malaysia is ineffective in reducing
agency problems led to the suggestion that the system is merely a ceremonial
rubber stamp (Mallette & Fowler, 1992), form over substance, (Pascoe &
Rachagan, 2005), window dressing (Shim, 2006) and box ticking (Haat et al.,
2008).

2.3.

Ownership Concentration in Malaysia

Thillainathan (1999) reported that a joint survey carried out by FCCG, the KLSE
(now known as Bursa Malaysia) and PriceWaterhouseCoopers in 1998, revealed
that substantial shareholders became members of the board of most Malaysian
listed companies; more than a quarter of them were also involved in the
management of the companies. This interference of the substantial shareholders
will jeopardise the interest of the minority shareholders. Highly concentrated
ownership was a contributing factor in the financial crisis in 1997 and remains a
problem today. In the post-financial crisis, the ownership concentration become
more entrenched through ownership structure (Tam & Tan, 2007).

Highly

concentrated ownership in East Asian countries can be explained from two
different views. The political view, on the one hand suggests that ownership
concentration arises as a natural response to high managerial agency costs (Roe,
2003). On the other hand, the legal view suggests that shareholders concentrate
their shareholding to overcome poor legal investor protection (La Porta et al.,
1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). La Porta et al. (1998) suggested two possible
reasons for highly concentrated ownership in countries with weak investor
protection. Firstly, large capital investments allow the shareholders to closely
monitor the management.

Secondly, low protection discourages the small

shareholders from paying shares at a high price, hence low demand from them
indirectly stimulates ownership concentration.

Ultimately, concentrated

ownership substitutes legal protection. Another contributing factor for highly
concentrated ownership is corrupted or ineffective outside governance
mechanisms such as product markets, labour markets and takeover markets
(Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Malaysia specifically, was
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ranked relatively high in legal protection for shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998)
but the enforcement of the law is weak (Krishnamurti et al., 2005). Further,
Young et al. (2008) stated that the board of directors itself needed institutional
support, so that they could function effectively, but it appears that the institution
itself is not effective. Similar point was raised by Barton, Coombes and Wong
(2004) that good governance practices could not be achieved when there is weak
enforcement of legal regulations, insufficient well-trained accountants and
disruption of cultural factor in the board room.

Thillainathan (1999) explained four types of control and cash-flow rights groups
in Malaysian companies. The first group is the management-control that refers to
dispersed ownerships where managers have control rights but have little or no
cash flow rights. Very few Malaysian firms fall in this group. The other three
groups are shareholder-control that are categorised as follows: (a) direct majority
stake with controlling rights, (b) direct minority stake with controlling rights and
(c) indirect stake through pyramid and cross-shareholding. The pyramid structure
enables the shareholders to obtain outside capital into the founding group while at
the same time retaining the capital within the group. These poor structures lead to
less transparency and prevent good governance systems.

Many Malaysian

companies are in group (a) and (b) whilst many public companies are in group (c).
In group (c), the control rights of the shareholders far exceed their voting rights
because of wide control including controlling rights in subsidiaries or associated
companies of the listed companies.

As noted in Singam (2003), majority

shareholders who gained control through cross-shareholding have less concern in
the business; but have great interest in nominating the board (Rachagan, 2010).
Thillainathan (1999) also noted that the firms’ resources are commonly passed
among the majority shareholders without due regard to accepted principles of
bookkeeping and accounting.

Since large shareholders govern the firms (Thillainathan, 1999), they do not rely
on legal aspects to protect their investment. Legal protection is important to the
minority shareholders but if concentrated owners substitute the legal protection,
expropriation by the large shareholders could adversely affect the interest of the
minority shareholders. Singam (2003) acknowledged that expropriation activities
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of the controlling shareholders include paying a special dividend to themselves,
entering into unfavourable business transactions with other companies that they
have control of, or engaging in excessively risky projects, that benefit them but
put other stakeholders at the risk of failure. The controlling shareholders also
abuse the power they have in firms, which commonly results in less transparency,
opaque financial transactions and misuse of funds raised (Solomon, 2007). The
behaviour of the controlling shareholders could be driven by incentive that are
different from the minority shareholders; the large shareholders invest not because
they want to maximise their wealth but more to maximise the private benefits
associated with control and empire building (Thillainathan, 1999).

Many studies have argued that corporate governance in Asian firms does not
function effectively mainly due to the weak legal system or poor enforcement,
high concentrated ownership and family-controlled types of companies (Allen,
2000; Globerman, Peng, & Shapiro, 2011). In addition, the relevant authority did
not enforce the regulation, as one example provided in Bidin (2009) shows that no
action was taken even though firms failed to file annual accounts or to hold an
AGM. Yet, the only measure taken by the Companies Commission of Malaysia
was suggesting that the directors attend a training program, with no indication of
its benefit being relevant to the problem. Further, the corporate governance model
in UK was designed to reduce the conflict between managers and shareholders,
hence the same model may not be able to reduce conflict between controlling and
minority shareholders (V. Z. Chen, Li, & Shapiro, 2011)

2.4.

Theoretical Background

Corporate governance studies were motivated from the agency perspective
whereby firms employed governance mechanisms to control agency conflict in
firms. Ownership structure, board of directors and audit committee are internal
governance mechanisms developed to meet this purpose. Additionally, empirical
studies showed that accounting conservatism can also govern the firm as it
reduces managers’ opportunistic behaviour and increases firm value (Watts,
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2003), hence complementing the monitoring role of the other governance
mechanisms.

2.4.1. Agency Theory
Agency theory deals with the contractual relationship between the agent
(manager) and the principal (shareholders) under which shareholders delegate
responsibilities to the manager to run their business. This theory argues that when
both parties are expected to maximise their utility, there is good reason to believe
that the agent may engage in opportunistic behaviour at the expense of the
principal’s interest. Jensen and Meckling (1976) modelled this condition as an
agency relationship where the inability of the principal to directly observe the
agent’s action could lead to moral hazard, thus increasing agency cost. To reduce
the conflict, it was suggested that managers own shares of the firm so that their
interests are in line with shareholder’s wealth maximisation.

The traditional

manager-shareholder conflict, however, is not relevant to firms with highly
concentrated ownership. According to Hannsmann cited in Rachagan (2006, p.
268), other than manager-shareholder conflict and company-other contracting
party conflict, the conflict between majority shareholders and minority
shareholders is more relevant in the Malaysian economy due to its highly
concentrated ownership structure.

This conflict indicates that the controlling

shareholders (including managers) expropriate the interest of the minority
shareholders for their own private advantage (Fan & Wong, 2002).

Large shareholders can easily monitor managers because they have more access to
information and thus have more knowledge of decision making (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1986).

However, since the large shareholders’ investment is less

diversified, and they thus have limited liquidity, they are exposed to financial loss
if the firm experience difficulties. This constraint may encourage them to extract
a private benefit at the expense of the minority shareholders. As large owners
have effective control of the firm and also because they oversee the financial
reporting policies of firm (Fan & Wong, 2002), they can, and will, conceal any
expropriation from the financial reports.
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Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003)

affirmed that the incentive to avoid external monitoring and loss of reputation
encourage the dominant shareholders to conceal their behaviour.

In addition, agency theory points out the role of the board of directors to monitor
both the majority shareholders and management; and to protect minority
shareholders’ interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). It was suggested that the board of
directors could help reduce agency costs because it holds ultimate control over
management even though some of the decision functions are entrusted to top
management. Sound corporate governance should be considered as a vital means
in reducing agency conflict especially when it functionally accommodates the
interest of all shareholders. Complementing the board role in monitoring the
management, resource dependence theory suggests the board be represented by
outside directors to enhance flow of information and reduce uncertainty and
secure firms’ resources. Pfeffer & Salancik (2003) suggested that the board act as
a ‘co-optative’ mechanism that links firms with the external environment in
accessing resources, exchanging information, developing inter firm commitment
and establishing legitimacy.

Managerial hegemony theory views the board of directors as a legal fiction that is
ineffective in reducing agency conflict, if the management dominates the board
(Mace, 1971). As a ‘co-optative’ mechanism, the board is flexible and easy to
implement as management may control the selection of the outside directors
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Management may appoint outside directors who have
less knowledge about the business, hence making them dependent on the
information supplied by the managers. Or the outside directors are motivated
merely by the financial incentive from the board seat and desire the reputation
associated with board membership (Kosnik, 1987). Directors who have weak
attributes are less likely to challenge the management decision.

2.4.2. Positive Accounting Theory
The firm is considered as ‘nexus of contracts’ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), where
it has a contractual relationship with various groups of people such as employees,
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creditors, government and public, simply referred to as the stakeholders. Positive
accounting theory is associated with the contractual view of the firm where
accounting is used as a tool to facilitate the formation and performance of the
contract by mitigating the contractual costs that may arise from the agency
conflict. In contrast to normative theory that seeks to determine the appropriate
structure of managers’ incentive to reduce the agency conflict, positive accounting
theory predicts and explains actual accounting practices and focuses on analysing
the agency costs arising from the contractual arrangement between the owners and
top management of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This theory posits that
managers make accounting choices tailored to their needs to increase their wealth
through compensation incentives, to avoid violation of debt contract or to
minimise political cost. Positive accounting theory, thus suggests that accounting
choices such as conservatism are desirable to limit managers opportunistic
behaviour, without which managers are able to extract firms wealth for their
private benefit.

2.5.

Prior Studies

The existing evidence on the relationship between accounting conservatism with
ownerships structure, board of directors and audit committee is scarce, despite
many empirical studies documenting the merits of conservatism in the agency
relationship. Further, those studies that examined conservatism and corporate
governance were mostly conducted in developed countries. To understand and to
assess the role of these governance mechanisms on conservatism, the
effectiveness of those mechanisms are reviewed based on other aspects of
financial reporting that commonly exist in the literature.

This review starts with the merits and downsides of conservatism. Next, findings
from previous studies are classified according to the factors examined in this
thesis namely; ownership concentration, board of directors’ characteristics, audit
committee characteristics, ethnicity and moderating relationship.
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2.5.1. Accounting Conservatism
Accounting conservatism practices have been the subject of a long–standing
debate as to how they affect the quality of the financial statements. Discussion on
conservatism has appeared in the literature since the 1960s (e.g. Devine, 1963;
Sterling, 1967) and continues to the present. Financial Accounting Standard
Board (FASB) (1980, para. 92) stated that: “......introduces a bias into financial
reporting,

conservatism

tends

to

conflict

with

significant

qualitative

characteristics, such as representational faithfulness, neutrality, and comparability
(including consistency)”. FASB however, affirmed that conservatism should not
arise from deliberate consistent understatement of net assets and profits.
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) (2007, para. 37) stated that
deliberate action to understate assets or incomes; or overstate liabilities or
expenses and creation of hidden reserves would result in non-neutral information
and reduce the quality of reliability.

The auditors, audit committee members and management are struggling to define
the concept of quality (Jonas & Blanchet, 2000) because financial reporting
quality is a vague concept which has led many studies to focus on factors that
constrain the achievement of earnings quality such as earnings management,
financial restatements and fraud (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004).
Consistent with the accounting standards board, Jonas and Blanchet (2000)
affirmed that accounting information that meet the desired qualitative
characteristics should be faithful, verifiable, neutral and consistent.

They

however added that, the quality of the financial reports could be viewed from
different approaches, either from users need or for shareholders’ protection. The
users view quality financial reports as those that provide relevant and reliable
information for decision making.

For shareholder protection, quality of the

financial reports is viewed as those that provide full and fair disclosure and does
not contain misleading information. In conservatism however, there is a trade-off
between relevant and reliable. Conservatism may be less relevant due to the bias
in understatement of the earnings, but it provides reliable information as to the
reported figures, which minimised managers’ opportunistic behaviour and provide
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for timely reporting on potential loss. One important effect of conservatism noted
by Kirk and Siegel (1996, p. 55) is “.... prudent reporting based on healthy
scepticism build confidence in the results and in the long run best serves all of the
divergent interests that are represented by the [FASB’s] constituents”.

The importance of conservatism was highlighted in a survey carried out by
Graham, Cannice and Sayre (2002) that financial analysts treated conservative
financial reports as more important than the underlying reported earnings of the
firms.

Their results suggest that accounting conservatism adds value to the

financial reports; plausibly because it produces clean and reliable accounting
figures.

Q. Chen et al. (2007) found that conservatism reduced managers’

incentive to manage earnings. They argued that managers managed earnings to
fulfil investor expectations to avoid adverse effect on the share prices. Since
conservatism recognises losses in a timely manner and delays the recognition of
gains until they are verified; it reduces the impact of the news on the share price
and in turn limits the incentive for earnings management. The findings of Iyengar
and Zampelli (2010) proved that conservatism produced reliable financial reports
as managers’ incentive was tied to the accounting performance. To a certain
extent, these findings do not support Penman and Zhang (2002) who claimed that
conservatism adversely affect the quality of the earnings.

Specifically, they

reported that conservatism increased unrecorded reserves in high growth firms,
and when the growth of the investment was reduced; the release of the reserves
inflated future income.

Of a similar view, Sen (2005) pointed out that

conservative accounting may lead to unsustainable high future earnings.

In

contrast to steady growth firms, future earnings of growth firms are higher
because the growing investments are able to sustain higher levels of future
earnings. When the steady growth firms wanted to show higher earnings, they
would mimic the quality of the growth firms by making an adverse selection
decision, such as cut back on investments (and thus depreciation on invested
assets) in the short run or choose less conservatism. It was argued that, even
though asymmetric timeliness, which measures conservatism, reduced earnings
persistence (Basu, 1997), it benefits the borrower in terms of lower borrowing
costs (A. S. Ahmed, Billings, Morton, & Stanford-Harris, 2002). Consequently,
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equity holders may prefer timeliness of loss even though it impairs the earnings
persistence (DeFond, 2010).

Much evidence supports conservatism’s advantages to firms particularly as an
agency tool. The governance role of financial information depicted in Figure 2.2
shows that financial information produced as a result of conservative accounting,
disciplines managers on project selection and prevents expropriation activities.
Bushman and Smith (2001) argued that information in the financial reports
provides direct and indirect inputs to corporate control mechanisms, which
promote efficient governance of corporate control. Consistent with this argument,
the findings of Ball, Robin and Sadka (2008) showed that IPO firms employ
greater conservatism as demanded by the market and regulatory authorities for
timely loss recognition upon going public. Additionally, Sun and Liu (2011)
reported that firms employed higher conservatism when they were closely
monitored by financial analysts.

The findings of Lara et al. (2009) showed that the impact of not controlling
opportunistic behaviours earlier is harmful to the firms’ wealth. They reported
that UK bankrupt firms in their study sample showed a decrease in conservatism
and aggressive earnings management prior to firm failure. In contrast, Francis
and Martin (2010) showed that financial reports of firms with more profitable
investments, which were measured by bidder's announcement returns and by
changes in post-acquisition operating performance, were more conservative.
Their evidence implies that conservatism disciplines and encourages managers to
maximise the shareholders’ wealth.

.
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ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

REDUCED COST OF
EXTERNAL FINANCING

Better identification of good vs. bad
projects by managers and investors

Discipline on project selection &
expropriation by managers
(GOVERNANCE ROLE OF

Reduction in information asymmetries
among investors

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
(PROJECT IDENTIFICATION)

INFORMATION)

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
of firms & of other firms

STOCK PRICE INFORMATION

Figure 2.2: Governance Role of Financial Information
(Source: Bushman and Smith (2001))
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(ADVERSE SELECTION)

As a governance tool, conservatism is significantly important in debt contracts and
executive compensation contracts (Watts, 2003). In debt contracts, creditors favour
conservatism because they are concerned with the lower bound measure of a firm’s
net assets before granting loans (Beneish & Press, 1993). In liquidation cases,
conservative accounting is applied to determine the value of the net assets; where
possible losses are taken into account leaving out the unverifiable gains.

The

dividend covenant in debt contracts also demonstrates conservatism so that managers
are obliged to meet the minimum net assets to repay the creditors. A. S. Ahmed et
al. (2002) proved the significant role of conservatism in debt contracts as firms with
conservative financial reports were ranked higher in debt rating and had lower cost
of debt. Further, Zhang (2008) showed that conservatism benefits the lender in
terms of an early signal of possible debt violation and that advantage was shared
with the borrower in terms of lower interest costs. Managers have the advantage of
holding private information and may use the information to profit themselves
(LaFond & Watts, 2008). Additionally, managers enjoy limited liability and limited
tenure that enable them to escape from their poor decisions (LaFond &
Roychowdhury, 2008) and such decisions may be detrimental to the shareholders’
wealth. For instance, managers who require excessive compensations may overstate
earnings and avoid outflow funds such as foregoing positive net present value
projects. Or, they may accept negative net present value projects in order to foster
“empire-building” or manipulate stock price (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007).
Conservatism is important in executive compensation contracts because possible
losses as a result of managers’ decisions are shown immediately in the financial
reports; hence managers are not overpaid (Watts, 2003).

Based on the theoretical argument that shareholders incur agency costs in order to
reduce agency conflict, Kwon (2005) showed that conservative accounting was
useful in controlling the suboptimal managerial decisions relative to earnings
reported neutrally or liberally. Conservatism also lowers asymmetric information
and enhances value relevance of earnings, thus strengthening its role as a governance
mechanism.

H. Lin (2006) showed that conservatism is effective in revealing

managers’ private information on projects undertaken by the firm.

The study

indicates that for a good project, managers are willing to employ conservatism as
they could enjoy compensation in the period the project produces cash flow.
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However, managers who undertake bad project are declining to employ conservatism
because they will lose compensation in any such period. Hence, the decision to
employ more or less conservatism signals the prospects of the project undertaken by
the managers. LaFond and Watts (2008) asserted that accounting conservatism
reduces asymmetric information as it provides hard information on verifiable gains
and discloses possible losses which managers might decline to reveal. With lower
asymmetric information, managers are constrained from hiding unfavourable
information.

Hui, Matsunaga and Morse (2009) investigated the effect of

conservatism on management earnings forecasts; and showed that increase in
conservatism reduced the frequency and timeliness of the earnings forecast. The
result is consistent with the role of conservatism in reducing information asymmetry
and future uncertainty.

With regard to the value relevance of earnings, Kim and Kross (2005) argued that
timely recognition of bad news in earnings might affect the firm’s ability to generate
future cash flow, which indeed makes it more pertinent for cash flow projection. In
order to test the notion, the study grouped the sample firms into a ‘conservatism
increasing’ industry and a ‘conservatism not increasing’ industry.

The results

showed that the explanatory power of the earnings to predict future cash flow
increased in the ‘conservatism increasing’ group but not in the other group. The
evidence implies that conservatism improves the predictability of future cash flows.
W. D. Brown et al. (2006) argued that the value relevance of earnings was reduced
due to managers’ opportunistic behaviour in using accounting choice that favours
their personal interest.

Since conservatism constrains managers’ expropriation

activities, it therefore increases the value relevance of earnings particularly in
countries with higher accrual intensity.

2.5.2. Ownership Concentration
The traditional agency conflict suggests that managers involved with daily business
activities, tend to create asymmetric information and expropriate shareholders’ value
(Bhasa, 2004); specifically by seeking higher salary, perquisites, job security and
even direct exploitation of the firm’s cash flows (Eriotis, Vasiliou, & Ventoura32

Neokosmidi, 2007). Managers who hold private information have an incentive to
use it for a private advantage that would result in violation of debt contracts, receive
excessive compensation and overstate the financial figures to transfer shareholders’
wealth to themselves (LaFond & Watts, 2008).

It was suggested that; managers’ interests would be aligned with those of the
shareholders if they become part owners of the firm. Managerial ownership however
is not a solution to the agency conflict in East Asian countries because their
ownership structure is highly concentrated.

In East Asian countries, conflict

between majority shareholders and minority shareholders is more prevalent as
decision made by the controlling owners may jeopardise the interests of the minority
shareholders. The controlling owners, who are in fact the management of the firms,
or control the managers of the firms, can access managers’ private information and
may take advantage of their controlling power to extract firms’ wealth for their own
good. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), the large shareholders have an
incentive to proceed with expropriation activities to protect their investments. The
conflict of interest created by the concentrated owners, particularly the insiders, is
the main issue in emerging economies. Klassen (1997) however argued that inside
concentrated owners have less incentive to be involved with income increasing
behaviour through manipulation of accounting reports or to conceal their activities
from the financial reports, as they communicated the firm value to the capital market
through other channels than the financial reports alone. However, Ball et al. (2003)
stated that resolving asymmetric information through insider communication reduces
timeliness in accounting earnings and reduces the quality of the financial reports and
its disclosure. Gomes (2000) argued that expropriation is costly to the concentrated
shareholders because their wealth may be reduced if the minority shareholders
discount the share price. Whilst that assurance was based on bonding costs i.e.
agents guarantee not to pursue action harmful to the principal (Jensen & Meckling,
1976), Young et al. (2008) argued that such care for reputation and credibility may
be diminished in crisis periods; and the controlling shareholders choose to
expropriate.

Many studies have highlighted the unfavourable effect of concentrated ownership
such that it may distract from capital allocation efficiency (Maher & Andersson
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2002) and firms may employ weak internal controls, and thus increase the risk of
expropriation (Bozec & Bozec, 2007).

Gibson (2003) stated that majority

shareholders expropriated especially when they are also creditor, manager or
customer; thus they can extract rents from the firm through these relationships. With
the decision power in firms, the managers may gain private benefit by diverting firm
resources or spending funds on unprofitable projects (Lemmon & Lins, 2003). In the
Malaysian context, controlling shareholders increased their profit through related
party transactions or earnings management (Rachagan, 2006).

The controlling

shareholders not only expropriated but also concealed their behaviour through selfinterested accounting choices and concealed firm performance from outsiders to
avoid disciplinary action (Korczak & Korczak, 2009).

The entrenchment effect of the concentrated owners is adversely affecting the
accounting information. Concentrated owners produced less informative earnings to
conceal their expropriation activities and to avoid outside monitoring, hence
reducing the credibility of the information for outside shareholders (Fan & Wong,
2002). This finding is consistent with the finding of Haat et al. (2008) who found no
association

between

corporate

governance

and

transparency,

or

between

transparency and corporate performance. They argued that the users did not use
annual reports for investment decisions due to it reporting less relevant information,
or because of the availability of other credible and easily accessible sources of
information. The manipulation of financial information and less reliance on the
reports however implies that concentrated owners may have more freedom to pursue
their personal agenda. Chin, Kleinman, Lee and Lin (2006) examined earnings
forecasts of Taiwanese companies and found that firms with concentrated ownership
structure issued less accurate and more optimistically biased forecasts. They argued
that concentrated owners used their power to manipulate the earnings in order to
protect and promote their own economic position.

Haniffa and Hudaib (2006)

examined Malaysian listed firms and found that concentrated ownership increased
the accounting returns but not the market returns. Their results imposed doubts on
the reliability of the accounting figures, while Dalton and Dalton (2005) argued that
the accounting based measures are subject to managerial manipulation more than the
market measures.
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Ownership structure was evidently inversely related to conservatism, but the
argument that explained the direction of the relationship varied. For US firms that
have dispersed ownership, LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) argued that lower
managerial ownership led to higher agency conflict; and thus the shareholders
demanded for more conservatism. Kung et al. (2010) who examined Chinese listed
companies argued that, firms with concentrated owners employed less conservatism
because

the

owners

resolved

asymmetric

information

through

private

communication. Shuto and Takada (2010) examined Japanese firms and showed that
managerial ownership at low and high levels were inversely related to conservatism,
while at the intermediate level of ownership, they were positively related. Consistent
with LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008), Shuto and Takada (2010) argued that
conservatism was employed to reduce agency conflict. High managerial ownership
indicates lower agency conflict, hence conservatism is needed less. The actual
motive for adopting lower conservatism at high ownership levels may not simply be
due to lower agency conflict. Evidence showed that concentrated ownerships do
more harm than good particularly to the minority shareholders. Fan and Wong
(2002) and Chin et al. (2006) showed that concentrated owners created agency
conflict between controlling owners and outside shareholders. Further, high insider
ownership were more likely withholding bad news in order to delay or avoid loss of
wealth (Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 2009). If managerial ownership does substitute
conservatism as evident in LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) and Shuto and Takada
(2010) or because concentrated owners have closely monitored the managers and
have less concern on the financial reports (Ball et al., 2003; Dargenidou et al., 2007),
it is believed that the wealth of the other shareholders could be adversely affected.

Although managerial ownership helps to align common interests with shareholders,
up to a certain point, the managers may become entrenched as their ownership
increases. Ding, Zhang and Zhang (2007) however reported that at an initial stage,
the entrenchment effect led the owners to manage earnings upward, but reduced
when cash flow rights reached beyond the point of full control. The same effect may
not be apparent in Malaysian firms due to its pyramidal and cross-shareholding
structure of ownership, as explained by Thillainathan (1999). Inside concentrated
ownership adversely affects the corporate governance system, not only because they
are the main reason that firms engage in earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003) but
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also because they get to choose less effective internal governance mechanisms. For
example, where CEO and chairman positions are not separated, where there is lower
proportion of non-executive directors on the board and no appointment of a nonexecutive director as the chairman (Lasfer, 2006).

Horner (2010) argued that

managerial entrenchment increases with an increase of directors’ equity ownerships
in firms; and hence predicted that at low levels of equity ownership, directors choose
to separate CEO and chairman roles but turn over combine roles when their
ownership increases.

S. N. Abdullah (2006b) showed that inside ownership should be neither too low nor
too high, for the good of the firm, as both conditions can lead to financial distress
status. Similar findings were reported by Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007)
on earnings management and Ming and Gee (2008) with regards to firm financial
performance. For Polish listed companies, Korczak and Korczak (2009) reported
that earnings information improved only when the managerial ownership was
between 25% and 50%, indicating that excessive managerial ownership is
detrimental to the firm value. Further evidence indicated that inside controlling
shareholders were associated with low firm performance (Schiehll, 2006), low level
of corporate social responsibility (Ghazali, 2007) and high earnings management
(Sarkar, Sarkar, & Sen, 2008).

Much evidence suggested the harmful effect of inside concentrated owners; but the
outside concentrated owners are potentially an effective monitor. The findings of
Yeo, Tan, Ho and Chen (2002) suggested that outside large shareholders were good
monitors in reducing earnings management as the shareholders improved
informativeness of the earnings. This is supported by Azofra, Castrillo and Delgado
(2003) for Spanish firms as the outside large shareholders reduced earnings
management. However, Schiehll (2006) did not find an association between outside
concentrated ownership and firm performance for Canadian firms, whilst Rahman
and Ali (2006) found no association between ownership concentration and earnings
management for Malaysian firms.

Rahman and Ali (2006) however, did not

distinguish between internal ownership and outside ownership concentration as
examined in Yeo et al. (2002) and Schiehll (2006).
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Overall, the results of previous studies suggested that the inside concentrated owners
have detrimental effect on the firm value whilst the outside concentrated owners are
a good governance mechanism.

2.5.3. Board of Directors Characteristics

Fama and Jensen (1983) and Keasey and Wright (1993) suggested that the board of
directors represent the highest form of internal control to monitor top management
including the CEO.

Four characteristics i.e. board composition, board size,

director’s skill and CEO duality are among important attributes of the board. Jensen
(1993) argued that these factors influenced the board’s role in monitoring managers.
Director’s skill is an important factor because directors with a good understanding of
business operations can effectively review the financial reports (Lanfranconi &
Robertson, 2002).

2.5.3.1.

Board Composition

Board composition refers to the participation of outside directors, also known as
independent directors, on the board. Relative to a separate system of control and
decision, Fama and Jensen (1983) acknowledged that internal managers dominate
the board because they can perform better if they are in the capacity to control and
make decisions. However, they further noted that dominant insiders are less likely to
survive in a competitive business because of a lack of separation between decision
management and decision control. Hence it was suggested that the presence of
independent directors on the board ensures board independence from the
management, as it clearly segregates the management and control tasks. In addition,
independent directors can solve disagreements among the internal managers or
between the internal managers and residual claimants. Thus, boards comprising
independent directors will provide a counter balance so that the insiders do not take
advantage of their position and sacrifice the shareholders’ wealth. Based on the
resource dependent view of Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), the presence of independent
directors on the board will enhance the flow of information, and hence protect the
firm resources and reduce uncertainty.
37

Previous studies investigating the effectiveness of independent directors on the board
have mainly suggested that independent directors have a positive influence in the
firm. Beasley (1996) examined financial statements fraud, and compared board
composition between firms where fraud occurred and those where no fraud occurred.
It was reported that firms with no fraud had a higher proportion of independent
directors. Empirical studies also showed that independent directors are an effective
monitor to the financial reporting process. Evidence on UK firms produced by
Peasnell, Pope and Young (2006) showed that independent directors reduced
earnings management and the effect was more pronounced when the firms’ premanaged earnings were below threshold. Additionally, findings of Koh, Laplante
and Tong (2007) on Australian firms and Benkraiem (2009) on French firms, all
support the significant role of the independent directors in mitigating the earnings
management. A UK study carried out by Beekes et al. (2004) and a US study by A.
S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) both found that high proportions of independent
directors were associated with high levels of conservative accounting. A Spanish
study carried out by Lara et al. (2007) also linked conservatism with the board of
directors but used an aggregate index as a proxy for a strong board. The study
showed that strong boards incorporated bad news into earnings significantly faster.
Weak boards, conversely, captured the good news faster than the stronger board.
The evidence suggests that independent directors employ more conservatism to assist
them in monitoring the management. Ameer, Ramli and Zakaria (2010) reported
that performance of Malaysian listed firms was high when their board of directors
were represented by a majority outside directors relative to those represented by a
majority inside directors.

Although independent directors will enhance the monitoring efficiency of the board,
concentrated owners are less likely to appoint them to the board. The findings were
presented by Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008; 2009) who examined firms
with concentrated ownership from 22 countries. They showed that independent
directors improved firm value especially in a country with weak legal protection for
the shareholders.

However, only some of the concentrated owners chose an

independent board and it was mainly due to the need for outside financing to fund
their investments. In a similar vein, Setia-Atmaja (2009) examined concentrated
ownership of Australian listed firms, and found that firms with concentrated
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ownership had fewer independent directors. They also reported that closely held
firms with less independent directors, underperformed firms with more independent
directors.

Empirical studies have also shown that independent directors in firms with
concentrated ownership are ineffective in improving governance of the firm. P.
Klein, Shapiro and Young (2005) reported that independent directors in firms with
high concentrated ownership had a significant negative effect on firm value of
Canadian firms. S. N. Abdullah (2004) examined Malaysian listed firms for the
period between 1994 and 1996, and reported that independent directors had no
influence on firm performance.

Investigating New Zealand firms, K. Ahmed,

Hossain and Adams (2006) found no association between independent directors and
earnings informativeness. A further study by S. N. Abdullah (2006b) for the study
period 1999 to 2001, also failed to find any association between independent
directors and financial distress status. This evidence is consistent in suggesting that
one contribution to the Asian financial crisis was the weak corporate governance
associated with ineffective independent directors. Rahman and Ali (2006) found no
association between independent directors and earnings management for the period
2002 and 2003. Using data from 2002 to 2005, S. N. Abdullah, Yusof and Nor
(2010) did not find an association between independent directors and financial
restatements.

The evidence suggests that independent directors have no direct

impact on the financial reports but the findings of Salleh, Stewart and Manson
(2006) showed that independent directors promote other governance mechanisms.
They argued that these directors were associated with higher audit fees because they
demanded quality audit service.

Overall, the results from the abovementioned studies imply that independent
directors play an important role in governance but to effectively improve the
governance, these independent directors must be sufficiently independent in practice
to be able to limit the expropriation activities of the controlling shareholders from
the minority shareholders.
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2.5.3.2.

Board Size

Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) argued that firms should not appoint too
many directors to the board and suggested a maximum of seven or eight directors.
According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), directors on a large board are less likely to
criticise the policies of top managers, hence are subject to CEO control. Further,
large board tends to involve less meaningful discussion since too many directors are
involved in the discussion, making it both time consuming and difficult to achieve
cohesiveness. Further, a large board is less effective due to slowness in decision
making, is more risk averse and creates a free rider problem i.e. one member is
depending on other members to monitor management. Jensen (1993) recognised that
overcapacity is caused by changes in physical technology, organisational practices
and management technology.

However, too many people within the same

geographical location cannot work together effectively.

Supporting Lipton and

Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993), Judge and Zeithaml (1992) found that a large
board was less involved in strategic decision making and Forbes and Milliken (1999)
reported that a large board led to a problem of coordination.

Supporting a small board, empirical studies reported that large board size was
associated with low firm performance (Cheng, 2008; Guest, 2009; Mak & Li, 2001),
high earnings management (Rahman & Ali, 2006) and low earnings informativeness
(K. Ahmed et al., 2006). Chang (2009) reported for Taiwanese firms, indicating that
an increase in board size led to an increase in the occurrence of financial distress
status. They showed that the board size of financially distressed firms was 9.24,
which was higher than those of the healthy firms with an average of 7.24. The
findings confirm the suggestion by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) that
if board members exceeded 8, the board is ineffective. Findings of Vafeas (2000)
showed that a small board led to higher returns-earnings suggesting that fewer board
members are better informed on the earnings of the firm. Recent evidence from
Larmou and Vafeas (2010) showed that for a significantly small board, adding more
members increased the share return but when the size reached a certain limit, adding
more directors would reduce performance.
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In opposing arguments, Dalton and Dalton (2005) suggested that a large board offers
a broader pool of knowledge and expertise, but Jensen (1993) argued that the
problem of coordination in large board size can outweigh the benefit. Also, Dalton
and Dalton (2005) argued that fewer members on the board occupied themselves
with decision making, and hence become less effective in monitoring the
management.

The results from Akhtaruddin, Hossain and Yao (2009) partly

supported the Dalton and Dalton’s (2005) argument, by reporting a positive
relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure, though the positive effect
was due to more independent directors on the board. Nevertheless, evidence on
board size is indeed mixed. Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan (2004) examined firms in
Japan and Australia, and reported an inverse relationship between board size and
performance for Japanese firms, but no association for the Australian firms. Pietra,
Grambovas, Raonic and Riccaboni (2008) reported that a large board reduced firm
value only in small and medium firms, but not significantly in large firms. Based on
the complexity of the firm’s business, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) reported that
a large board was beneficial to complex firms because they have greater advisory
needs, a larger degree of diversification and higher financial leverage. In summary,
a large board provides a better exchange of skill and knowledge but there is more
risk that many members will be unable to coordinate well, and will create free rider
problems.

2.5.3.3.

Board Skills

Three relevant types of skill are examined in the literature, namely tenure of
independent directors, financial expertise and multiple directorships, detailed as
follows.

Board Tenure: Firm-specific expertise

Directors, who served on the firms’ board for a longer period, would have greater
understanding about the firms’ businesses and eventually become more competent.
Buchanan (1974) suggested that directors with firm-specific skills are more
committed to the firm, which in turn increases their effort to achieve the firm’s goal.
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Opposing this expertise hypothesis, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) preferred that there is
a time limit for the directors serving on the board otherwise, the seasoned directors
may assume some of the CEO functions. Their suggestion implies that long time
relationships between the independent directors and the management would impair
the independence of the board, and hence defeat the purpose of having independent
directors in the firm. The management friendliness hypothesis proposed by Vafeas
(2003) indicates that seasoned directors are more likely to befriend the management
and become less effective in monitoring the managers.

He found that outside

directors serving for twenty years and more became affiliated with the management
as these senior directors were preferred in the nomination and compensation
committee. The finding suggests that the basis for the director’s appointment was
more on preference than qualification. Further, he claimed that longer tenure relates
to the attrition process as they found that directors’ participation on committees and
additional directorships reduced eventually with longer service.

The empirical evidence on board tenure is mixed. Peasnell, Pope and Young (2005)
examined UK firms and reported that outside directors with longer tenure reduced
earnings management, implying that directors are more competent to curb earnings
manipulation. Rutherford and Buchholtz (2007) showed that longer tenure reduced
asymmetric information within the firms as it led to frequent information exchange
with the other committees in the firms. However, it did not determine the quality of
the information gathered by the board, and did not lead to more proactive
information seeking. The findings of Chang (2009) indicated that board tenure was
not a contributing factor to financial distressed status of the Taiwanese firms, though
majority members of the non-financial distress firms’ board were senior directors
relative to those in the financial distressed firms.

Board financial expertise

To monitor the financial reporting process, the directors must have accounting
knowledge in order to produce quality financial reporting either to control
manipulation or to make information more transparent. Lanfranconi and Robertson
(2002) pointed out that the collapse of Enron and WorldCom was due to the lack of
knowledge of their board members. Specifically, in the Enron case, the board
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members did not understand its complex financial planning structures that used
‘special purpose entities’.

In the WorldCom case, the board members had no

knowledge of basic accounting principles, as they were not aware of expenditure
being capitalised instead of expensed. Hence, in the two cases one could ask how
effective the directors were in carrying out their duties.

Empirical studies showed that financial expertise is an important determinant of
quality financial statements. The findings of Agrawal and Chadha (2005) on US
firms highlighted the importance of accounting knowledge among the outside
directors. Initially, they found that independent directors did not determine the
probability of firms being required to restate their accounts. However, when the
study tested outside directors with financial expertise, the result was significant. The
finding implies that outside directors are effective in reducing the probability of
financial restatements only if they have financial expertise. Guner, Malmendier and
Tate (2008) examined several types of financial expertise including financial
executives, finance professors and bank executives. The study reported that bank
executives acting as directors on the board benefit the creditors but not the
shareholders. Specifically, bank executives were associated with higher debt though
the firms had low investment opportunities. The findings on the non-bank finance
executives however confirmed that, this type of financial expertise promotes better
governance as it led to less value-destroying acquisition.

Very few studies explored financial expertise on the board as they focused more on
the financial expertise of the audit committee. Although the board assigned its
committee with the oversight role of the financial reporting process, the quality of
the reports remained the responsibility of the board members. As noted by Volpe
and Woodlock (2008), many boards have been charged to review major issues on
accounting principle and financial statements presentation. Hence, knowledge on
accounting and financial aspects are of the utmost importance.

However, the

highlight from the Volpe and Woodlock (2008) survey of 160 Fortune companies
showed that the board members had a lack of knowledge on financial and accounting
issues including basic accounting.
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Overall, the empirical evidence showed that directors must have financial expertise;
otherwise it may impair their ability to monitor the management, and hence be
unable to detect irregularities in the financial reports.

Multiple directorships: Firm-governance skill

Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that outside directors develop reputational effects
which reflect on them as an expert in decision control. The value of the outside
directors primarily depends on their performance as internal managers in other
companies. Accordingly, they signal to the market that they are expert in decision
control, aware of the importance of separate decision control and are capable of
working in the decision control system. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) however argued
that multiple directorships can adversely affect the directors ability to monitor the
management as they are distracted by the affairs of other organisations. The findings
of Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) did not support the busyness hypothesis
as suggested by Lipton and Lorsch (1992); since they found that directors with
multiple directorships participated in other committees and attended more committee
meetings. Their findings support the reputational effect as suggested by Fama and
Jensen (1983); since the firms’ abnormal returns increased subsequent to the firms’
announcement of the appointment of additional directorships. Fich and Shivdasani
(2006) argued that Ferris et al.’s (2003) findings could be driven by the methodology
choices and econometric specifications as the study utilised cross sectional analysis.
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) used panel data and reported that firms where the
directors had three or more directorships experienced lower market to book ratios as
compared to firms where directors had fewer directorships. The results remain after
using an accounting-based performance i.e. ROA. Their additional analysis further
heighten the belief that multiple directorships are associated with weak governance
because these busy directors were less likely to remove the CEO of poor performing
firms.

Further, it was argued that multiple directorships improve information sharing on
legal actions against other firms, thus avoid the same pitfall and litigation. However
Schnake, Fredenberger and Williams (2005) found that that multiple directorships
were associated with an increased number of legal investigations brought against the
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firms. Their evidence is consistent with Schnake and Williams (2008) who found
that multiple directorships negatively affect firm performance. The study argued that
informational advantage gained from other firms may be lost due to lesser amounts
of time spent in the firms. Saleh et al. (2005) showed that multiple directorships
were effective in reducing earnings management only in firms with negative
unmanaged earnings. The study argued that directors in loss making firms are more
likely to be replaced than those of the profit making firms and the result could have
been driven by the motivation to secure their employment instead of reflecting their
competency. Other empirical studies not supporting multiple directorships were
evidenced by low market performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006), low accounting
conservatism (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007) and high earnings management
(Sarkar et al., 2008).

2.5.3.4.

CEO Duality

CEO duality refers to the leadership structure where a company’s CEO also acts as
chairman of the board. Two competing theories that explain the consequences of
this structure are agency theory and stewardship theory. Agency theory argues that
CEO and chairman roles should be separated since board responsibilities are to
monitor the management including the CEO. The stewardship theory perceives that
the duality roles improve the leadership as there is no information breakdown
between the CEO and the board. Leadership structure adopted in UK and US
provides an example of adopting these conflicting views (Coombes & Wong, 2004).
UK follows the separate structure on the ground that the duties of CEO and chairman
are different, thus split roles are crucial for board independence. There are no
recommendations on the leadership structure for the US firms but they need to
provide justification for their selection. Those who combined the two roles believe
that CEO acting as chairman is mostly beneficial in terms of communication, as it
facilitates decision making.

Consistent with the agency theory, Jensen (1993, p. 866) argued that CEO cannot
become the chairman of the board because the chairman needs to independently run
the board meeting, oversee the process of hiring, firing, evaluating and compensating
the CEO. Supporting the stewardship theory, Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997)
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claimed that the dual role may diminish incomplete communication between the
CEO and chairman, thus reduce internal conflicts and inconsistencies in decision
making. Furthermore, the CEO’s knowledge about the business allows timely and
optimal decisions, resulting in better firm performance. Similarly, A. Klein (1998)
stated that inside directors possess more knowledge and expertise about firms’
activities which outside directors might lack. Accordingly the dual role allows the
CEO-chairman to utilise the information and increase the effectiveness of the board.
Daily and Dalton (1997) referred to the joint structure as strong leadership and the
separate structure as effective monitors. It was suggested that the joint leadership
provides a positive signal that the firms have a strong leadership and it is considered
as a more efficient and reasonable form of governance. Nevertheless, practitioners
and financial communities prefer the separate structure as it works as a monitoring
mechanism. Farooque, Zijl, Dunstan and Karim (2007) found positive impact of
CEO duality on the financial performance of Bangladesh firms, and hence argued
that owner-specific attributes such as entrepreneurial skill could have increased the
firm value.

Mixed evidence on the effect of leadership structure suggests that neither agency
theory nor stewardship theory is superior. However, most evidence suggests that the
combined structure is harmful. For example, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995)
reported that firms that combined the CEO and chairman roles were more likely
subjected to accounting enforcement actions by the SEC for infringement of GAAP.
A. Klein (2002) found that CEO who held a position in the nominating and
compensation committees, manipulated the earnings by increasing the absolute value
of discretionary accrual. Muniandy (2007) reported that Malaysian firms that
combined the CEO and chairman position were associated with higher audit fees. In
contrast, the split structure is more efficient as it is associated with more accounting
conservatism (G. V. Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008) and such firms performed better
than firms’ board with duality roles (Rahman & Haniffa, 2005).

Despite the complementing findings on the split of CEO-chairman roles, the findings
of S. N. Abdullah (2004, 2006b), A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and Chang
(2009) were not supporting agency theory or stewardship theory as CEO duality was
not associated with firm performance and accounting conservatism. Cornett, Marcus
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and Tehranian (2008) reported that the combined structure had no influence on the
earnings management of US listed firms.

Dahya, Garcia and Bommel (2009)

showed that there was no difference in firm performance whether the firms split or
combine the CEO-chairman.

Other studies showed that leadership structure is

dependent on other factors. For instance, Faleye (2007) found that CEO duality was
beneficial to firms with a complex business; and might not harm shareholders’
interest if the CEO is a reputable person as the CEO may controls his or her
behaviour to protect the reputation. Lam and Lee (2008) reported that the joint
structure benefits the non-family firms whilst the separate structure benefits the
family firms. The board of the family firms were more likely to be dominated by the
insiders; hence chairman should be independent from the management to avoid
conflict of interest. Ramdani and Witteloostuijn (2010) performed a cross country
analysis on Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand and tested the effect of
CEO duality on different levels of performance. Their findings showed that CEO
duality was beneficial for average performing firms but not significant for low
performing firms and top performing firms.

2.5.4. Audit Committee Characteristics
The audit committee plays an important role in corporate governance as it is charged
with the oversight role of the financial statements. A vigilant audit committee
ensures that probability of fraud on financial statements is reduced (Rezaee, 2003).
Previous studies evaluated the effectiveness of the audit committee, amongst others
on the composition of independent directors on the committee, the proportion of
financial expertise on the committee and frequency of the committee meetings held
per year.

2.5.4.1.

Audit Committee Composition

The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance stated that the audit committee be
composed entirely by non-executive directors, with a majority independent directors.
The recommendation is consistent with the merit of having outside directors, who
could resolve any disagreement among internal managers and reduce conflict
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between internal managers and residual claimants (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Further,
it was argued that independent directors were less reluctant to question management
decisions or policies (McMullen & Raghunandan, 1996) and provide a balance of
power on the relationship between the board and management (McCabe & Nowak,
2008). Zain and Subramaniam (2007) proved this argument as they found that
internal auditors put a significant trust in the independent directors to raise any
controversial issues, especially from audit committee members with significant
knowledge of investment.

Much evidence suggests that audit committee independence mitigates agency
conflict in the firms. McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) documented that firms
with financial reporting problems were less likely to have independent directors on
the audit committee relative to firms with no financial problems. Muniandy (2007)
found that CEO duality increased audit fees; but the relationship was mitigated by
the presence of independent directors on the audit committee. The result of the study
implies that auditors perceive that audit committee independence promotes a reliable
accounting process. The findings of Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat (2007) further
showed that audit committee independence led to lower earnings management.

Whilst the studies suggest that audit committee independence enhances the quality of
the financial reports, the findings of Owens-Jackson, Robinson and Shelton (2009)
indicate that independence did not eliminate occurrence of fraud in reported
earnings, even if the committee was comprised wholly of independent directors.
This evidence is consistent with the results from meta-analysis carried out by
Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) which indicates that audit committee independence is
more effective in improving the quality of the audit than the quality of the financial
statements. They found that audit committee independence had a weak relationship
with accounting accruals and in avoiding financial restatements but was strongly
associated with auditor ratification and averting auditor resignation. In a different
context, Mustafa and Youssef (2010) reported that audit committee independence
was not effective unless the independent directors are financial experts.

S. N.

Abdullah et al. (2010) found that financial restatements increased with the proportion
of independent directors on the audit committee. Their result has two implications:
firstly, the independent directors are effective, as noted by Pomeroy and Thornton
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(2008) in that the independent directors revealed the need for the restatements, which
often indicated a low quality of financial reporting. Secondly, the independent
directors are not effective, consistent with the Rose and Rose (2008) argument that
financial restatements occurred due to earnings management and earnings
manipulation, but were not detected by the members of the audit committee.

In respect to conservatism, so far there is no study that investigates its association
with audit committee independence except by G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan
(2008). They found that audit committee independence did not influence accounting
conservatism for US firms.

2.5.4.2.

Financial Expertise

The attributes of financial experts as defined by the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) are to be attained through education and experience as (a) public
accountant or auditor, (b) a principal financial officer, controller or principal
accounting officer of an issuer, or (c) from a position involving the performance of
similar functions (Bedard & Gendron, 2010, p. 189). This definition was later
broadened to include CEO or president (Securities and Exchange Commission,
2003); following comments received by the SEC that the characteristics to be
considered as financial experts are too restrictive, hence firms may not able to find a
qualified one. The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance indicates that all audit
committee members must be financially literate and at least one should be a member
of an accounting association or body (Securities Commission, 2007). The Bursa
Malaysia adopts the same condition in its listing requirements but has specifically
stated that (a) at least one director must be a member of Malaysian Institute of
Accountants, or alternatively, (b) must have at least three years working experience
with (i) academic qualifications as listed in Part I of the First Schedule of the
Accountants Act 1967, or (ii) a member of one of the recognised bodies list out in
the Part II of the First Schedule of the Accountants Act 1967. The definition of
financial experts employed in Malaysia is therefore, strictly applied to directors who
have qualifications and experience in accounting and finance.
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With reference to the impact of the inclusion of non-accounting experts by the SEC,
several studies have been carried out on US companies. DeFond, Hann and Hu
(2005) tested the market reactions upon the firms announcement of the appointment
of accounting financial experts versus non-accounting financial experts on the audit
committee. The study revealed that the market reacted positively to the appointment
of the accounting financial experts but not to the appointment of the non-accounting
financial experts. A similar result was reported by Davidson, Xie and Xu (2004)
indicating that the market perceives financial expertise as a good monitor of the
financial reports. G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008, 2009) examined the effect
of accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial expertise on
accounting conservatism and audit fees. The main objective of their study was to
identify which of the two types of financial expertise contribute to better governance.
The studies found that only accounting financial expertise led to higher conservatism
and lower audit fees, and then conditional upon a strong governance structure in the
firms. Similarly, J. Krishnan and Lee (2009) identified that firms faced with high
litigation risks demanded financial expertise on the audit committee, and conditional
upon strong governance structure in the firms. Further, Dickins, Hillison and Platau
(2009) performed a survey on the financial analysts or supervisors of US investment
banking firms.

The study aimed to identify which of the financial attributes

influence analyst confidence in the financial statements. The study showed that the
financial analysts were more confident if the source of the expertise was accountingbased rather than supervisory-based i.e. the CEO. The above findings therefore, do
not support the inclusion of non-accounting financial experts adopted by the SEC.
Complementing the above results, the finding of Goh (2009) suggests that nonaccounting financial experts are more relevant in the supervisory form of the task
than in monitoring the financial reporting process. It was evident that the nonaccounting financial experts were effective in the remediation of material
weaknesses in internal control, whereas the accounting financial experts did not have
a significant impact.

McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) pointed out that a Certified Public Accountant
(CPA) on the audit committee enhances the committee awareness of any issues in
financial reporting, accounting and auditing. Comparing the financial problems and
non-financial problems of US companies, the study showed that those with financial
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problems were less likely to have a CPA on their audit committee. Similarly, Rose
and Rose (2008) who performed an experimental study on highly experienced audit
committee members found that, members with less accounting knowledge were
more likely to rely on insufficient managers explanation on the accounting
judgement relative to those with more accounting knowledge. They affirmed that
lack of accounting knowledge may give more freedom to the managers to manipulate
the financial statements.

Empirical studies have documented that financial experts contribute to better
governance as they reduced aggressive earnings management (Bedard, Chtourou, &
Courteau, 2004), associated with lower probability of financial restatements and
fraud (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004), led to less financial restatements (Agrawal &
Chadha, 2005) and reduced misappropriation of assets (Mustafa & Youssef, 2010).
DeZoort and Steven (2001) identified that audit committee members who possessed
audit-reporting knowledge but not financial-reporting knowledge, provided a greater
support for auditor in the dispute over material accounting policy choice issue, with
client management. However they argued that, high levels of accounting knowledge
might have driven a great diversity of opinions among the members of the audit
committee. Yatim et al. (2006) produced contrasting results as they found that
financial expertise on the audit committee of Malaysian firms led to higher audit
fees. They argued that higher fees may be related to quality of audit services
demanded by the financial experts. Rahmat et al. (2009) showed that independent
directors on the audit committee of Malaysian firms were associated with low
occurrence of financial distress status.

Nevertheless, evidence also documented the insignificant effect of financial experts
on the audit committee as they were not associated with financial restatements (J. W.
Lin, Li, & Yang, 2006), did not reduce earnings management unless the committee
members were active (Saleh et al., 2007) and did not explain the occurrence of
variation between the unaudited and audited accounts of Malaysian firms (Raman &
Saidin, 2009).

Generally, much of the evidence indicated that financial expertise on the audit
committee is a significant attribute of effective audit committee. However, in some
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cases the financial experts may not perform effectively if they do not get support
from other governance mechanisms.

2.5.4.3.

Audit Committee Meetings

The audit committee meeting provides an avenue for the committee members and
auditor to discuss issues pertaining to the financial statements. The auditor would
not only evaluate the compliance of the financial statements with the accounting
standards but also express judgement about the firm’s accounting choice of
principles, disclosures and estimates (Kirk & Siegel, 1996). This discussion would
make directors more aware of issues that might require special attentions and
eventually improve the quality of the financial reports. The Malaysian Code on
Corporate Governance stated a minimum of two audit committee meetings to be held
per year without the presence of the executive directors (Securities Commission,
2007). The actual number of audit committee meetings held per year however
depends on the company’s terms of reference and the complexity of the company’s
operation (Saleh et al., 2007).

Frequency of audit committee meeting is commonly used in empirical studies to
assess the diligence of its members.

Menon and Williams (1994) argued that

frequency of meeting is a crude measure to assess the committee activity because it
does not truly reflect the work accomplished or the effectiveness of the committee in
achieving quality financial reports. However, less frequent meetings do reflect lack
of monitoring as inactive audit committees are unlikely to monitor the management
effectively. The use of audit committee meeting to proxy for active committee was
also noted by Raghunandan and Rama (2007) who acknowledged it as the only
publicly available quantitative measure that signals the diligence of the members.

Most empirical studies showed that frequent audit committee meetings lead to
favourable outcomes. Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) showed that creditors
recognise the positive effect of active members on the reported earnings, as they
found that frequent meetings led to lower cost of debts. Abbott et al. (2004) found
that frequent meetings led to lower likelihood of restatement and an active
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committee had an average four meetings per year. Farber (2005) who compared the
meeting frequency between fraud and non-fraud firms reported that fraud firms held
significantly few meetings relative to the non-fraud firms.

Further, the study

reported that the number of meetings in the fraud firms increased gradually
throughout the analysis period.

The finding suggests that the audit committee

members become more active in monitoring the financial reporting process upon
detection of fraud. Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) also reported a negative association
between frequency of meetings and occurrence of fraud.

However, there are studies that do not support the importance of audit committee
meetings. Bédard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) reported that frequency of audit
committee meeting is not important if the members of the committee were
dominated by the financial expertise and independent directors. Audit committee
meeting is also reportedly not associated with the occurrence of the financial
restatement (J. W. Lin et al., 2006) and conservative accounting (G. V. Krishnan &
Visvanathan, 2008).

Rahmat et al. (2009) who examined Malaysian financial

distress firms found no significant difference in the frequency of meetings between
financial distress firms and non-financial distress firms; frequency of meetings did
not determine the financial distress status.
.

2.5.5. Ethnicity (Culture)
The influence of culture in accounting practice has long been acknowledged.
Schuler and Rogovsky (1998) found that culture influenced corporate financial and
operating strategies. Hope (2003) also showed that culture influenced accounting
system attributes such as authority, enforcement, measurement and disclosure. The
cross cultural work of Hofstede (1983) identified four cultural value dimensions
namely individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. Gray
(1988) proposed an association between Hofstede’s cultural values with four
accounting values namely; (a) Professionalism versus Statutory control, (b)
Uniformity versus Flexibility, (c) Conservatism versus Optimism and (d) Secrecy
versus Transparency. Table 2.1 summarizes Gray’s hypotheses on the association
between Hofstede’s cultural values and accounting values.
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In regards to

conservatism, Gray (1988) proposed that someone with low individualism and
masculinity but with high uncertainty avoidance may adopt a more conservative
approach to measurement.
Table 2.1
Summary of Gray’s hypotheses
Hofstede’s cultural values
Gray’s propositions on the accounting values
Individualism
High
Power Distance

Low

Uncertainty Avoidance

Low

Masculinity

-

Individualism

Low

Power Distance

High

Uncertainty Avoidance

High

Masculinity
Individualism
Power Distance

Professionalism: High

Uniformity: High

Low
-

Uncertainty Avoidance

High

Masculinity

Low

Individualism

Low

Power Distance

High

Uncertainty Avoidance

High

Masculinity

Low

Conservatism: High

Secrecy: High

Accounting conservatism is a significant accounting value dimension as it involves
the fundamental attitudes of an accountant in the measurement of assets and
reporting profits (Gray, 1988). Hofstede (2003) suggested that the more an activity
requires judgement, the more it will be ruled by value and hence influenced by
cultural differences. This idea was acknowledged by Tsakumis et al. (2009) in that
applying judgement to arrive at conservative reporting is most likely to be influenced
by cultural values, due to the principle-base of financial reporting standards.
Managers or accountants are allowed to use their discretion in the accounting
estimates, hence the decision arrived from the judgement could be driven by their
cultural values. In other words, national culture directly influences conservatism
which then affects the measurement of the financial information.
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The interest in Gray’s accounting values motivated empirical studies to examine
Gray’s propositions. Schultz and Lopez (2001) found that German and French
accountants, coming from countries with higher uncertainty avoidance, provided
more conservative warranty estimates than their American counterparts with lower
uncertainty avoidance. Doupnik and Richter (2004) examined accountants from
Germany, categorised as a high-conservative country; and accountants from US,
categorised as low-conservative country;

the results showed that German

accountants displayed higher conservatism relative to the US accountants. Guan,
Pourjalali, Sengupta and Teruya (2005) examined five Asia-Pacific countries i.e.
Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore to identify the effect of
Hofstede’s culture value on earnings management. The study found that higher
individualism led to higher aggressive earnings management; which is the opposite
of lower conservatism. However, Tsakumis (2007) did not support Gray’s (1988)
hypothesis. He employed an experimental method to examine the conservatism level
of the US and Greek accountants on the recognition of contingent assets and
contingent liabilities. His analysis identified that the Greek accountants displayed
lower individualism and higher uncertainty avoidance than the US accountants,
suggesting that the Greek accountants should be more conservative than the US
accountants. However, their results actually revealed that the US accountants were
more conservative than the Greek accountants.

In Malaysia, Iskandar and Pourjalali (2000) analysed the substantial changes in the
Malaysian economy and its culture from 1987 to 1997; and explained how these
factors may influence accounting practices.

Their analysis indicates that

individualism had increased due to increases in the country’s wealth and higher
survival rate in the competitive market, because of more opportunities in business
and urban migration. The uncertainty avoidance factor, however, had decreased due
to a lower inflation rate, improvement in quality of life and the ambitious vision of
2020.

Following Gray’s hypothesis, Iskandar and Pourjalali (2000) categorised

Malaysia as a low conservative country, supported by Ball et al. (2003) who found
that Malaysian auditors and managers were less transparent especially in the
recognition of losses.
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It is important to note that Iskandar and Pourjalali’s (2000) analysis was on the
national culture. Culture as defined by Perera (1989, p. 43) is “an expression of
norms,

values,

beliefs,

and

customs

which

reflected

typical

behavioral

characteristics” that are widely shared in a specific society at a particular point in
time. Since Malaysia is a multiracial country, national culture may not explain
behaviour of the ethnic groups in the country. Specter and Solomon (1990) claimed
that, the behaviour of different groups within a nation might not represent the
national culture. To predict the conservatism practices of the Malays and Chinese
ethnic groups in Malaysia, it is important to identify their level of individualism and
uncertainty avoidance.
mixed.

Literature on the Malay and Chinese individualism are

Firstly, some studies argued that Malays are less individualistic than

Chinese. A. Abdullah (1992) presented cultural values of the Malays, as among
others, faith in god, compliance, obedience, non-aggression and reciprocal
obligations, hence indicating that the Malays have high uncertainty avoidance. The
Chinese however are referred to as gamblers or risk takers; implying they have low
uncertainty avoidance. Islam is closed to collectivism and protect the rights of
private ownership (Baydoun & Willett, 1995); and since Islam is the main religion of
Malays, they are expected to have low individualism. Borrowing from management
research, Hamzah, Saufi and Wafa (2002) found the Chinese to be more
individualistic but had lower uncertainty avoidance than Malays. They assessed the
Malaysian managers’ leadership style and found that the Chinese prefered the
delegating style of leadership, greater autonomy and being more directive. Malays,
in contrast, preferred a participant leadership style, where they preferred to get
involved with the decision making. This is consistent with A. Abdullah’s (1992)
findings that Malays were more masculine because they preferred relationship-based
as compared to the Chinese who were task-oriented in achieving career-success.

Secondly, previous evidence indicated that the culture values between Malays and
Chinese are indifferent. L. Y. Lim (1998) stated that conceptually both Malays and
Malaysian Chinese have high collectivism (low individualism) which differs only in
terms of content. Although Malays derive pleasure from community spirit that help
to develop their sense of responsibility in helping others, the Chinese also have the
same spirit but they channel it through associations that they build amongst members
of the same clan, dialect or educational group, through which they offer help and
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security. This is supported by Juri (1999) who identified that Malays and Chinese
entrepreneurs in Peninsular Malaysia mostly shared the same cultural values of
masculinity, individualism and power distance, except that the Malays had higher
uncertainty avoidance than the Chinese. Selvarajah and Meyer (2008) examined two
leadership styles of Malaysians, (a) managerial behaviour type was assigned to the
Chinese and (b) personal qualities type was assigned to the Malays. The study
argued that the Malays were assigned to the personal qualities type because they
were considered as sensitive individuals living in harmony, having secured good
relationships with the community members. The Chinese were believed to have
persuasive powers and a strong sense of trust on leadership, thus relevant to the
Managerial Behaviour type. The results however showed that, both ethnic groups
fell under the Managerial Behaviour type. They argued that changes in mindset
might have narrowed the commercial gap between the Malays and Chinese as the
nation strives towards vision 2020. A. Abdullah (2001) found religiosity was the
only factor that differentiated the Malays from Chinese and Indian. This is further
confirmed by Fontaine and Richardson (2005) who found that the three ethnic
groups; Malays, Chinese and Indian were not culturally different as they shared most
of the cultural values examined in their studies.

Thirdly, some evidence suggested that Malays have high individualism levels.
Tamam, Hassan and Said (1996) reported that Malays middle-executives portrayed
the individualistic attribute. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examined the Malays ethnic
influences on voluntary disclosure in the Malaysian firms’ annual reports. They
predicted that Malays would provide less disclosure, consistent with Gray’s (1988)
hypothesis, that low individualism and high uncertainty avoidance lead to secrecy.
However, they found opposite directions that implied increased individualism in the
Malays. Similarly, Zawawi (2008) found that Malay employees in Nestle Malaysia
acted individualistically in certain situations if such acts would be of benefit to
themselves. The evidence on high individualism for Malays is consistent with the
claim of Iskandar and Pourjalali (2000) that Malaysia is experiencing modernisation.
Rahman and Ali (2006) added that Malays wealth had increased since the
introduction of the National Development Policy (NDP) in 1991 which provided
positive discrimination in favour of Bumiputera. As a nation becomes wealthier,
individual behaviour appears stronger (Hofstede, 1983).
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Patel, Harrison and

McKinnon (2002) examined the accountants’ professional judgement on auditorclient conflict resolution. Their survey on Malaysian Chinese, Australian and Indian
accountants revealed that Malaysian Chinese had lower individualism because their
decision could still be influenced by the client in order to maintain harmonious
interpersonal relationships and to avoid conflict.

The Australian accountants,

however, were less likely to resolve conflict by acceding to client demands and
assessed the auditors’ decision as being more unethical than the Indian and
Malaysian Chinese.

The effect of the ethnic groups on reported earnings can also be observed from the
political perspective. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) suggested that high profit is
sometimes associated with monopoly, hence firms will lower the reported earnings
to reduce the likelihood of adverse political action. The New Economic Policy
(NEP) implemented by Malaysian government created political incentives to
minority ethnic Chinese to not report higher profits (Ball et al., 2003). Bumiputera
firms that normally have a close relationship with the government might delay
reporting losses because the government does not want to take the blame or to avoid
foreign financing. Ball et al. (2003) inferred that the phenomena will encourage
income smoothing.

Evidence from Yen, Chun, Abidin and Noordin (2007)

confirmed the political incentive argument, as they found government linked
companies (GLC) managed earnings upwards while the Chinese family linked
companies (CFLC) managed earnings downwards.

They argued that the

compensation plan of the GLC is normally related to earnings; hence providing an
incentive to the GLC to report higher earnings. Incentives for tax saving might
encourage the CFLC to show lower profits; because Chinese who are task and profit
oriented may want to improve their cash flows so that they can maximise output.
The political incentive, compensation incentive and tax saving incentive suggest
Malays would report higher earnings whilst Chinese would report lower earnings.

2.5.6. Moderating Relationship
A moderating effect indicates if a relationship of two variables is affected by the
influence of another variable. Moderating governance factors employed in previous
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studies are numerous. Schnake and Williams (2008) used board size and outside
directors to moderate the adverse effect of multiple directorships on corporate
misconduct. The study found that small board size but not outside directors, was an
effective moderating factor.

Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) who examined

Malaysian listed firms, showed that the negative effect of board ownerships on
corporate voluntary disclosure was moderated by independent directors on the audit
committee.

Setia-Atmaja (2010) examined family controlled companies in

Australian listed firms and found that independent directors on the board influenced
the family controlled firms to pay higher dividends, and hence reduce potential
expropriation of the minority shareholders’ interest.

Whilst the above studies employed a single mechanism as the moderating factor,
others employed aggregate and multiple mechanisms. Strong governance has been
employed in a number of studies as an aggregate measure of governance mechanism.
DeFond et al. (2005) observed positive stock returns upon the appointment of
financial expertise on the audit committee but it occurred only for firms that have
strong governance. The study argued that strong governance assists the financial
expertise to increase the shareholders’ wealth. The moderating effect of the strong
governance on financial expertise is shown as studies indicated that financial
expertise in firms with strong governance led to more conservatism (G. V. Krishnan
& Visvanathan, 2008), reduced audit fees (G. V. Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009) and
was demanded when firms faced high litigation risk (J. Krishnan & Lee, 2009).

Using multiple mechanisms individually, Baek, Johnson and Kim (2009) examined
the moderating effect of five governance mechanisms on the relationship between
managerial ownership and level of discretionary disclosure. The mechanisms are
equity-based

executive

compensation,

outside

directors,

block

ownership,

institutional ownership and market for corporate control. They found that ownership
structure mechanisms influenced the managers to disclose ownership and investor
related information whilst the level of outside directors influenced the managers to
report board and management process disclosure. The results indicate that those
mechanisms reduce the incentive of managers not to disclose important and relevant
information to the stakeholders. Pissaris, Jeffus and Gleason (2010) examined pay
disparity where CEO compensations are largely more than incentive paid to other
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employees. They found that CEO duality, high board equity ownership and high
debt level improved the positive effect of executive pay disparity on firm
performance.

They argued that, (a) Unitary command hypothesis: highly

compensated CEO, who holds chairman position improves his authority, (b)
Incentive alignment: board equity contributes to strong governance and (c) Credit
monitoring: levered firms are subject to credit monitoring.

Researchers have raised concerns that the corporate governance model adopted from
developed countries does not work well in emerging economies due to its different
institutional environment notably concentrated ownership structure. In particular,
previous studies suggested that the board of directors or audit committee in emerging
economies are ineffective due to the dominant role of the concentrated owners of
whom the majority are insiders.

Moderating effects provide direct indication

whether or not the board of directors or audit committee is effective in influencing
the concentrated owners’ behaviour; or whether the concentrated owners reduce the
functionality of other governance mechanisms. Cho and Kim (2007) examined the
effect of large shareholders ownership on the relationship between independent
directors on the board and firm performance.

They reported that initially the

proportion of independent directors is positively related to firm performance.
However, the performance reduced when the independent directors were interacted
with the large shareholders. Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2009) performed
meta-analysis on the effectiveness of the independent directors on the board in
controlling earnings management.

Their study examined corporate governance

systems (Anglo-American versus emerging system) in moderating the relationship
between board independence and earnings management; and concluded that board
independence in the emerging system was ineffective relative to the Anglo-American
system. Hu, Tam and Tan (2010) reported that concentrated owners in Chinese
listed firms reduced firm performance; and board of directors and supervisory board
in the firms could not improve the firm performance since their monitoring duties
were hindered by the concentrated owners. V. Z. Chen et al. (2011) found similar
findings, where board meeting, CEO duality, independent directors and supervisory
board could not moderate the adverse effect of the concentrated owners on the firm
performance.
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Previous studies argued that ownership concentration limit firms’ governance
mechanism from function effectively. One aspect to test this argument is to test the
moderating effect of ownership concentration on the relationship between firms’
governance and conservatism. Entrenched controlling shareholders may adopt lower
conservatism, and hence may influence the firms’ governance to adopt lower
conservatism.

2.5.7. Methodological concerns on the corporate governance
measure to test moderating effect
Previous studies employed various approaches to examine corporate governance.
Most studies examined a small subset of corporate governance provisions (L. D.
Brown & Caylor, 2009) such as the effect of the proportion of outside directors,
board independence or board size on the firm performance, earnings, share return or
disclosure in the financial reports. However, there have been increasing studies that
incorporated a summary of corporate governance provisions to consider broad
governance mechanisms. Some of these studies used corporate governance ratings
provided by the rating agency. For instance, Klapper and Love (2004) examined 14
emerging markets using a corporate governance ranking index calculated by Credit
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA). Bauer, Guenster and Otten (2004) measured the
quality of the governance based on Deminor’s corporate governance rating. The
rating covered between 249 and 269 firms included in the FTSE Eurotop 300 over
the period 2000 to 2001. Ariff, Ibrahim and Othman (2007) who examined the
determinants of corporate governance ratings in Malaysia, relied on the Corporate
Governance Reporting Initiative, 2004. Their study constructed two portfolios to
distinguish firms’ rating either at the top 50% or bottom 50%. The rating took place
in year 2003 and was used as the sample period of the study. L. D. Brown and
Caylor (2009) incorporated 51 governance provisions based on Institutional
Shareholders Services (ISS), coding each governance provision as dichotomous
depending on whether or not ISS considers the firms’ governance to be minimally
acceptable.
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Gompers, Ishi and Metric (2003) however, developed their own external corporate
governance provision focusing on takeover defence provisions of US firms. Cremers
and Nair (2005) adopted Gompers’s index as a proxy of external corporate
governance; in addition to an internal governance proxy by percentage shareholding
of the largest institutional block holders and 18 largest public pension funds.
Further, survey studies developed questionnaires based on the best practices on
corporate governance.

Questionnaires formed by Drobetz, Schillhofer and

Zimmermann (2004) were based on the recommendations from the German
Corporate Governance Code and German corporate governance scorecard whilst
Black, Jang and Kim (2006) utilised the 2001 Korea Stock exchange of corporate
governance practices to construct a corporate governance index for Korean
companies. Similarly, Haat et al. (2008) constructed questionnaires to measure a
disclosure index based on the national and international best practice guidelines as
well as research studies.

Several studies focused on internal governance mechanisms, specifically the board
of directors and audit committee, as they provide the main emphasis in measure of
best practices in corporate governance. Studies examining moderating relationships
have employed single, multiple and aggregate measures of governance. Cho and
Kim (2007) interacted the proportion of outside directors with large shareholders
ownership, managerial ownership and block holding ownership. Baek et al. (2009)
employed several mechanisms: namely executive compensation, outside directors,
block ownership, institutional ownership and market for corporate control and
interacted them individually with managerial ownership.

Pissaris et al. (2010)

employed CEO duality, Gompers’s index, board equity ownership and leverage, and
interacted them individually with a pay disparity variable. V. Z. Chen et al. (2011)
employed four moderating variables: namely board meeting, CEO duality,
proportion of outside directors and supervisory board and interacted them
individually with ownership concentration.

Since the governance variables in the abovementioned studies were tested
individually, their approach on testing the governance effect are different from the
following studies. Cohen et al. (2004) and Lara et al. (2007) noted that interaction
among different governance players improve the effectiveness of the firms’
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governance, hence the aggregate measure impacts the effectiveness of the overall
governance employed in the firms. Accordingly, Lara et al. (2007) employed an
aggregate measure of governance of six internal mechanisms inclusive of the
characteristics of the board, audit committee and the presence of remuneration
committee. Khanchel (2007) used the characteristics of the board of directors, audit
committee and auditors to create board index, committee index and audit index. G.
V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008, 2009) who examined US firms, used an
aggregate measure of governance based on the board and audit committee attributes
including Gompers’s governance index. The variables considered in those studies
are similar with a few exceptions: G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008, 2009) did
not include compensation and nomination committee and numbers of meeting in
their governance measure as in Lara et al. (2007) and Khanchel (2007). Auditor was
included in the Khanchel (2007) study but not in the other two studies. G. V.
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008, 2009) however, included the institutional
ownership and Gompers’s governance index in their governance measure.

Different methods and measurements employed by previous studies to examine
corporate governance indicate that the quantitative indicators of governance are
highly subjective (Khanchel, 2007; Méon & Weill, 2005).

Additionally, the

corporate governance index based on ratings or surveys were subjective in
construction and hence may be biased, and of limited use to a sample of countries
(Méon & Weill, 2005, p. 82).

Ranking was assessed on certain governance

standards of the past, thus on historic data (Khanchel, 2007); for instance those used
by Bauer et al. (2004) and Ariff et al. (2007) are relevant for studies in the year the
ranking was made, but not necessary applicable for future studies.

This thesis is interested to identify whether ownership concentration limits firms’
internal governance from function effectively.

Hence, to account for total

governance mechanisms adopted by firms, the aggregate measure of governance is
used to measure firms’ governance and discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.5.6.
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2.6.

Summary

In general, even though conservatism practices divert from neutrality, the benefits
that they offer especially in limiting the moral hazard problem, improving corporate
governance and ultimately increasing firm value should be appreciated. Therefore,
in order to gain more understanding on the cost-benefit tradeoffs of conservative
accounting, there is a need to identify factors that drive this accounting practice
(Zhang, 2008).

The results of previous studies have shown that strong internal governance is
associated with the presence of independent directors, smaller boards, board
members with skill and separation of CEO and chairman roles. An effective audit
committee to monitor the accounting process is also linked to its attributes such as
the independent directors on the committee, members with financial expertise and
meeting frequency. Evidence showed that strong board attributes are associated with
better firms’ performance and quality financial information. Given that conservative
accounting is an effective mechanism; it could assist the board and audit committee
to overcome the agency conflict. Therefore, it is expected that strong attributes of
board of directors and audit committee lead to more conservative reporting.

There is limited evidence in Malaysia on the influence of ethnicity over financial
reporting.

The only study in Malaysia that associated ethnicity and financial

reporting was conducted by Rahman and Ali (2006) but they found that ethnicity did
not influence earnings management. Other studies examined ethnicity in relation to
audit fees (Yatim et al., 2006) and auditor choice (Ahmad, Houghton, & Yusof,
2006). So far, no study has examined ethnicity effects on accounting conservatism.
The evidence on the Hofstede-Gray hypothesis also leads to mixed arguments with
regard to individualism of Malays and Malaysian Chinese. Some studies found that
Malays are less individualistic than the Chinese whilst the others showed that
Malays and Chinese are indifferent in respect to individualism. Political factors,
compensation incentives and tax incentives also influence these ethnic groups, which
might lead them to act differently.
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Many studies found and argued that corporate governance in Asia generally, is
ineffective due to the presence of controlling shareholders. They were associated
with expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth; weak internal governance
system and low quality financial reports.
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CHAPTER THREE
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.1.

Introduction

This chapter explains the theoretical framework of this thesis and presents
hypotheses to be tested. There are ten hypotheses to be tested in relation to the effect
of ownership concentration, board of directors’ characteristics, audit committee
characteristics and ethnicity on accounting conservatism. Hypothesis 11 tests the
moderating effect of ownership concentration on the relationship between firms’
governance and conservatism.

Section 3.2 presents and discusses the conceptual framework employed in this thesis.
Section 3.3 presents the hypotheses according to independent variables presented in
the conceptual framework. Section 3.4 summarises this chapter.

3.2.

Conceptual Framework

Positive accounting theory suggests that conservatism is an effective tool to reduce
agency conflict. Based on the agency theoretical framework, this thesis includes
ownership concentration and characteristics of the board of directors and audit
committee to examine if they affect the use of conservative financial reports.
Additionally, the role of cultural values in influencing behaviour may also affect
directors’ judgment on accounting conservatism. This thesis uses ethnicity as a
proxy for culture.

Referring to the framework in Figure 3.1, this thesis examines ownership
concentration as classified into inside substantial shareholders and outside
substantial shareholders (see chapter 4 Section 4.5.1 for definition).

This

classification is made because previous evidence showed that outside shareholders
demand better governance relative to inside shareholders. Hence, their effect on
conservatism may vary. The board characteristics examined are board composition,
board size, board skill (proxied by board tenure, board financial expertise and
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multiple directorships) and CEO duality. The audit committee characteristics are
audit committee composition, audit committee financial expertise and audit
committee meeting. This thesis focuses on two ethnic groups: Malay (Bumiputera)
and Chinese directors, who sit on the board of directors and the audit committee.

OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION



Inside Substantial Shareholders (H1a)
Outside Substantial Shareholders (H1b)

BOARD OF DIRECTOR
CHARACTERISTICS

AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS
 Audit Committee Composition (H6)
 Audit Committee Financial Expertise (H7)
 Audit Committee Meeting (H8)

ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM

 Board Composition (H2)
 Board Size (H3)
 Board Skill:
Board Tenure (H4a)
Board Financial Expertise (H4b)
Multiple Directorships (H4c)
 CEO Duality (H5)

ETHNICITY



Bumiputera
Directors
on
Board/Audit
Committee (H9a and H9b)
Chinese Directors on Board/Audit Committee
(H10a and H10b)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

DEPENDENT
VARIABLE

Figure 3.1: Conceptual Model Underpinning this thesis
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As shown in Figure 3.2, this thesis also examined the moderating effect of
concentrated ownership on the relationship between firms’ governance and
conservatism. It is expected that firms that employ good governance practices would
employ more conservatism; but concentrated owners may limit the function of the
firms’ governance, and hence may lead to less conservatism.

(H11a)

Firms’ aggregate
measure of governance
(GOV)

ACCOUNTING
CONSERVATISM
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE

FOCAL INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE
(H11b)




OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION
Inside Substantial Shareholders (OCIN)
Outside Substantial Shareholders (OCOUT)
MODERATING
VARIABLES

Figure 3.2: Conceptual Model on Moderating effect of Concentrated Ownership

3.3.

Hypotheses Development

3.3.1. Ownership Concentration
Concentrated owners who have a large investment in firms have access to managers’
private information; hence reducing the traditional agency conflict between
managers and shareholders. As a result of this advantage, concentrated owners will
put less emphasis on the quality of the financial reports. Dargenidou et al. (2007)
argued that the majority shareholders have lower demand for accounting
conservatism because they rely less on the financial reports.

Two competing

arguments, namely the entrenchment effect and the substitution effect suggest that
majority shareholders would lead to less conservatism either because they do not
need a governance tool to control their behaviour; or their presence to monitor the
management substitutes for the governance mechanism.
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Previous studies however showed that outside shareholders’ demand quality
financial reports as they improved disclosure in financial reporting (Yeo et al., 2002)
and reduced earnings management (Azofra et al., 2003). Since the effect of inside
and outside shareholders on conservatism may vary, this thesis segregates the
ownership concentration into insiders and outsiders.

This thesis presents the

following hypotheses,

H1a:

The proportion of substantial shareholding by insiders is inversely
related to conservative accounting.

H1b:

The proportion of substantial shareholding by outsiders is positively
related to conservative accounting.

3.3.2. Board of Directors’ characteristics
Previous studies suggested that the characteristics of a strong board of directors
relate to representation by independent directors, limited number of members sitting
on the board, members possessing good skill and separation of CEO and chairman
roles. Independent directors are credited for being more experienced and for giving
independent judgment over the board’s decision. Evidence showed that independent
directors reduced fraud on financial statements (Beasley, 1996), lower earnings
management (Peasnell et al., 2006) and led to more conservatism (A. S. Ahmed &
Duellman, 2007; Beekes et al., 2004). Board of directors that are designed to control
agency conflict would demand more conservatism because it provides them with
early notice of any future losses and assists them in controlling managers’
opportunistic behaviour. This thesis presents the following hypothesis,

H2:

The proportion of independent directors on the board is positively
related to conservative accounting.

Empirical evidence on board size suggests that larger board size in most cases
reduces board effectiveness in monitoring management. Though several studies
indicated that a larger board has a broader pool of knowledge and has better
monitoring capacity, the risks of having too many members may outweigh the
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benefits. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) claimed that a large board creates a free rider
problem, slows decision making and members are less likely to criticise the
decisions of top managers. Additionally, a large board is less involved with strategic
decision making (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992) and leads to coordination problems
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999).

Empirical studies showed that a large board was associated with lower firm
performance (Mak & Li, 2001), higher earnings management (Rahman & Ali, 2006)
and higher occurrence of a distressed status (Chang, 2009). In contrast, small board
size led to a higher returns-earnings relation (Vafeas, 2000) and effective monitoring
of the quality of earnings (K. Ahmed et al., 2006). The previous evidence suggests
that large board size is associated with weak governance ability; hence it may not
promote conservative financial reports.

This thesis presents the following

hypothesis,

H3:

Board size is inversely related to conservative accounting.

Previous studies examined three types of skills contributing to effective governance,
namely firm-specific expertise, financial expertise and governance expertise. Firmspecific expertise refers to the cumulative knowledge of the firm through directors’
longer service on the firm’s board.

Financial expertise refers to accounting

knowledge that allows the directors to understand the process of preparing the
financial reports; and the ability to make decisions that will enhance the quality of
the information. Governance expertise refers to directors’ experience obtained from
their participation on the boards of other firms, which deepen their knowledge in
solving various problems.

Empirical studies showed that longer tenure reduced earnings management (Bedard
et al., 2004; Peasnell et al., 2005) and reduced the occurrence of a financial distress
status (Chang, 2009). Directors that are expert in financial aspects have better
monitoring skill, thus were more effective in enhancing the quality of the financial
reporting (Lanfranconi & Robertson, 2002; McMullen & Raghunandan, 1996; Rose
& Rose, 2008).
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In regards to multiple directorships, previous studies argued that although
directorships on the boards of other firms enhance the directors’ knowledge, they
may not be able to apply their knowledge effectively because they are too busy, and
hence have limited time with the firm. Consistent with this argument, evidence
showed that multiple directorships were associated with lower firm performance
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006), lower conservatism (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007)
and higher earnings management (Sarkar et al., 2008). The evidence suggests that
longer tenure and financial expertise are attributes of strong governance, hence will
lead to more conservatism to assist in their oversight role of the financial reporting
process. Multiple directorships are however, an attribute of weak governance that
will likely lead to less conservatism. This thesis presents the following hypotheses,

H4a:

Directors’ tenure is positively related to conservative accounting.

H4b:

The proportion of financial expertise on the board is positively related
to conservative accounting.

H4c:

The proportion of directors with multiple directorships is inversely
related to conservative accounting.

Using stewardship theory, previous studies have argued that duality roles reduce
internal conflict as incomplete communications are diminished when the two roles
are combined (Brickley et al., 1997) and improve board effectiveness because
executive directors are more knowledgeable about the firms’ business than the
independent directors (A. Klein, 1998). Daily and Dalton (1997) pointed out that
separating or combining the CEO and chairman roles are based on two perspectives,
either for strong leadership structure or for effective monitoring.

They further

acknowledged that practitioners and financial communities prefer the separate
structure. In view of the presence of concentrated owners, especially insiders in the
majority of the Malaysian firms, separating the roles may limit full control of the
controlling owners over the board’s decision. Driven by previous evidence that CEO
duality created more harm to board effectiveness (Dechow et al., 1995; A. Klein,
2002; Rahman & Haniffa, 2005), this thesis posits that the joint structure will lead to
less conservatism. This thesis presents the following hypothesis,

H5:

CEO Duality is inversely related to conservative accounting.
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3.3.3. Audit Committee characteristics
This thesis examines three attributes of audit committee, namely independent
directors on audit committee, directors with financial expertise and frequency of
audit committee meetings.

Previous studies argued that independent directors on the audit committee improve
governance because they can resolve disagreement among internal managers (Fama
& Jensen, 1983) and confront controversial issues with the internal auditors (Zain &
Subramaniam, 2007). Empirical evidence showed that independent directors were
associated with fewer financial reporting problems (McMullen & Raghunandan,
1996), reduced earnings management (Saleh et al., 2007) and positively moderated
the CEO duality effects on audit fees (Muniandy, 2007). Since evidence indicates
that independent directors on the audit committee reduce agency conflicts and are
effective in monitoring the financial reporting process, it is likely that they will
demand more conservatism. This thesis presents the following hypothesis,

H6:

The proportion of independent directors on the audit committee is
positively related to conservative accounting.

The study of McMullen and Raghunandan (1996), Rose and Rose (2008) and
Dickins et al. (2009) highlighted it is important for audit committee members to have
financial expertise. Similar to the evidence on financial expertise on the board,
previous studies established that financial expertise on the audit committee reduced
earnings management (Bedard et al., 2004), led to less restatement of earnings
(Abbott et al., 2004) and employed more conservative accounting (G. V. Krishnan &
Visvanathan, 2008). Since, users of the financial statements rely on the competency
of directors to oversee the process of the financial reporting; it is more likely that
financial expertise employs more conservatism to assist in their governance roles.
This thesis presents the following hypothesis,

H7:

The proportion of financial expertise on the audit committee is
positively related to conservative accounting.
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The frequency of audit committee meeting is an indication of the diligence of the
audit committee members as they would normally resolve issues with the auditors in
a formal meeting. Raghunandan and Rama (2007) stated that frequent meetings
reflect active committee members.

Empirical studies showed that frequent audit committee meetings led to lower cost of
debt (Anderson et al., 2004), reduced the possibility of restatement (Abbott et al.,
2004) and lowered fraud occurrence (Owens-Jackson et al., 2009). Accordingly, it is
perceived that audit committee members who hold meetings frequently are
concerned with the quality of the financial reports; hence will likely demand more
conservatism. This thesis presents the following hypothesis,

H8:

The frequency of audit committee meeting is positively related to
conservative accounting.

3.3.4. Ethnicity
The evidence in literature to predict the effect of Bumiputera (or Malays) and
Chinese ethnic groups on conservatism is mixed.

Empirical studies on the

individualism component of Gray (1988) alone, produced mixed findings and
arguments. Whilst some studies showed that both ethnic groups were indifferent in
terms of individualism (Juri, 1999; Selvarajah & Meyer, 2008; Sendut, 1991), there
are studies that suggest that Malays had lower individualism than the Chinese (A.
Abdullah, 1992; Hamzah et al., 2002) or Malays’ individualism had increased
(Iskandar & Pourjalali, 2000; Tamam et al., 1996; Zawawi, 2008). It is difficult to
predict the effect of ethnicity based on the individualism concept.

The political incentive and compensation or tax incentives suggest that the
Bumiputera ethnic group prefer to report higher earnings while the Chinese ethnic
group prefer to report lower earnings (Ball et al., 2003; Yen et al., 2007). Based on
these incentives, it is likely that the Bumiputera ethnic group will employ less
conservatism but the Chinese ethnic group will employ more conservatism. Haniffa
and Cooke (2002) found Malay directors to be less secretive. According to Gray’s
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(1988) hypothesis, individualism has the same impact on secrecy and conservatism.
Therefore, following from Haniffa and Cooke’s (2002) findings, Malay directors
who were less secretive may suggest that they are also less conservative. Consistent
with the political incentive and compensation or tax incentives and findings of
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), this thesis presents the following hypotheses,

H9a:

The proportion of Bumiputera members on the board is inversely
related to conservative accounting.

H9b:

The proportion of Bumiputera members on the audit committee is
inversely related to conservative accounting.

H10a: The proportion of Chinese members on the board is positively related
to conservative accounting.
H10b: The proportion of Chinese members on the audit committee is
positively related to conservative accounting.

3.3.5. Moderating effect of Ownership Concentration
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance stated that Malaysian firms should
adopt the best practice of corporate governance to ensure better monitoring ability.
However, previous studies argued that corporate governance system in Asian
countries is not working effectively due to the influence of the concentrated owners.
This evidence was documented by Cho and Kim (2007), Hu, Tam and Tan (2010)
and V. Z. Chen et al. (2011), that concentrated owners limit the effectiveness of the
firms’ governance mechanisms.

This thesis predicts that firms’ that practice good governance would employ more
conservatism. However as many studies had argued, the performance of the firms’
governance mechanism could be adversely affected by the influence of the
concentrated owners. This thesis presents the following hypotheses,

H11a: There is a positive relationship between firm’s governance and
conservatism.
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H11b: The power of the concentrated owners, represented by the percentage
of ownership, negatively moderates the positive effect of the firms’
governance on conservatism.

3.4.

Summary

The first part of this chapter presents the conceptual framework in this thesis. Four
main independent variables were identified, which are ownership concentration,
board of directors’ characteristics, audit committee characteristics and ethnicity. The
predicted effect of these variables on conservatism practices was explained under the
hypotheses development. There are seventeen hypotheses altogether; the first fifteen
hypotheses test the relationship between the independent variables and the
conservatism and the final two hypothesis tests the moderating effect of ownership
concentration on the relationship between firms’ governance and conservatism.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH METHOD
4.1.

Introduction

This chapter provides explanation relating to the data used in this thesis. Firstly, it
explains the sampling method and sources of the data. Next, it describes proxies and
the measurement of the variables. This thesis employs a panel data methodology;
hence procedures to examine the panel data are also presented.

4.2.

Sampling

The sample companies were extracted from the population of all companies listed on
the main board and second board of Bursa Malaysia. A list of companies printed
from the Bursa Malaysia website was used as a reference to extract firms’ financial
data from Datastream. Finance related companies were excluded because they fell
under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1989, which possess unique
characteristics and operated in different compliance and regulatory environment
(Chu & Cheah, 2006; Yatim et al., 2006). PN4 classified companies, which are
distressed companies with given time and opportunity to regularise their financial
position to the minimum required of a listed company, were also excluded to avoid
the influence of their financial condition on the results of this thesis. Following
Strong and Walker (1993) and S. N. Abdullah (2006c), companies that changed their
financial year end during the sample period were also excluded. Also, excluded
were companies that had undergone significant mergers or reconstruction, and those
with unavailable online annual reports. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the initial
sample.

This thesis employed two measures of conservatism; namely accrual-based
conservatism and asymmetric timeliness. For a sample of seven years period (20012007), i.e. nine years complete accounting data, t= 2000-2008 is required to measure
accrual-based whilst ten years complete accounting data, t= 1998-2007 is required to
measure asymmetric timeliness. Accrual-based conservatism used an average three76

year accounting data which is centred in year t. Therefore, a measure in 2001
requires financial data for 2000-2002; and a measure in 2007 requires financial data
for 2006-2008.

Asymmetric timeliness measure used a three-year backward

accumulation of earnings and share returns. Thus, the measure for 2001 requires
financial data of 1999-2001. In order to be included in the sample, firms with fiscal
year end before December 1999, must have complete share prices in the relevant
months of 1998 so that share returns for 1999 can be computed.

Table 4.1
Derivation of Sample
Sample selection from 2001-2007
Total number of companies extracted from the Datastream
Less:
Financial related companies
PN4 companies
Companies that change financial year end
Companies involved with mergers or reconstructions
Missing share price in any period between 1998-2007
Incomplete online annual report in any period between 2001-2007
Initial sample

807
(42)
(12)
(12)
(28)
(270)
(143)
300

After deletion of outliers, the initial sample of 300 firms for 7 years (2100 firm-year
observations) was reduced to 2031 firm-year observations for accrual-based
conservatism (CONACCR) and 2012 firm-year observations for asymmetric
timeliness (AT). Table 4.2 presents the sector representation of the data distributions
in the two models; CONACCR and AT.

Sectors
Industrial product
Trading and Services
Consumer product
Plantation
Construction
Property
Technology
Infrastructure
Hotel
Total

Table 4.2
Sector Representation of the Sample
CONACCR
Firm-year
%
observations
775
38
399
20
347
17
165
8
164
8
63
3
62
3
28
1
28
1
2031
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AT
Firm-year
observations
778
401
324
164
165
63
62
27
28
2012

%
39
20
16
8
8
3
3
1
1

4.3.

Sources of Data

Data was collected from two separate sources: Datastream and annual reports.
Monthly share prices obtained from Datastream were used to compute stock returns.
Market values or market capitalisation, which is a product of share price and number
of outstanding shares, were also retrieved from the database. Any missing financial
figures from Datastream were acquired from the annual reports.

The annual reports were retrieved from the Bursa Malaysia website at
www.bursamalaysia.com.my. Data on ownership concentration, board of directors
and audit committee were manually extracted from these annual reports. Data on
ownership concentration were obtained under the analysis of shareholding section.
Information on board of directors and audit committee were extracted from the board
of directors’ profile and audit committee report respectively. All relevant data was
collected from 2001 to 2007, except those used to compute conservatism measures
that required additional figures from 1998 to 2000 and 2008. The sample period of
this thesis starts from 2001 because it was the year in which Malaysian listed firms
were required to make mandatory disclosure of the extent of compliance (or noncompliance) with the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance adopted in 2000.
The starting year was chosen to ensure availability of the governance data in the
annual reports and to ensure uniformity of corporate governance practices of all
Malaysian companies.

4.4.

Conservatism Measures

This thesis used two measures of conservatism; (a) accrual-based conservatism
proposed by Givoly and Hayn (2000) and asymmetric timeliness introduced by Basu
(1997). Basu’s conservatism measure has encouraged many studies on accounting
conservatism1(Givoly, Hayn, & Natarajan, 2007), but several studies highlighted its
limitations as a measure of accounting conservatism (e.g. Beaver & Ryan, 2005;
1

As at July 2006, Basu’s measure has been quoted by 270 published and working papers (Ryan,

2006).
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Dietrich, Muller, & Riedl, 2007; Pae, Thornton, & Welker, 2005). Ryan (2006)
acknowledged the criticisms2, but concluded that Basu’s measure remained as the
primary measure of accounting conservatism. Nevertheless, Givoly et al. (2007)
affirmed the importance of incorporating several measures of conservatism, as
reliance on a single measure to assess the conservatism of the reporting entity may
lead to an incorrect conclusion. This thesis follows Lara et al. (2009) who used
accrual-based and asymmetric timeliness to measure accounting conservatism.

4.4.1. Accrual-based Conservatism (CONACCR)
Reverse pattern of accruals occurs when periods in which net income exceeds (falls
below) cash flow from operation, is expected to be followed by periods with
negative (positive) accruals (Givoly & Hayn, 2000). Firms with a steady state are
expected to converge accruals in previous periods to cash flow from operation in the
subsequent periods.

Therefore, a consistent predominance of negative accruals

across firms over a period of time is an indication of conservatism.

The accrual-based measure of conservatism was computed as income before
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (INC) plus depreciation expenses
(DEPRN) minus operating cash flows (OCF) and deflated by total assets (TA). The
accrual value is averaged over a three-year period centred at year t, and multiplied
by -1 and referred to as CONACCR. The simple form is shown as follows:

Accruals3 years = [(INC + DEPRN – OCF)] / TA
CONACCR = (Accruals / 3 years) X (-1)

Averaging over a number of years will mitigate the effects of any temporary large
accruals, since accruals are likely reversed within one to two years (Richardson,
2

Ryan (2006,footnote no.2) states that “In my view, two well-known empirical results together imply
the biases identified by Dietrich et al.(2007) are likely to be fairly small and so biases in returnsbased measures of asymmetric timeliness are likely to be correspondingly small. First, the low values
of R2 observed in contemporaneous returns–earnings regressions suggest that the extent to which
earnings causes returns is tiny compared to the extent to which both variables are determined by
other, more primitive information. Second, a large literature, only some of which employs the reverse
regressions of earnings on returns used to estimate asymmetric timeliness, exists that shows returns
typically reflect information on a timelier basis than earnings”.
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Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna, 2005). The CONACCR value above was derived after
multiplying by -1, so that higher value of CONACCR indicates more conservatism.
Zhang (2008) noted that the accrual conservatism measured here is a non-operating
accruals that summarise the actual recording of bad news and capture the asymmetric
verification requirements as reflected in earnings.

4.4.2. Asymmetric Timeliness (AT)
Basu (1997) introduced asymmetric timeliness to measure accounting conservatism
where share returns are used as a proxy for news about firm performance.
Timeliness in earnings is measured using reverse-regression between earnings and
contemporaneous returns that capture the difference in the effects of negative returns
and positive returns on earnings. A dummy variable (D) interacts with the return
variable (R) to proxy for bad news (R D) whilst the main effect on return (R) is a
proxy for good news. Basu’s regression model is presented as follows:
Eit/Pit – 1 = β0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3Rit*Dit + εit
Where:

For each firm (i) and each year (t),
Eit /Pit – 1 = Net Income before extraordinary items divided by beginning of fiscal
year market value of equity;
R

= fiscal year share return;

D

= dummy variable is equal to 1 if returns are negative; 0 if otherwise.

R*D

= Interaction between R and D

The sensitivity of earnings to good news is measured by the β1 estimate while
sensitivity of earnings to bad news is measured by β1 + β3. Positive coefficients are
predicted for intercept (β0) and return (β1). The positive sign for the intercept
reflects the realised gain (good news) from previous periods recognised in the
current year (Basu, 1997). The value of β3 reflecting the incremental sensitivity of
earnings to bad news compared to good news, and thus measures the accounting
conservatism.

The coefficient of β3 is commonly referred to as ‘asymmetric
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timeliness’. Under greater conservatism, earnings will have higher sensitivity to bad
news as compared to good news. Accordingly, β3 is expected to be larger than zero.

4.5.

Measurement of Independent Variables

This section provides the operational definitions of each independent variable
examined in this thesis. The independent variables are categorised as ownership
concentration, board of directors’ characteristics, audit committee characteristics,
ethnicity and control variables. Table 4.3 provides a summary of the measurements
used in this thesis.

Table 4.3
Summary of the Measurements of the Variables
Variables
Acronym
Measurements
DEPENDENT VARIABLES:
1) Accrual-based
CONACCR Accrual measure=
Conservatism
[(Income before extraordinary item &
discontinued operation + depreciation operating cash flow)  total asset]  3
years X (-1).
2) Earnings Price ratio
Eit/Pit – 1
Net Income before extraordinary items 
beginning of fiscal year market value of
equity.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:
Ownership Concentration:
1) Inside Substantial
OCIN
Percentage of substantial shareholding held
Shareholders
by executive and non-independent nonexecutive directors.
2) Outside Substantial
OCOUT
Percentage of substantial shareholding held
Shareholders
by outsiders who are independent from the
management.
Board of Directors characteristics
3) Board Composition
BID
Proportion of independent directors to total
directors on board.
4) Board Size
BS
Natural logarithm of board size.
5) Board Tenure
BT
Average years the independent directors
served on the firm’s board.
6) Board Financial Expertise
BF
Proportion of board members with
financial expertise to total directors on
board.
7) Multiple Directorships
BSHIP
Proportion of board members with more
than two outside directorships to total
directors on board.
8) CEO Duality
BCD
Dummy = 1 if CEO-Chairman roles
combine; 0 if separate.

81

Variables
Acronym
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:
Audit Committee characteristics
9) Audit Committee
ACID
Composition
10) Audit Committee
ACF
Financial Expertise
11) Audit Committee
Meeting
Ethnicity
12) Bumiputera Directors
Board
13) Bumiputera Directors
Audit Committee
14) Chinese Directors
Board
15) Chinese Directors
Audit Committee
Control Variables
16) Auditor
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)

Firm Size
Profitability
Leverage
Sales Growth
Market to Book

Measurements

Proportion of independent directors to total
directors on audit committee.
Proportion of audit committee members
with financial expertise to total directors
on audit committee.
Numbers of audit committee meeting held
per year.

ACM

on

BBR

on

ACBR

on

BCR

on

ACCR

Proportion of Bumiputera directors to
directors on board.
Proportion of Bumiputera directors to
directors on audit committee.
Proportion of Chinese directors to
directors on board.
Proportion of Chinese directors to
directors on audit committee.

AUD

total
total
total
total

Dummy = 1 if audited by big 4 audit firm,
0 otherwise.
Natural logarithm of total assets.
Cash flow from operation  Total assets.
Noncurrent liabilities  Total assets.
Annual percentage change in sales.
Market value of equity  Book value of
equity.

TA
PROF
LEV
SGROW
MTB

4.5.1. Ownership Concentration
Ownership concentration is measured by the percentage of the firm’s outstanding
shares held by the substantial shareholders. Section 69D of Companies Act 1965,
defines substantial shareholder as a person who holds not less than five per centum
of the aggregate of the nominal amounts of all the voting shares in the company.
The substantial shareholding disclosures in the annual reports indicate the
shareholders’ direct interest and indirect interest. Direct interest refers to shares
directly purchased from the firm under the shareholder’s own name whilst indirect
interest refers to the interest of individual shareholders (or firms) through shares
owned in another linked company and/or through shareholdings by the shareholder’s
family members.

Many studies have used the top ten largest, the top five largest or the largest
shareholders as a proxy for ownership concentration. This thesis however, uses
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substantial shareholders as the proxy because many Malaysian firms are controlled
by certain parties via nominee names to remain anonymous (Chu & Cheah, 2006;
Singam, 2003).

Selecting the largest shareholders, top five or top ten largest

shareholders as the proxy for ownership concentration may not be accurate because
the list of the 30 largest shareholders in the annual reports does not aggregate
different securities accounts belonging to the same person.

The substantial

shareholding, however account for total ownerships with five percent and more
including through nominees and indirect holding via other institution or connected
person. Therefore, shareholders who fall outside the top five or ten in the list of the
30 largest shareholders are accounted for under the substantial shareholding.

This thesis classified the substantial shareholders into insiders and outsiders. This
measure is undertaken following a survey result due to Bursa Malaysia and
PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2002, that directors involved in management were also
substantial shareholders of the company (Satkunasingam & Shanmugam, 2006).
The insiders (OCIN) are substantial shareholders who are executive and nonindependent non-executive directors (or their family members) of the company or
firms in which the executive and non-executive directors (or their family members)
have an indirect interest. The outsiders (OCOUT) are those, other than categorised
under insiders, who are individuals or firms that are independent from the
management. The measures for the two types of substantial shareholders are (a)
OCIN is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares held by the inside
substantial shareholders; and (b) OCOUT is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding
shares held by the outside substantial shareholders.

4.5.2. Board of Directors’ characteristics
Board composition (BID) is the proportion of independent directors on the board.
Bursa Malaysia defines independent directors as those independent of the
management, and free from any business or other relationship which could interfere
with the exercise of independent judgment or the ability to act in the best interest of
the stakeholders.

BID was computed as the total number of independent non-

executive directors on the board divided by the total number of board members (S.
N. Abdullah, 2006a; A. Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2006).
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Board size (BS) is the natural logarithm of total number of board members. A
similar measure was employed by previous studies, among others A. S. Ahmed and
Duellman (2007), G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) and Lam and Lee (2008).

Board skill is proxied by board tenure, board financial expertise and multiple
directorships. These three proxies represent different skills possessed by directors on
the board that may influence accounting conservatism. Board tenure reflects firmspecific expertise; board financial expertise reflects directors’ expertise in
accounting or finance, and multiple directorships reflect governance expertise.
Board tenure (BT) is the average years the independent directors served on the
firm’s board. BT was computed as the total number of years of service of all
independent directors on the board divided by the total number of independent
directors on board (Peasnell et al., 2005; Rahman & Ali, 2006).

Board financial expertise (BF) is the proportion of board members with
qualifications or experience in accounting or finance, including those who are
members of accounting professional bodies. The definition includes directors
who are current or former chief financial officers, accountants and former
auditors. BF was computed as the total number of board members with financial
expertise divided by the total number of board members (Bedard et al., 2004;
Saleh et al., 2007).

Multiple directorships (BSHIP) are the proportion of directors on the board
with more than two outside directorships. A similar measure was employed by
Ferris et al. (2003), Saleh et al. (2005) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006). Many
previous studies (e.g.: A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007) used average number of
additional directorships as a measure of BSHIP. Fich and Shivdasani (2006)
noted that an average number of directorships is a noisy measure as the number
of directorships are widely dispersed. This thesis found that average number
could not be used because most companies did not provide a clear number of the
directors’ additional directorships. Rather, this thesis observed that the word
‘several’ was used in place of the actual number of directorships. This thesis
assumed ‘several’ as more than two directorships. BSHIP was computed as the
84

total number of board members with more than two outside directorships
divided by the total number of board members.
CEO Duality (BCD) occurs when the CEO is also the chairman of the board.
Dummy was assigned as 1 if the roles of the CEO and chairman were combined and
0 otherwise.

4.5.3. Audit Committee characteristics
Audit committee composition (ACID) is the proportion of independent directors on
the audit committee.

ACID was computed as the total number of independent

directors on the audit committee divided by the total number of audit committee
members (G. V. Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008; Salleh et al., 2006).
Audit committee financial expertise (ACF) is the proportion of audit committee
members with qualifications or experience in accounting or finance, including those
who are members of accounting professional bodies.

The definition includes

directors who are current or former chief financial officers, accountants and former
auditors. ACF was computed as the total number of audit committee members with
financial expertise divided by the total number of audit committee members (G. V.
Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008).
Audit committee meeting (ACM) was measured as the number of meetings held by
the audit committee per year. The same measure had been used by previous studies
to proxy for the diligence of the audit committee (e.g.: G. V. Krishnan &
Visvanathan, 2008; Raghunandan & Rama, 2007)

4.5.4. Ethnicity
This thesis examines Bumiputera ethnic and Chinese ethnic directors on the board
and audit committee.

Bumiputera directors on board (BBR) were computed as the total number of
Bumiputera directors on the board divided by the total number of board members.
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Bumiputera directors on audit committee (ACBR) were computed as the total
number of Bumiputera directors on the audit committee divided by the total number
of audit committee members.

Chinese directors on board (BCR) were computed as the total number of Chinese
directors on the board divided by the total number of board members.

Chinese directors on audit committee (ACCR) were computed as the total number
of Chinese directors on the audit committee to the total number of audit committee
members.

4.5.5. Control Variables
As in previous studies, this thesis included auditor, firm size, growth, profitability
and leverage as control variables in the regression models, given the evidence of the
association between these variables and accounting conservatism. Sales growth and
market to book ratio are the two proxies for growth; where sales growth is a control
factor in accrual-based conservatism whilst the market to book ratio is a control
factor in asymmetric timeliness.

Auditor (AUD) was measured using binary variables; a dummy is assigned the value
of 1 if firms were audited by big four audit firms and 0 otherwise. Empirical
evidence showed that the auditor influences financial reporting process; for instance
appointment of a big six auditor led to lower earnings management (Becker,
DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Francis & Krishnan, 1999).
Additionally, big-firm auditors were more widely associated with conservatism than
were non big-firm auditors. For instance, DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) found
that big six auditors adopted more conservatism than the non-big six auditors.
Chung et al. (2003) reported that large audit firms demanded more accounting
conservatism. Relative to small and medium size audit firms, large audit firms are
more exposed to loss of reputation or legal action in case of audit failure. Small
audit firms are less likely to be sued because their ability to settle lawsuits may be
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insufficient to cover the costs incurred by the shareholders or creditors. A positive
association is expected between auditor and conservatism.
Firm size (TA) was measured by the natural logarithm of total assets.

This

measurement was employed by Rahman and Ali (2006) and G. V. Krishnan and
Visvanathan (2008). According to Watts and Zimmerman (1978), large firms that
are exposed to more political costs will adopt more accounting conservatism.
However, these political costs could be subject to the information asymmetry effects
and the aggregation effects. LaFond and Watts (2008) viewed larger firms to suffer
less information asymmetry because they produce more public information. This is
supported by the findings of Givoly et al. (2007) where asymmetric timeliness of
earnings of the large firms was significantly smaller than for small firms. Thus,
large firms with lesser information asymmetry may be exposed to lower political
costs, hence adopt lower conservatism. A negative association is expected between
firm size and conservatism.
Profitability (PROF) was computed as cash flow from operations divided by total
assets, following A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and G. V. Krishnan and
Visvanathan (2008). Relative to profitable firms, A. S. Ahmed et al. (2002) noted
that unprofitable firms will be less likely to employ conservative accounting as it
will decrease its profits further.

A positive association is predicted between

profitability and conservatism.
Leverage (LEV) was computed as total noncurrent liabilities divided by total assets
following A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan
(2008). As the demand for conservatism is partly from debt contracting, it is argued
that highly leveraged firms may employ more conservative accounting in order to
reduce the conflict between shareholders and debt holders. A. S. Ahmed et al.
(2002) reported that firms employed accounting conservatism and dividend policy to
mitigate the debtholders-shareholders conflict, which in turn reduced the cost of
debt. Also, LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) documented that highly leveraged
firms employed more conservatism. Beatty, Weber and Yu (2008) reported that debt
holders demanded conservative financial reports even though they had the ability to
specify the financial numbers in the debt contract. A positive association is expected
between leverage and conservatism.
87

Sales growth (SGROW) is the percentage of annual growth in total sales [SGROW=
(Salest - Salest-1)/Salest-1]. SGROW is included in the CONACCR regression model
because A. S. Ahmed et al. (2002) argued that growth in sales is likely to affect the
CONACCR measure due to several reasons. First, SGROW affects accruals items
such as inventory and receivables; and in turn affects CONACCR. Second, for firms
with declining sales, CONACCR is a poor measure of accounting conservatism. A
negative association is expected between sales growth and accrual-based
conservatism because higher sales growth will likely increase current accruals,
which in turn reduces CONACCR.

Market to book (MTB) was measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book
value of equity. MTB is a proxy for growth opportunity and needs to be controlled
for in the asymmetric timeliness model because changes in growth opportunities can
create variation in the asymmetric timeliness that are unrelated to accounting
conservatism (Roychowdhury & Watts, 2007). LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008)
stated that MTB is used to control for the effect of beginning composition of equity
value on future asymmetric timeliness. A negative association is expected between
market to book and asymmetric timeliness.
4.5.6.

Moderating Relationship: Aggregate measure of firms’ governance
(GOV)

This thesis, which focused on internal governance mechanisms, is interested in
identifying whether ownership concentration constrains firms’ governance from
applying high conservatism practices. The concentrated owners were identified as
inside substantial shareholders (OCIN) and outside substantial shareholders
(OCOUT). Aggregate measure was used to measure firms’ governance (GOV)
following the approach undertaken by Lara et al. (2007), Khanchel (2007) and G. V.
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008); and because aggregate measure accounts the
effectiveness of the overall governance employed in the firms (Cohen et al., 2004;
Lara et al., 2007). If Malaysian firms’ governance mechanisms are effective, the
controlling shareholders might not be able to influence the firms’ governance to
adopt lower conservatism.
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To compute the aggregate measure of firms’ governance (GOV), this thesis
incorporated eight governance mechanisms that are consistent with the
recommendation in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and the empirical
evidence.

The mechanisms are board composition, board size, CEO duality,

financial expertise on the board and audit committee, audit committee composition,
audit committee meeting and auditor to represent the firms’ governance.

As

presented below, the empirical evidence has shown that these mechanisms have
significant roles in determining the effectiveness of the firms’ governance.

Board Composition

Agency theory and resource dependence theory highlight the importance of having
independent directors on the board so that the board could monitor the management
effectively (Fama & Jensen, 1983).

Additionally, independent directors could

protect firms’ resources and reduce uncertainty as a result from improving the flow
of information between the firms and outside environment (Pfeffer & Salancik,
2003).

Since independent directors are associated with strong governance,

Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance dictates that Malaysian listed firms to
comply with minimum one third ratios of outside directors on the board. Empirical
evidence showed that independent directors contributed to strong governance as it
improved the quality of the financial reports (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007;
Beekes et al., 2004; Benkraiem, 2009; Dahya et al., 2008; Dahya, Dimitrov, et al.,
2009; Koh et al., 2007; Peasnell et al., 2006; Salleh et al., 2006). Concentrated
owners themselves acknowledged that the presence of independent directors on the
board are a threat to them as evidence showed that, firms with concentrated owners
had few independent directors (Dahya et al., 2008; Setia-Atmaja, 2009).

The

evidence suggests that higher proportions of independent directors on the board
contribute to stronger governance.

Board Size

The best practices in corporate governance suggest that firms should revise its board
size that makes it function effectively. Previous studies have shown that members in
a large board were inactive in strategic decision making and had problem in
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coordination (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). Most empirical
evidence supported the Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) arguments that
large board is ineffective for monitoring the management as it was associated with
low firm performance (Cheng, 2008; Guest, 2009; Mak & Li, 2001), high earnings
management (Rahman & Ali, 2006), lower earnings informativeness (K. Ahmed et
al., 2006) and higher occurrence of financial distress status (Chang, 2009). Hence,
large board is considered an attribute of weak governance.

CEO Duality

The best practices in corporate governance suggest firms to separate the CEO and
chairman roles; and require firms to disclose reasons if they choose to combine them.
The requirement is a clear indication that the combined roles may impair the board
independence.

Conflicting views of whether or not the CEO should hold the

chairman position are explained by the agency theory and the stewardship theory.
To promote good leadership, the stewardship theory suggests that the CEO and
chairman roles should be held by one person.

However, from the governance

perspective proposed by the agency theory, separating the two roles ensures board
independence from the management. Much evidence suggests that joint leadership
structure weakened firms’ governance, as it led to earnings manipulation (Dechow et
al., 1995; A. Klein, 2002) and higher audit fees (Muniandy, 2007). The separate
structure however, contributes to stronger governance as it was associated with more
accounting conservatism (G. V. Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008) and increased firm
performance (Rahman & Haniffa, 2005). Lam and Lee (2008) showed that when
insiders dominate the board, CEO and chairman roles should be separated. The
empirical evidence suggests that CEO duality is an attribute of weak governance.

Financial Expertise on the Board and Audit Committee

The quality of the financial statements remains the responsibility of the board of
directors although audit committee has been formed to deal with issues relevant to
financial reports. This is consistent with Volpe and Woodlock (2008) argument that
board members are responsible to review major issues on accounting principle and
financial statements presentation. Evidence has shown that financial failure was
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caused by lack of accounting knowledge among the board members (Agrawal &
Chadha, 2005; Guner et al., 2008; Lanfranconi & Robertson, 2002). In addition,
audit committee members need to have expertise in accounting or finance to qualify
them as monitor of financial reporting process.

Malaysian Code on Corporate

Governance requires the members of the audit committee to be financially literate
and at least one is a registered member of the accounting body.

The market

perceives financial expertise as an attribute of strong governance as reflected by the
increased in the stock returns following the appointment of financial expertise to the
firms (Davidson et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 2005).

Also, financial expertise

enhanced the quality of the financial reports (Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal &
Chadha, 2005; Bedard et al., 2004) and enhanced governance through the demand of
quality audit (Yatim et al., 2006). Further, financial analysts preferred financial
expertise over the non-accounting financial expertise (Dickins et al., 2009).
Therefore, higher proportions of financial expertise on the board and audit
committee contribute to stronger governance.

Audit Committee Composition

Fama and Jensen (1983) and McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) highlighted the
significant role of independent directors on the audit committee in reducing agency
conflict.

Most empirical evidence showed the benefit of having independent

directors on the audit committee as firms were less likely experiencing financial
problem, the independent directors were associated with lower earnings management
and they reduced the negative effect of CEO duality on audit fees (McMullen &
Raghunandan, 1996; Muniandy, 2007; Saleh et al., 2007). Since audit committee
independence would contribute to better monitoring of the management, the
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance suggests that majority of the audit
committee members must be represented by independent directors.

Based on

empirical evidence, higher proportions of independent directors on the audit
committee contribute to stronger governance.
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Audit Committee Meeting

Audit committee meeting is a place where the members of the audit committee meet
and discuss with the auditor on accounting issues including those that arise from the
internal audit.

Frequency of meetings therefore, reflects how active the audit

committee members communicate with the auditors. The best practices of corporate
governance suggest a minimum of two meetings with the auditor without the
presence of the management, but active members are expected to hold frequent
meetings. Number of meetings reflect the diligence of the committee members
(Raghunandan & Rama, 2007) and most evidence suggests that frequent meetings
improve governance as it was associated with less fraud (Farber, 2005; OwensJackson et al., 2009), improved quality of the financial reports (Abbott et al., 2004)
and led to less cost of debt (Anderson et al., 2004). The evidence suggests that
frequent audit committee meetings contribute to stronger governance.

Auditor

Auditor plays an important role in corporate governance as the auditor provides an
independent assessment on the financial reports. According to the best practice
guidelines, audit committee members are required to have a close collaboration with
the auditor to resolve any problems and conditions arising from the audit works.
Since the auditor is regarded as an active participant in the governance process
(Cohen et al., 2004), the audit committee members may not able to monitor the
management effectively without the auditor’s support. The big-brand auditors (the
big 4/5 audit firms) are perceived to be a strong governance mechanism; as evidence
showed that they provided quality audit service through higher qualified opinion in
the case of detection of earnings management (Johl, Jubb, & Houghton, 2007),
reduced earnings forecast errors (Ahmad-Zaluki & Wan-Hussin, 2010; Lee, Taylor,
& Taylor, 2006) and influenced firms to disclose internal audit reports mandatorily
and led to frequent audit committee meetings (Haron, Ibrahim, Jeyaraman, & Chye,
2010).
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Computation of GOV

Following Khanchel (2007), percentile ranking was used to obtain GOV. Higher
score in the ranking indicates direction of stronger monitoring.

Procedures to

compute the percentile ranking are explained as follows:

(a)

The eight mechanisms were ranked from bottom to top; small value was
ranked bottom and high value was ranked top. Firms that were ranked with
highest score represent those firms having stronger mechanism.

With

exceptions, larger board size reflecting weak governance and was ranked in
reverse order where larger board was scored lower. Similarly, firms that
combined the CEO and chairman roles were scored lower than those who
separated the roles. The computations were run by the STATA statistical
software, using syntax: egen rank_ (variable name) = rank (variable name).
The egen syntax ensures that any tied values on the variables are ranked as
an average score.

(b)

The ranked score of the eight mechanisms in part (a) were added and
divided by eight and were assigned as the average ranked score of GOV.
The average score was used to compute percentile rank, simply i divided by
n (i/n) where i is the rank and n is the number of observations.

Multiple regressions analysis was carried out to test the moderating effect of
concentrated ownership on the relationship between GOV and conservatism.
Moderated relationship tests the interaction effect between the focal independent
variable and moderated variable; and interaction effect exist if the effect of the
independent variables on the dependent variables changes depending on the value of
the moderating variable (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). Since this thesis wanted to test
the effect of concentrated owners on the relationship between firms’ governance
(GOV) and conservatism, hence GOV is the focal independent variable and
concentrated owners i.e. insiders (OCIN) and outsiders (OCOUT) are the moderating
variables.

The model summarises this moderating relationship as presented in

Chapter 3, figure 3.2.

93

The interaction effect between GOV with OCIN and OCOUT was operationalised as
follows. OCIN and OCOUT were separately multiplied with GOV to represent the
effect of insiders and outsiders on firms’ governance. The two interaction variables,
OCIN*GOV and OCOUT*GOV were included in the original regression models
used in the hypothesis testing earlier, but excluded the eight variables that have been
accounted for in the GOV.

An interaction effect exists if the coefficients on

OCIN*GOV or OCOUT*GOV are significant.

For the asymmetric timeliness

model, 3-way interactions were made to test the moderating effect of OCIN and
OCOUT on the effect of GOV on R and RD. The interacted variables are shown as
follows:

OCIN*GOV*R,

OCIN*GOV*RD,

OCOUT*GOV*R

and

OCOUT*GOV*RD.

4.6.

Regression Models

4.6.1. Accrual-based Conservatism (CONACCR)
The following regression model tests the influence of ownership concentration,
attributes of the board of directors, attributes of the audit committee and ethnicity of
the directors on accrual-based conservatism.
CONACCRit = β0 + β1OCINit + β2OCOUTit + β3BIDit + β4BSit + β5BTit + β6BFit +
β7BSHIPit + β8BCDit + β9ACIDit + β10ACFit + β11ACMit + β12BBRit + β13ACBRit +
β14BCRit + β15ACCRit + β16AUDit + β17TAit + β18PROFit + β19LEVit + β20SGROWit +
εit

(1)

Where:

For each firm (i) and each year (t),

CONACCRit =

Accrual-based measure of conservatism proposed by Givoly and
Hayn (2000).

OCINit

=

Percentage of substantial shareholding held by executive and
non-executive directors.
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OCOUTit

=

Percentage of substantial shareholding held by outsiders
independent from the management.

BIDit

=

Proportion of independent directors to total directors on board.

BSit

=

Natural logarithm of board size.

BTit

=

Average years the independent directors served on the firm’s
board.

BFit

=

Proportion of board members with financial expertise.

BSHIPit

=

Proportion

of

directors

with

more

than

two

outside

directorships.
BCDit

=

Dummy = 1 if CEO-Chairman roles combine; 0 if separate.

ACIDit

=

Proportion of independent directors to total directors on audit
committee.

ACFit

=

Proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise.

ACMit

=

Number of audit committee meetings per year.

BBRit

=

Proportion of Bumiputera directors to total directors on board.

ACBRit

=

Proportion of Bumiputera directors to total directors on audit
committee.

BCRit

=

Proportion of Chinese directors to total directors on board.

ACCRit

=

Proportion of Chinese directors to total directors on audit
committee.

AUDit

=

Dummy = 1 if audited by big 4 audit firm; 0 otherwise.

TAit

=

Natural logarithm of total assets.

PROFit

=

Cash flow from operation  Total assets.

LEVit

=

Noncurrent liabilities  Total assets.

SGROWit

=

Annual percentage change in sales.

4.6.2. Asymmetric Timeliness (AT)
As presented in section 4.4.2, the following is Basu’s original model of asymmetric
timeliness.
Eit / Pit – 1 = β0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3Rit*Dit + εit
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(2)

Where:

For each firm (i) and each year (t),
Eit / Pit – 1

=

Net Income before extraordinary items  beginning of fiscal year
market value of equity.

R

=

Fiscal year share return.

D

=

Dummy variable is equal to 1 if returns are negative; 0 otherwise.

R*D

=

Interaction between R and D.

Interaction of independent variables with equation 2:

This thesis extends Basu’s original model to examine the relationship between
conservatism and ownership concentration, board of directors’ characteristics, audit
committee characteristics and ethnicity. These independent variables and the control
variables interact with each variable in Basu’s original model as shown in equation
2. The following model illustrates the interaction of OCIN with each component in
equation 2. Similar interactions are made with the remaining independent variables;
OCOUT to MTB, but are not shown for clarity purposes.
Eit/Pit – 1 = β0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3Rit*Dit + β4OCINit + β5Rit*OCINit + β6Dit OCINit +
β7Rit*Dit*OCINit + ............+ εit
The coefficient of the interaction term R*D with the independent variable, represents
the effect of the respective variable on asymmetric timeliness. For instance, the
effect of insiders on asymmetric timeliness, is observed on β7, which is the
coefficient of the interaction term of R*D with insiders (R*D*OCIN). If insiders
employ more conservatism, β7 is expected to be positive.
Basu’s original specification of asymmetric timeliness used a one year measure of
earnings (Eit) and returns (Rit). A one year horizon is, however affected by firms’
failure to record asset write-downs, since due to conservatism, previous increases in
assets were unrecorded. This is referred to as the “buffer” problem (LaFond &
Watts, 2008). Pae et al. (2005) stated that Basu’s annual coefficient understates the
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degree of conservatism. Also, Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) noted that the single
period asymmetry is not a measure of aggregate conservatism but is an implication
of asymmetric verification standards.

They stated that asymmetric timeliness

measures estimated over several years would progressively eliminate time lags
between returns and earnings.

Following this suggestion, A. S. Ahmed and

Duellman (2007), LaFond and Watts (2008) and LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008)
are amongst others who accumulated the returns and earnings over the past three
years. A similar approach was employed in this thesis.

4.7.

Research Design

This thesis employed panel data methodology to examine the effect of the
independent variables on accounting conservatism. Panel data methodology has
been adopted by previous accounting studies including Banker, Devaraj, Schroeder
and Sinha (2002); Bhattacharya et al. (2003); Schiehll (2006); Sanchez-Ballesta and
Garcia-Meca (2007); Ming and Gee (2008); Leng (2008) to name a few. Data in this
thesis was analysed using STATA statistical software version 11 as it is suitable for
panel data regression.

Panel data, also known as longitudinal data or cross sectional time series data, refers
to data on the same subjects observed over several years. Greene (2008) noted that
some issues could not be studied purely by cross sectional or time series data; firms’
conservative accounting can be better captured if firms are examined for a longer
period (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Roychowdhury & Watts, 2007). This
thesis examined 300 firms over 7 years.

Panel data suggests that the subjects (countries, states, firms or individuals) under
study are heterogeneous. It means that although some variables vary across subject
and time, there are many of other variables that may be subject-invariant or timeinvariant. Subject invariant refers to factors that influence all subjects but varies
across time. Time-invariant refers to factors that are time constants as they are
unique to the subjects. It is important to include these type of variables (subjectinvariant or/and time-invariant) in the model equation; otherwise it leads to bias in
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the resulting estimates. The panel data methodology provides a solution to control
these invariant factors that are not controlled for either in cross sectional or time
series studies. Additionally, a further motivation for using panel data is to solve the
omitted variables problem (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 247).

4.7.1. Advantages of Panel Data
Over pure cross sectional and pure time series analysis, panel data has benefits,
discussed in Hsio (2003) and Baltagi (2008) and presented as follows:
a.

Panel data provides a richer source of information as it accounts for multiple
observations on cross sectional units. Thus, it offers more variability and is
more efficient in the estimation of parameters. The informative data also
provides more reliable estimates and tests a more sophisticated behavioural
model with less restrictive assumptions.

b.

For pure time series data, serious multicollinearity problem appears among the
independent variables (X); where current period independent variables (Xt) are
highly correlated with those in previous period (Xt-1). Hence, for panel data,
differences in the X across cross sectional units can be used to reduce the
collinearity. This is due to the fact that the pooling of cross sectional and time
series data increases variability that can be decomposed into variation between
subjects and variation within subjects.

c.

Individual heterogeneity is controlled in panel data. The panel data model
resolves or reduces the problem of omitted variables, due to mismeasurement
or no observed items that correlate with the included independent variables in
the model.

d.

Panel data allows the researcher to study the complex issues of dynamic
behaviour because it can identify and estimate effects that are simply not
detectable in either pure cross section or time series data.
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e.

Panel data enables the researcher to identify an otherwise unidentified model
which under usual circumstances may be undetectable due to measurement
errors.

4.7.2. Panel Data Analysis
The simple OLS regression assumes that the sample companies were homogenous,
thus do not account for heterogeneity unlike in the panel regression technique. Jager
(2008) investigated whether panel data that is analysed using a simple OLS
regression technique produced a different result than if it is analysed using panel data
techniques.

The results generated from the two techniques are substantially

different; implying that adopting OLS technique on panel data leads to incorrect
inference.

Panel data observations cannot be assumed as independently distributed across time
due to individual unique factors that remain constant over time (Baddeley &
Barrowclought, 2009; Wooldridge, 2003).

Therefore, a single regression (also

known as pooled OLS) applied in pure cross-sectional or time series analysis, which
assume homogeneity, if estimated on panel data may lead to misleading inference
(Baddeley & Barrowclought, 2009). In simple pooling on panel data no adjustment
is made for firm specific factors, resulting in autocorrelation, because for each year
under study the firm unique factor was left in the residual. Additionally, it also
results in heterogeneity bias in terms of omitted variables bias because the firm
unique factor is not included in the deterministic part of the model (Baddeley &
Barrowclought, 2009).

Panel regression models control for the heterogeneity effect in panel data using
either a fixed effects model or random effects model. The main difference between
the two methods is whether the unobserved effects (the error term) are correlated
with included independent variables (Wooldridge, 2003).
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4.7.2.1.

Fixed Effects Model

Each entity has its own individual attributes, which are constant across time, that
may or may not affect the dependent variables. Fixed effects, which investigate the
relationship between the dependent and independent variables within an entity,
control for these unobserved unique attributes (the time-invariant factor) within the
entity that may affect or bias the dependent variables. Following the assumption
underlying the use of a fixed effects method that the error term is correlated with the
independent variables; this method removes the effect of unobserved time-invariant
characteristics from the independent variables, so that the net effect of independent
variables is assessable. Therefore, the fixed effects method is unbiased as it controls
for unobserved time-invariant factors but it may be inefficient if the correlation that
it assumes is really zero (Allison, 2009).

The fixed effects method can be implemented either by dummy variables or through
the mean deviation method. A dummy variables method is implemented by creating
a set of dummy variables for each entity in the data set. The coefficient of the
entity’s dummy variables produced upon analysis represents an estimate of the
unobserved time-invariant factors. However, Wooldridge (2003) suggested that this
method is not practical for data sets with many cross sectional observations. Allison
(2009) pointed out that this method imposes difficulty as it may be beyond the
capacity of the accounting software. The mean deviation method is an alternative to
estimate fixed effects regression which is simple to perform using accounting
software. The mean deviation method implies that mean values for all time-varying
variables is identified for each entity. Subsequently, these entity’s specific means
are subtracted from the observed value for each variable. In this method, estimate
coefficients for the time-invariant independent variables are not given, since their
values are constant for each entity; subtracting the entity-specific mean of timeinvariant variables from the individual values yield a value of zero for all entities.
Accordingly, the time-invariant independent variables are dropped out of the
equation, nevertheless their effect has been controlled (Allison, 2009).
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4.7.2.2.

Random Effects Model

The advantage of a random effects model over the fixed effects model is that timeconstant independent variables are allowed and can be examined in a regression
model. This result from the assumption that the unobserved effect is not correlated
with the independent variables, whether or not they are fixed over time.

Accordingly, a random effects model allows time-constant independent variables and
does not drop them out of the regression model.

However, if it violates the

assumption that fixed effects are not correlated with the disturbances reflected in the
between effects, it may produce biased results.

4.7.3. Hausman Specification Test
According to Greene (2008), the assumption in random effects model that individual
effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors has little justification. Thus, it may
suffer inconsistency should this correlation exist. As noted earlier, the main factor
that distinguishes fixed effects from the random effects is whether the error term is
correlated with the included independent variables.

Hence, in order to choose

between the fixed effects method and random effects method of panel data
regression, the Hausman specification test is used to determine the existence of the
correlation.

Recall that the fixed effects model assumes that the independent variables are
correlated with the error term whilst the random effects model does not. Thus, the
following hypotheses are to be tested:

H0:

Unobserved effect is uncorrelated with explanatory variables

H1:

Unobserved effect is correlated with explanatory variables

The null hypothesis (H0) predicts the use of random effects and the alternative (H1)
as fixed effects. To test whether there is any correlation between the error term and
the explanatory variables, the Hausman specification test is performed upon running
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the fixed effects and random effects regression models (Baltagi, 2008).

If the

Hausman test produces a significant p-value, the null hypothesis is rejected; hence
the fixed effects model should be used.

Two Hausman tests were performed, one each for the accrual-based conservatism
(CONACCR) and asymmetric timeliness (AT). In both conservatism models, the
Hausman tests were significant at the 1% level, thus rejecting the null hypothesis.
Accordingly, the fixed effects model clustered at firm level was used to estimate the
effect of the independent variables on accounting conservatism. Pirie and Smith
(2008) who examined accounting information of Malaysian firms suggested that firm
fixed effects model is a preferred specification in the Malaysian market because it
provides more informative results as it incorporates fixed effects for individual firms.

4.7.4. Diagnostic Tests
This section explains the diagnostic tests performed on the data employed in this
thesis. First, the diagnostic tests on the data distributions in terms of normality,
extreme outliers and multicollinearity are discussed.

Second, diagnostic tests

specifically for the panel data are presented, namely contemporaneous correlation
(also known as cross sectional dependence), heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.

4.7.4.1.

Normality

Normality refers to the shape of data distributions for an individual quantitative data
variable and its correspondence to the normal distribution.

Normality is a

fundamental assumption in multivariate analysis, such that a sufficiently large
deviation from normality will lead to invalid statistical results (Hair, Black, Babin,
Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). In multivariate analysis, the residual, which is the
difference between the observed and predicted values, is assumed to be independent
and normally distributed. Accordingly, the residual is assessed for normality testing.
Should the examination of residuals meet the assumption, it is unnecessary to check
the normality of individual variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007)
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Skewness and kurtosis are among the common statistical tests for normality.
Skewness reflects the balance of the distribution, with the skewness of non normal
distribution shifted to one side (left or right). Kurtosis refers to “peakedness” or
“flatness” of the distribution compared to normal distribution.

Tabachnick and

Fidell (2007) claimed that the use of skewness and kurtosis statistical tests are
sensitive in a large data set. A variable with significant skewness or kurtosis often
does not deviate enough from normality to make a significant difference to the
analysis. They suggest looking at the shape of the distribution on a graph. The
distributions of the residual based on standardized normal probability plots (pnorm),
which are sensitive to non-normality in the middle range of data, was observed.
Further, as recommended by Miller (1997), the residual was observed against the
quartiles of a normal distribution (qnorm), which is sensitive to non-normality near
the tails. Hair et al. (2006) stated that the normal probability plot is a reliable
approach as actual data values are compared with the cumulative distribution of
normal distribution. A line representing the actual data that closely follows the
diagonal line (normal distribution) indicates normality.

Examination of the

normality plot of CONACCR and AT models employed in this thesis indicated
minor deviation from normality.

Since this thesis examined data from a large

sample, this condition may not distort the results as significant departure from non
normality may be negligible for a sample size of 200 or more (Hair et al., 2006).

4.7.4.2.

Outliers

Transformation is one of the options to solve a normality problem cause by the
outliers. However, some authors have argued against it. Grissom (2000) argued that
the means of transformed data can occasionally reverse the difference of means of
the original data. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) highlighted that data transformations
are not usually recommended, although they are feasible as a remedy for outliers and
for failures of normality.

This thesis detected multivariate outliers using the method developed by Hadi (1992,
1994). The procedure was conducted using the hadimvo syntax, which method is
more robust than the classical Mahalanobis Distance (Hadi, 1992). Extreme points
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identified were further investigated to ensure that they were not due to data entry
error. Upon deletion of the outliers, the initial sample of 300 companies observed
from year 2001 to 2007 (2100 firm-year observations) were reduced to 2031 firmyear observations for CONACCR model and 2012 firm-year observations for AT
model.

4.7.4.3.

Multicollinearity

According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) and Hair et al. (2006), a multicollinearity
problem exists if the correlation between independent variables exceeds 0.9. The
Pearson and Spearman correlations shown in Table 5.4 indicated that the highest
correlation was between Bumiputera directors on board (BBR) and Bumiputera
directors on audit committee (ACBR) at 0.71. Also, correlation between Chinese
directors on board (BCR) and Chinese directors on audit committee (ACCR) was
0.73.

In addition to the correlation values, the test on the variance inflation factor (VIF) is
performed since multicollinearity cannot necessarily be detected or ruled out by
examining the matrix of the correlations between variables (Hamilton, 2009). VIF is
an indicator of the effect that the other independent variables have on the standard
error of a regression coefficient. VIF that exceeds 10 suggests collinearity problems.
The VIF test ran on the independent variables used in this thesis showed that the
highest VIF was 7.91 for ACCR. The above correlation and VIF values suggest that
there is no multicollinearity problem between the independent variables; hence these
variables can be fitted into one regression model.

4.7.4.4.

Contemporaneous Correlation

Contemporaneous correlation, also known as cross sectional dependence refers to the
correlation of unobserved factors across units. This cross-sectional dependence is
more likely to occur for a sample with cross-section units (Wooldridge, 2003).
Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) suggested that strong interdependencies between crosssectional units can plausibly follow from the economic and financial factors that are
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integrated in country and financial entities. Thus, a similar response could have been
experienced by individuals as explained by genuinely interdependent preferences,
neighbourhood effects, herd behaviours and social norms. Ignoring its presence will
cause bias in the standard error estimation. The test on cross-sectional dependence
in STATA was performed using xtcds, pesaran syntax which is valid for panel data
that has large N and small T (Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). This procedure implements
a parametric testing procedure proposed by Pesaran (2004).

The test on cross-sectional dependence was carried out on the two regression models
employed in this thesis, which are accrual-based conservatism (CONACCR) and
asymmetric timeliness (AT), but only the test on the AT model showed a significant
p-value indicating the presence of cross sectional dependence.

Accordingly,

standard errors with the presence of cross sectional dependence need to be corrected.

4.7.4.5.

Heteroskedasticity

Homoskedasticity is where the error process is independently and identically
distributed.

Although the error process may be homoskedastic within cross-

sectional units, its variance may differ across units: a condition known as groupwise
heteroskedasticity (Baum, 2001).

According to Baltagi (2008), assuming

homoskedasticity in regression disturbances of panel data model is a restrictive
assumption because every unit has its own individual characteristics or heterogeneity
which remains constant overtime.

Baltagi (2008) further stated that ignoring the presence of heteroskedasticity
produced a consistent but inefficient estimate of the regression coefficients, and the
standard errors of these estimates would be biased. Heteroskedasticity of the error
term is tested based on a modified Wald statistic (Baltagi, 2008). This test was
performed using xttest3 syntax in STATA. The test carried out on CONACCR and
AT models confirmed the presence of heteroskedasticity in the residual.
Accordingly, standard errors with the presence of heteroskedasticity need to be
corrected.
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4.7.4.6.

Autocorrelation

Autocorrelation, also known as serial correlation, refers to the correlation of error
components across time periods. This condition violates the classical assumption of
regression analysis but it is a reasonable characteristic of error term in time series
analysis (Wooldridge, 2003). Autocorrelation is likely to have more substantial
influence on the estimated covariance matrix of the least square estimator than is
heteroskedasticity (Greene, 2008, p. 211).
The tests to detect the presence of autocorrelation was carried out using xtserial
syntax in STATA, which implements a test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic
errors of a linear panel-data model, as discussed by Wooldridge (2002). The tests on
CONACCR and AT models confirmed the presence of autocorrelation.

4.8.

Robust Standard Error

The diagnostic tests on the panel data detected the presence of cross sectional
dependence, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residual of the AT model.
According to Sarafidis, Yamagata and Robertson (2009), time dummies are a
popular approach undertaken by researchers to overcome the cross sectional
dependence problem.

However, Sarafidis et al. (2009) claimed that the time

dummies are not effective if all pairs of cross section units do not have identical
cross section dependence, which is commonly the case. Researchers generally make
this assumption such that time dummies in models purge the cross section
dependence (Hoechle, 2007). Petersen (2009) explained that time dummies will
remove the cross sectional dependence completely, only if the time effect is fixed. If
the time effect is not fixed, cross sectional dependence will remain and a robust
standard error clustered by firm can be biased. Accordingly, this thesis corrected for
the cross sectional dependence in the AT model by employing the fixed effects panel
regression estimates based on Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) standard errors. Driscoll
and Kraay’s (1998) standard errors is a nonparametric covariance matrix estimator
that is robust to cross sectional dependence, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(Hoechle, 2007). This procedure was performed using xtscc syntax in STATA.
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As for the CONACCR model, the diagnostic tests detected the presence of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residual. Hence, the standard errors in
the CONACCR model were estimated based on Rogers (1993) clustered at firm
level. Clustering at firm level, also called firm fixed effects, produces an estimator
that is robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-panel correlation. This
technique ensures that valid statistical inference on the coefficient is made.

4.9.

Goodness of Fit

Panel data regression reports three R2 values; (a) R2 within, (b) R2 between and (c) R2
overall. As explained in section 4.7.3, this thesis ran fixed effects regressions, hence
R2 within is used as a measure of goodness of fit of the models (StataCorp, 2009).

4.10.

Summary

This chapter discusses the research method employed in this thesis. In order to meet
the objectives of this thesis, accounting data and corporate governance data were
retrieved from Datastream and firms’ annual reports. A sample of 300 companies
over a seven-year period was selected but reduced after deletion of outliers.

This thesis adopted two measures of conservatism, namely accrual-based
conservatism and asymmetric timeliness. In respect of independent variables, inside
and outside substantial shareholders were investigated under the ownership
concentration. The attributes of board of directors examined in this thesis were
extensive covering board composition, board size, board tenure, board financial
expertise, multiple directorships and CEO duality.

Three attributes of audit

committee explored in this thesis were audit committee composition, financial
expertise and audit committee meeting. Bumiputera and Chinese ethnic groups on
the board of directors and audit committee were identified to investigate their effect
on conservatism.

Based on the Hausman specification test, this thesis employed a firm fixed effects
model.

Diagnostic tests on the data in respect to normality, outliers and
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multicollinearity were run. Additionally, diagnostic tests specifically on panel data
were carried out to determine an appropriate panel regression model that will
produces robust standard errors.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS
5.1.

Introduction

This chapter reports the findings of this thesis.

The sections are organised as

follows. Section 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables employed in
the regression model. Section 5.3 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlation
analysis. Section 5.4 reports the results of the multiple regression models. Section
5.5 presents the results of several additional analyses to identify the robustness of the
earlier tests. Section 5.6 presents the results on the moderating effect of ownership
concentration. Section 5.7 summarises the overall findings of this thesis.

5.2.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample of 2,031 firm-year
observations which were used to run the accrual-based conservatism (CONACCR)
model. E/P, R and MTB used in the asymmetric timeliness (AT) model were based
on 2012 firm-year observations. The mean value of the CONACCR is -0.006 lower
than the mean value of accrual-based conservatism for US firms at 0.010 reported by
both A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan
(2008).

Different institutional factors, such as ownership structure, might have

driven this discrepancy, as Malaysian firms’ ownership structure is highly
concentrated to large shareholders in contrast to widely held ownership structure in
US.

The descriptive statistics showed that the mean ownership by insiders (OCIN) was
31.03% and mean ownership by outsiders (OCOUT) was 22.48%. Mean value of
OCIN found in this thesis (and previously documented by other Malaysian studies)
is far higher than those reported by studies in other countries. For instance, LaFond
and Roychowdhury (2008) who examined US firms, reported a mean ownership of
4.5% for top five managers and Baek et al. (2009) examined firms listed in Standard
& Poor index reported that top five managers in the firms hold an average of 1.88%
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of equity shares and the mean ownership of the blockholding is 7.61%.

High

shareholdings by the insiders obtained in this thesis impose concerns whether they
used their controlling power for personal benefit as argued by Yeo et al. (2002).

Table 5.1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
-0.006
-0.008
0.053
0.144
0.174
0.449
0.162
0.110
0.624
31.029
32.580
20.917
22.477
14.490
23.727
0.401
0.375
0.112
7.683
7.000
1.889
6.763
6.000
4.328
0.267
0.250
0.157
0.480
0.500
0.290
0.696
0.670
0.125
0.369
0.330
0.190
4.693
5.000
0.962
0.371
0.333
0.237
0.409
0.330
0.285
0.531
0.571
0.264
0.525
0.500
0.297
1,160,000
247,000 3,500,000
0.052
0.045
0.084
0.087
0.036
0.117
9.096
6.910
29.100
1.055
0.836
0.785

Variable
CONACCR
E/P
R
OCIN (%)
OCOUT (%)
BID
BS
BT
BF
BSHIP
ACID
ACF
ACM
BBR
ACBR
BCR
ACCR
TA (RM’000)
PROF
LEV
SGROW (%)
MTB
Dummy Variables:
BCD=1 (Combined CEO-chairman roles) : 4.8%
AUD=1 (Big 4 audit firms)
: 65.5%

Min
Max
-0.254
0.281
-2.416
2.542
-1.780
3.280
0.000
81.230
0.000
92.500
0.000
1.000
3.000
17.000
0.000
31.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
2.000
10.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
21,200 44,000,000
-0.341
0.537
0.000
0.693
-91.720
172.630
-1.776
5.683

CONACCR= Accrual-based conservatism, E/P= Earning price ratio, R= Annual share return,
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial expertise,
BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, ACID= Audit committee composition, ACF= Audit committee
financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR=
Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on
audit committee, TA= total assets value, PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, SGROW= Sales
growth, MTB= Market to book ratio, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-Chairman combine; 0 otherwise,
AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0 otherwise.
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The mean value of board composition (BID) indicated that firms had complied with
the recommendation of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) to
have at least one third of the board comprising independent non-executive directors.
This mean value of 0.40 however, indicated that 60% of the board composition in
Malaysian firms was dominated by the insiders. Also, about 70% of the audit
committee members were independent directors following the Malaysian Code on
Corporate Governance (MCCG) recommendation that independent directors must
dominate the audit committee. However, the minimum zero values of both BID and
ACID indicated the non-presence of independent directors on the board of directors
and audit committee in some firms. Examination on a yearly basis revealed that the
minimum values occurred in 2001 and 2002, which were the transition periods
before firms fully complied with the MCCG implemented in 2001. In fact, the
compliance deadlines set then by KLSE (now known as Bursa Malaysia) were
extended three times during 31 March 2002 to 31 March 2003 (Haron et al., 2005).

The average board size reported in this thesis was eight directors, similar to Haniffa
and Hudaib (2006) and Rahman and Ali (2006). The board size is appropriate as
exceeding eight is deemed ineffective (Jensen, 1993).

The average tenure of

independent directors on the board (BT) was seven years, the longest being thirtyone years.

An insight into the data showed that the average tenure increased

gradually from 2001 to 2007, suggesting that the same independent directors
continued to serve the same companies throughout the period. The statistic showed
that on average 48% of the board members had more than two outside directorships;
implying that half of the board were busy or probably had more experience from
their service on other boards. The duality role in Malaysian firms is considered
small with only 4.8% of the sample combining the CEO and chairman roles. G. V.
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) who examined US firms reported that 79% of their
sample combined the two roles. There has been an improvement to the leadership
structure of Malaysian firms compared to that reported previously. For instance, a
statistic of 25.7% was reported for the study period 1996 to 2000 (Haniffa & Hudaib,
2006) and 12% for 2001 (Muniandy, 2007).

Despite this fact however, board

independence in Malaysian firms is not a guarantee because a majority of substantial
shareholders in Malaysian firms sit on the board, and hence may influence decisions
of the board.
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In respect of financial expertise, on average 37% of the audit committee members
had financial expertise (ACF) relative to 27% on the board (BF). The zero minimum
value for the BF and ACF indicated that there were firms which did not have
financial expertise on their board or audit committee. An analysis of the sample
firms showed that 107 firm-year observations (5.27%) did not have financial
expertise. A further examination of the data showed that the absence of financial
expertise in the audit committee not only occurred in 2001, but continued until 2007.
In 2001, 51 firms (17.59%) did not have financial expertise on their audit committee,
but this reduced to 11 firms (3.90%) in 2007. This outcome suggests that although it
is mandatory for firms to have at least one member of the audit committee with
financial expertise, some firms breached the rules. Firms are not required to appoint
financial expertise on the board; but since audit committees are required to do so,
and the audit committee members are appointed from the board of directors, the rules
have indirectly strengthened the board structure.

This thesis found that the

proportion of financial expertise in the board of directors had increased from an
average of 22.38% in 2001 to 29.19% in 2007.

The average number of audit committee meetings (ACM) held per year was about
five meetings, and the most frequent was ten meetings per year. Based on the firmyear observations, 43.72% of the observations met four times a year, followed by
38.95% of the observations met five times a year. Less than four meetings a year
was represented by 3.34% and more than five meetings a year was represented by
13.98% of the observations. The statistics showed that a majority of the Malaysian
firms have active members in the audit committee.

The mean proportion of Chinese directors on the board (BCR) and audit committees
(ACCR) were both 0.53. The mean proportions of Bumiputera directors on board
(BBR) and audit committee (ACBR) were 0.37 and 0.41 respectively. The values
indicated that both board and audit committee were represented by more Chinese
than Bumiputera directors. The mean ratio of Bumiputera on the board is consistent
with Salleh et al. (2006) of 38% but lower than Rahman and Ali (2006) of 48%.
About 66% of the sample was audited by big four audit firms (AUD). This is close
to the number reported by Yatim et al. (2006) of 68.8%.
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Table 5.2
Percentage of firms based on Ownership Concentration
Insiders and
Dispersed Concentrated
Insiders
Outsiders
Outsiders
ownership
Ownership
dominant dominant
dominant
Full
sample
(N=2031)
2001
(n=290)
2002
(n=291)
2003
(n=292)
2004
(n=289)
2005
(n=293)
2006
(n=294)
2007
(n=282)

Combination

3.25

96.75

52.63

24.42

17.33

2.36

2.41

97.58

50.34

24.14

21.38

1.72

2.41

97.60

52.58

22.34

19.24

3.44

2.74

97.26

52.40

21.92

20.89

2.05

3.81

96.20

54.33

23.88

15.57

2.42

4.44

95.57

52.22

25.60

16.04

1.71

3.74

96.26

53.06

26.19

14.29

2.72

3.19

96.81

53.55

26.95

13.83

2.48

Table 5.2 presents statistics on the percentage of firms with dispersed and
concentrated ownership. Following Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999), Chu
and Cheah (2006) and H. J. A. Ahmed (2009), shareholding below 20 percent was
labelled as a dispersed structure. Based on the full sample, only 3.25% of the
distributions had dispersed ownership whilst the remaining 96.75% had concentrated
ownership. Of the firms with concentrated ownership, 52.63% were dominated by
insiders, 24.42% were dominated by outsiders and 17.33% were dominated by both
insiders and outsiders. The yearly distributions showed that firms with dispersed
ownership remained below 5% and those with concentrated ownership remained
above 90% throughout.

The information also indicated that insiders were the

dominant owners of the firms. This condition warrants investigation to determine
whether inside or outside substantial shareholders have a different effect on the
conservatism.

To identify if there is any significant difference in conservatism practices between
the dispersed and concentrated ownership, t-tests were performed and results were
presented in Table 5.3 (Panel A). The test was carried out only for accrual-based
conservatism (CONACCR) but not asymmetric timeliness (AT) because AT is not a
firm specific measure.
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a)

b)

a)

b)

Table 5.3 (Panel A)
Mean Difference on Accrual-based Conservatism:
Dispersed vs. Concentrated Ownership
Mean
Dispersed vs. Concentrated
Shareholding below 20%
0.001
Shareholding equal and above 20%
-0.006
Shareholding below 50%
-0.001
Shareholding equal and above 50%
-0.009
Table 5.3 (Panel B)
Mean Difference on Accrual-based Conservatism:
Inside vs. Outside Substantial Shareholders
Mean
Outsiders vs. Insiders
Majority outsiders
-0.002
Majority insiders
-0.008
Outside dominant owner (=>20%)
Inside dominant owner (=>20%)

-0.001
-0.010

t-statistic

0.928

3.236***

t-statistic

2.324**

3.134***

***p<0.01; **p<0.05

Different categories for ownership concentration were used.

First, firms were

classified into two: dispersed ownership (shareholding below 20%) and concentrated
ownership (shareholding equal and above 20%). Based on this measure, the mean
CONACCR of the dispersed ownership was positive (0.001) in contrast to the
negative value for the concentrated ownership (-0.006). The mean value suggests
that firms that were not closely controlled by the substantial shareholders were more
conservative than their counterparts, but the difference was not significant. Second,
the measure to split the groups was then changed based on shareholding below 50%
versus 50% and above. The cut-off 50% shareholding adopted here follows Chu and
Cheah (2006), who specified a shareholding ranging from 20 to 50% as dominant
minority while above 50% as a dominant majority. The result showed that the mean
difference of the CONACCR between the two groups was significant at the 1% level
but both groups displayed negative CONACCR. In order to investigate further this
issue, mean CONACCR was observed for firms classified into the 3 groups which
were shareholding less than 20%, 20% and above but less than 50% and 50% and
above (not tabulated).

The analysis showed that increases in shareholding

percentage were followed by decreases in the CONACCR mean. This outcome
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implied that as the shareholding increased, the demand for accrual-based
conservatism was reduced.

This thesis also compared the CONACCR between inside owners and outside
owners using two categories, and the results were presented in Table 5.3 (Panel B).
The first category was based on a majority shareholding and the second category was
based on a sub-sample of firms dominated by only insiders or outsiders using 20%
cut-off point of dominant shareholding. In both methods of classification, the mean
CONACCR for insiders and outsiders were negative and the mean differences were
significant. The test results indicated that while both insiders and outsiders were less
conservative, the inside owners were far less conservative than the outside owners.

5.3.

Correlation Analysis

Table 5.4 presents correlations between the CONACCR and independent variables.
Pearson correlations are shown below the diagonal and Spearman correlations are
shown above the diagonal. As compared to the Pearson correlation coefficient, the
Spearman correlation reduced sensitivity to extreme values. The positive coefficient
for outside substantial shareholders (OCOUT) is consistent with the expectation that
outside owners who demand better governance employed higher conservatism. The
negative coefficient for inside substantial shareholders (OCIN) is consistent with the
expectation that inside owners employed lower conservatism. Board attributes that
had significant associations with the CONACCR measure were board composition
(BID) and board size (BS). Audit committee attributes significantly correlated with
the CONACCR measure were audit committee composition (ACID), financial
expertise (ACF) and audit committee meeting (ACM). All control variables: auditor
(AUD), firm size (TA), sales growth (SGROW), profitability (PROF) and leverage
(LEV) were significantly correlated with CONACCR. The inverse relationships
between BS and CONACCR are consistent with the argument that large board size
reflects weak board, thus employ less conservatism. The positive sign on BID is
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Table 5.4
Pearson (Spearman) Correlations below (above) the diagonal*
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

1

-0.12

0.06

0.01

0.01

-0.03

0.02

-0.09

0.01

-0.06

-0.06

0.07

0.04

-0.04

0.07

-0.06

-0.07

-0.03

-0.15

0.16

0.08

-0.11

1

-0.63

-0.12

0.02

-0.12

0.03

-0.05

0.08

0.00

0.01

-0.04

-0.33

0.35

-0.27

0.28

-0.03

-0.20

0.02

0.00

-0.05

0.04

-0.73

1

0.02

0.01

0.04

0.05

0.17

-0.02

-0.03

-0.02

0.01

0.29

-0.36

0.21

-0.27

0.13

0.23

0.03

0.15

0.00

BID

0.07

-0.13

0.01

1

0.05

0.03

0.02

-0.26

0.07

0.31

-0.11

0.10

0.19

-0.15

0.09

-0.10

0.02

0.03

0.00

-0.04

0.03

BT

-0.01

0.03

0.06

0.01

1

-0.15

0.18

0.09

-0.05

-0.01

-0.15

-0.02

-0.05

-0.01

0.05

-0.05

0.05

0.28

0.09

0.15

0.11

6

BF

-0.01

-0.14

0.06

0.08

-0.19

1

-0.07

-0.17

0.06

0.06

0.55

0.04

-0.01

-0.02

0.05

-0.06

0.03

-0.03

-0.03

-0.07

-0.04

7

BSHIP

0.00

0.01

0.08

0.01

0.16

-0.07

1

0.04

0.12

0.03

-0.08

-0.04

0.01

-0.03

0.01

-0.01

0.08

0.21

0.00

0.09

0.08

8

BS

-0.13

-0.05

0.17

-0.31

0.09

-0.19

0.05

1

-0.10

0.05

-0.12

0.00

0.07

-0.11

0.06

-0.08

0.08

0.27

0.08

0.12

0.00

9

BCD

0.01

0.07

-0.06

0.07

0.00

0.06

0.12

-0.11

1

-0.07

0.08

0.04

-0.07

0.10

-0.09

0.11

0.03

0.01

-0.03

0.03

0.04

10

ACID

-0.04

-0.04

-0.01

0.36

-0.03

0.07

0.01

0.00

-0.05

1

-0.01

0.07

0.07

-0.01

0.06

-0.03

-0.01

0.07

0.05

-0.05

0.09

11

ACF

-0.06

-0.02

-0.02

-0.07

-0.19

0.54

-0.05

-0.08

0.06

0.04

1

-0.06

-0.09

0.10

-0.06

0.09

-0.01

-0.20

0.00

-0.03

-0.04

12

ACM

0.04

-0.04

0.03

0.08

-0.01

0.04

-0.05

0.03

0.03

0.06

-0.05

1

0.09

-0.04

0.07

-0.02

-0.14

0.12

0.02

-0.04

0.06

13

BBR

0.03

-0.36

0.36

0.21

-0.06

0.10

0.05

0.05

-0.06

0.13

-0.05

0.13

1

-0.79

0.71

-0.65

0.04

0.22

-0.02

-0.06

0.15

14

BCR

-0.02

0.38

-0.45

-0.16

-0.01

-0.09

-0.04

-0.08

0.08

-0.06

0.07

-0.06

-0.80

1

-0.58

0.73

-0.14

-0.24

0.02

-0.04

-0.02

15

ACBR

0.04

-0.29

0.26

0.13

0.06

0.10

0.02

0.05

-0.08

0.11

-0.07

0.08

0.75

-0.60

1

-0.88

-0.08

0.21

-0.03

-0.06

0.11

16

ACCR

-0.03

0.31

-0.32

-0.12

-0.05

-0.09

-0.02

-0.06

0.11

-0.06

0.08

-0.03

-0.67

0.75

-0.88

1

-0.01

-0.23

0.01

0.01

-0.06

17

AUD

-0.06

-0.05

0.14

0.04

0.07

0.01

0.08

0.08

0.03

-0.01

0.00

-0.12

0.05

-0.15

-0.07

-0.01

1

0.09

0.08

0.09

-0.06

18

TA

-0.05

-0.22

0.31

-0.01

0.30

-0.02

0.25

0.30

0.04

0.04

-0.17

0.14

0.21

-0.22

0.20

-0.22

0.09

1

0.16

0.12

0.33

19

SGROW

-0.15

0.02

0.03

-0.04

0.04

-0.03

0.01

0.09

0.00

0.04

0.04

0.02

-0.01

0.01

-0.02

0.00

0.07

0.12

1

0.08

0.06

20

PROF

0.16

-0.05

0.19

-0.03

0.15

-0.06

0.07

0.11

0.02

-0.02

-0.04

-0.02

-0.03

-0.07

-0.02

-0.02

0.10

0.14

0.05

1

-0.12

21

LEV

0.07

-0.04

0.00

0.03

0.11

0.00

0.09

0.06

0.00

0.10

-0.05

0.07

0.14

-0.06

0.09

-0.06

-0.06

0.40

0.04

-0.06

1

1

CONACCR

2

OCIN

3

OCOUT

4
5

*Bold text indicates significance at the 5% level or better
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consistent with the expectation that a board represented by more independent
directors employed higher conservatism. Additionally, frequent audit committee
meetings were positively related to conservatism. Surprisingly, negative signs on
ACID, ACF and AUD suggest that they led to lower conservatism. Coefficient signs
on ethnic groups on both board and audit committee (ACBR and ACCR) were
contrary to those predicted. However, since simple correlation does not consider the
joint effect of other variables, it should be interpreted with caution as it is subject to
omitted variables bias.

Inside substantial shareholders (OCIN) were found to be inversely correlated with
the proportion of independent directors on the board (BID), board financial expertise
(BF) and board size (BS) but positively related to CEO duality (BCD).

This

evidence suggests that the higher the proportion of substantial shares held by the
insiders, the lower the number of independent directors on the board, the lesser the
number of directors with financial expertise, the smaller is the board size and the
more likely for the firm to combine the roles of the CEO and chairman of the board.
The inverse association between OCIN and total assets suggests that insiders were
dominant in smaller firms. In terms of ethnicity, both on board and audit committee,
inside substantial shareholders (OCIN) were inversely related to Bumiputera
directors but positively related to Chinese directors. It suggests that greater numbers
of inside substantial shareholders were Chinese.

The outside substantial shareholders (OCOUT) were positively related to board
tenure (BT), board financial expertise (BF) and board size (BS) but inversely related
to CEO duality (BCD). This evidence suggests that the higher the proportion of
substantial shares held by outsiders, independent directors stayed on the firms’ board
for a longer term, board size was larger and the more likely for the firm to separate
the CEO and Chairman roles. In contrast to the insiders, a higher proportion of
outside substantial shareholders was positively associated with Bumiputera ratios but
negatively related to Chinese ratios. The relationship indicates that firms dominated
by outsiders had more Bumiputera directors on the board.

CEO duality (BCD) had an inverse relationship with the Bumiputera ratios (BBR and
ACBR) but was positively related to the Chinese ratios (ACBR and ACCR). It
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suggests that a board or audit committee dominated by the Bumiputera directors
preferred a separate leadership structure whereas the dominant Chinese directors
adopted the combined structure. Correlation between total assets (TA) and board
size (BS) suggests that firms that grew in size had more directors on the board. Also,
as the size of the board increased, the more active the audit committee became.

The positive correlation between the proportion of independent directors on the
board and audit committee (BID and ACID) with Bumiputera ratio (BBR and
ACBR) implied the domination of Bumiputera directors in the composition of the
independent directors.

The negative relationship between BID and ACID with

Chinese ratio suggests otherwise.

5.4.

Multivariate Analysis

Two sets of regression models representing two measures of conservatism were
employed to test the hypotheses in this thesis.

First, the regression model of

CONACCR is explained and followed by the regression model of AT. Results on
the hypothesis testing for both measures are presented after Section 5.4.2, according
to the hypothesis and independent variables.

The final section of this chapter

summarises the results.

5.4.1. Accrual-based Conservatism (CONACCR)
The following empirical model was employed to test the effect of ownership
concentration (H1), board attributes (H2-H5), audit committee attributes (H6-H8)
and ethnicity of directors (H9-H10) on CONACCR. Also included were control
variables which might have an influence on conservatism practices namely auditor,
total assets, profitability, leverage and sales growth.
CONACCRit = β0 + β1OCINit + β2OCOUTit + β3BIDit + β4BSit + β5BTit + β6BFit +
β7BSHIPit + β8BCDit + β9ACIDit + β10ACFit + β11ACMit + β12BBRit + β13ACBRit +
β14BCRit + β15ACCRit + β16AUDit + β17TAit + β18PROFit + β19LEVit + β20SGROWit +
εit
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Table 5.5 presents the results of the firm fixed effect regression for CONACCR. The
reported t-statistics for the CONACCR model were estimated based on Rogers’s
(1993) method and were robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The Fvalue of the model was statistically significant at the 1% level and the R2 within was
11.03%.

Table 5.5
Results of Accrual-based Conservatism
Predicted sign
Coefficients
0.197
-0.001
-0.001
+
+
0.026
-0.005
+
0.001
+
0.014
-0.014
-0.004
+
-0.011
+
0.005
+
0.002
0.094
-0.027
+
0.066
+
-0.023
+
0.004
-0.012
0.178
+
+
0.037
0.000
-

Variables
t-statistic
constant
1.12
OCIN
-2.71***
OCOUT
-2.17**
BID
0.9
BS
-0.42
BT
0.95
BF
0.58
BSHIP
-0.99
BCD
-0.14
ACID
-0.71
ACF
0.38
ACM
1.37
BBR
2.08**
ACBR
-0.77
BCR
1.55
ACCR
-0.69
AUD
0.57
TA
-1.29
PROF
7.15***
LEV
1.27
SGROW
-2.17**
F-value
4.41***
R2 within
.1103
N
2031
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID=
Board composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board
financial expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEOchairman combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit
committee financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on
board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board,
ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0
otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV=
Leverage, SGROW= Sales growth.
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5.4.2. Asymmetric Timeliness (AT)
The following regression model was employed to test the effect of ownership
concentration (H1), board attributes (H2-H5), audit committee attributes (H6-H8)
and directors’ ethnicity (H9-H10) on asymmetric timeliness (AT).

Independent

variables included in the AT model were similar to those in CONACCR, except
MTB was used in place of SGROW.
Eit/Pit – 1 = β0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3Rit*Dit + β4OCINit + β5OCINit*Rit + β6OCINit*Dit
+ β7OCINit*Rit*Dit + β8OCOUTit + β9OCOUTit*Rit + β10OCOUTit*Dit +
β11OCOUTit*Rit*Dit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes,
Ethnicity & Control Variablesit + εit
As explained in section 4.6.2, this thesis estimated Eit/Pit – 1 and Rit on a three-year
backward accumulation as suggested by Roychowdhury and Watts (2007).
Regression was also run using one-year estimate of asymmetric timeliness from
Basu’s (1997) original model and shown in Appendix A, column (a). The results
were similar except that more significant findings were found in the three-year
estimates reported in Table 5.6. The regression model was estimated based on a firm
fixed effect regression; and standard errors were corrected based on Driscoll and
Kraay’s (1998) method so that they are robust to cross-sectional dependence,
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Hoechle, 2007). The F-value of the model
was statistically significant at the 1% level and the R2 within was 23.74%.

The results in Table 5.6 depict the interaction of independent variables with each
item in Basu’s (1997) original model. Due to the lengthy list of interactions, only
main variables are shown in the table. The full list of the regression results is shown
in the Appendix A, column (b). Explanatory variables that interact with R (e.g.:
BID*R) represents their timeliness in recognising good news into earnings.
Variables that interact with RD (e.g.: BID*RD) represent the incremental effect of
recognizing bad news relative to good news into earnings; called asymmetric
timeliness.

If the variable leads to more conservatism, the coefficient on its

interaction with R (e.g. BID*R) is expected to be negative. Coefficient on its
interaction with RD (e.g. BID*RD) is expected to be positive.
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Variables
OCIN*R
OCIN*RD
OCOUT*R
OCOUT*RD
BID*R
BID*RD
BS*R
BS*RD
BT*R
BT*RD
BF*R
BF*RD
BSHIP*R
BSHIP*RD
BCD*R
BCD*RD
ACID*R
ACID*RD
ACF*R
ACF*RD
ACM*R
ACM*RD
BBR*R
BBR*RD
ACBR*R
ACBR*RD
BCR*R
BCR*RD
ACCR*R
ACCR*RD
AUD*R
AUD*RD
TA*R
TA*RD
PROF*R
PROF*RD
LEV*R
LEV*RD
MTB*R
MTB*RD
F- value
R2 within
N

Table 5.6
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness
Predicted signs
Coefficients
+
-0.002
-0.001
-0.001
+
-0.002
-0.421
1.351
+
+
-0.089
-0.169
0.006
+
-0.002
-1.017
0.571
+
+
-0.058
-0.075
+
-0.101
0.038
0.130
-0.355
+
0.412
+
0.199
0.043
+
-0.042
+
-0.283
0.848
+
0.211
-0.803
-0.224
0.461
+
0.100
-0.664
+
-0.172
0.218
+
+
0.028
0.056
0.474
+
-0.392
-0.265
-0.639
+
+
0.082
-0.202
-
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t-statistic
-1.76*
-0.7
-1.34
-0.4
-4.96***
3.23***
-2.83***
-0.83
1.92*
-0.31
-8.31***
2.07**
-1.29
-1.1
-4.87***
0.51
1.73*
-4.12***
4.25***
0.88
2.87***
-0.82
-1.35
5.88***
1.35
-2.14**
-1.33
2.71***
0.81
-2.18**
-2.69***
2.85***
1.46
1.15
1.91*
-0.53
-1.34
-3.89***
6.35***
-11.13***
27.02***
.2374
2012

***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
R= Stock return, D= dummy equal 1 if R is negative; 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board
composition, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple
directorships, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-chairman
combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee
financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board,
ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR=
Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0
otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV=
Leverage, MTB= Market to book value.

5.4.3. Ownership Concentration and Conservatism (H1)
Results in Table 5.5 showed that inside substantial shareholders (OCIN) were
negatively related to CONACCR and significant at the 1% level. This finding
implies that inside owners led to lower conservatism and they did not use
conservatism as a governance tool. This result is consistent with the argument that
inside dominant shareholders create agency conflict; and thus support the outcome of
the adverse effect of insiders ownership in Malaysian firms; for instance, high
ownership by insiders led to financial distress status (S. N. Abdullah, 2006b),
produced lower levels of corporate social responsibility (Ghazali, 2007) and reduced
financial performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ming & Gee, 2008).

The coefficient on outside substantial shareholders (OCOUT) was significant at the
5% level but the sign was the opposite of that expected.

Lower conservatism

practices by OCOUT suggest that they did not employ higher conservatism to
promote better governance.

This finding suggests that outside substantial

shareholders in Malaysia did not exercise their governance role through higher
demand of accounting conservatism.

These results confirmed that substantial

shareholders in Malaysia, regardless of whether they are insiders or outsiders,
adopted less conservative accounting.

Table 5.6 showed findings as in CONACC, where OCIN and OCOUT led to lower
AT reflected by the negative coefficients on OCIN*RD and OCOUT*RD. Their
effect however, was not significant suggesting that inside and outside substantial
shareholders had no direct influence on asymmetric timeliness. OCIN led to slower
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recognition of good news into earnings as reflected by the negative coefficient of
OCIN*R, but the effect was marginal.

The results from the CONACCR measure supported Hypothesis 1a that inside
substantial shareholders were less conservative. Also, based on the CONACCR
measure, Hypothesis 1b was rejected because the significant negative association
obtained on outside substantial shareholders was contrary to expectations. Based on
the AT measure, both hypotheses were rejected because neither relationship was
significant.

5.4.4. Board of Directors’ characteristics and Conservatism (H2H5)
CONACCR is expected to be positively associated to board composition (BID),
board tenure (BT) and board financial expertise (BF) because these characteristics
reflect strong governance mechanisms. Also, board size (BS), multiple directorships
(BSHIP) and CEO duality (BCD) are predicted to have inverse relationships with
CONACCR as these characteristics reflect weak governance mechanisms.

The

results showed that the coefficient signs on all of the board attributes were as
expected, but none of them were significant.

In contrast, BID was positively associated with AT (BID*RD) and significant at the
1% level. The effect of BT on good news (BT*R) was significant at the 10% level.
The positive sign on the coefficient suggests that longer tenure led to faster
recognition of good news into earnings, contrary to conservatism practices.
Nevertheless, BT had no significant effect on AT (BT*RD). BF was positively
related to AT (BF*RD), significant at the 5% level. This indicates that the higher the
proportion of board members with financial expertise, the higher conservatism
practices were adopted.

The effect of BS and BSHIP on AT (BS*RD and

BSHIP*RD) were consistent with the expectation, but the relationships were not
significant. Nevertheless, a negative significant coefficient for BS*R suggested that
a larger board led to slower recognition of good news into earnings. As reflected by
the negative coefficient, CEO duality was found to be more conservative in the
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recognition of good news (BCD*R) but not significantly associated with AT
(BCD*RD).

Hypotheses 2 to 5 were not supported if based on the CONACCR measure.
However, Hypothesis 2 with regards to board composition and Hypothesis 4b with
regards to board financial expertise were supported based on the AT measure.

5.4.5. Audit Committee characteristics and Conservatism (H6-H8)
CONACCR is expected to be positively related to the proportion of independent
directors on the audit committee (ACID), audit committee financial expertise (ACF)
and audit committee meeting (ACM). With the exception of ACID, the coefficients
sign on ACF and ACM were as predicted but all were not significant.

The negative effect of ACID on AT (ACID*RD) was significant at the 1% level,
contradicting the expectation that higher proportions of independent directors on
audit committee contribute to higher conservatism practices.

Previously it was

argued that, independent directors on the audit committee are expected to employ
higher conservatism because they represent strong governance. However, the result
showed that more independent directors on the audit committee led to lower
conservatism.

ACF was positively related but not significantly with AT (ACF*RD). This implies
that the merit of financial expertise to oversee the financial reporting process was not
strong enough to influence conservatism practices. No significant association was
found between ACM and AT (ACM*RD). The findings also showed that all the
audit committee attributes led to faster recognition of good news into earnings, as
reflected by the positive coefficients for ACID*R, ACF*R and ACM*R.

Hypotheses 6 was rejected in the CONACCR model because it was not significant,
whilst it was rejected in the AT model because the direction of relationship was the
opposite of that expected. Hypotheses 7 and 8 were rejected in both the CONACCR
and AT models.
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5.4.6. Ethnicity and Conservatism (H9-H10)
Turning to the effect of ethnicity, the positive coefficient on ethnic groups on board
suggest that higher proportions of Bumiputera (BBR) and Chinese (BCR) directors
on boards led to higher conservatism. Interestingly, the same ethnic groups on audit
committee however, behaved differently because higher proportions of Bumiputera
(ACBR) and Chinese (ACCR) directors on the audit committees led to lower
conservatism.

The direction of relationships between the ethnic groups and

conservatism was similar in CONACCR and AT, except that only BBR was found
significant in CONACCR whilst all the ethnic variables were significant in AT.
Significant relationship between BBR and CONACCR suggest that Bumiputera
directors on the board play an important role in the governance of the firms, as they
significantly led to more CONACCR. The mixed results supported Hypotheses 9b
and 10a but cause the rejection of Hypotheses 9a and 10b.

5.4.7. Control Variables and Conservatism
Out of five control variables, profitability (PROF) and sales growth (SGROW) were
significantly associated with CONACCR while auditor (AUD), leverage (LEV) and
market to book ratio (MTB) were significantly related to AT.

PROF was not

significantly associated with AT but the significant positive coefficient for PROF*R
suggested that profitable firms led to faster recognition of good news into earnings.
Except LEV, the other coefficient signs are consistent with the previous studies
notably A. S. Ahmed et al. (2002) and G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008). A
positive coefficient on PROF is consistent with the argument that profitable firms are
willing to be more conservative, while loss making firms are reluctant because
conservatism will further reduce their earnings. A positive coefficient on AUD is
consistent with previous evidence that big audit firms were more conservative in
order to protect their reputation and to minimise legal action should earnings be
overstated. A negative association between LEV and AT was surprising because it
contradicted previous evidence and the prediction that creditors demand higher
conservatism to protect their interest. The significant negative coefficient on MTB
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support the findings of Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) and LaFond and
Roychowdhury (2008) that firms with growth opportunities were less conservative.

5.5.

Additional analyses

Several additional tests were carried out to identify the credibility of the initial
results. Using dummy variable as an alternative measure, this additional analysis reexamined board size (BS), audit committee independence (ACID), audit committee
financial expertise (ACF), audit committee meeting (ACM) and leverage (LEV).

5.5.1. Board Size measured using binary variables
This thesis reported in the initial analysis that board size (BS) was not significantly
related to both CONACRR and AT. An insight into the data revealed that 51% of
the observations had less than eight board members and 33% had more than eight
members. The remaining 16% observations had the ideal eight members on board
suggested by Jensen (1993). This variation could possibly explain the insignificant
effect of BS on accounting conservatism when BS was measured using continuous
variable.

This thesis repeated the regression analysis where BS was measured as a dummy
variable, labelled as DUMMY_BS. Dummy variable coded 1 is for large BS (>8
members) and 0 for small BS (<=8 members). Eight members was used as the cutoff point following Jensen’s (1993) suggestion that exceeding eight is ineffective.
The coefficient on DUMMY_BS using that measure (not tabulated) was positive and
insignificant. The dummy variable was then changed to include eight as large BS.
Specifically, dummy variable coded 1, if BS is equal and above eight (>=8), and 0 if
otherwise (<8).

As reported in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8, the coefficients were

negative but still not significant. These results, therefore confirm the initial evidence
that BS is not a significant factor influencing accounting conservatism. Results on
the other variables are similar to the initial analysis. The full list of the AT results
are shown in the Appendix B.
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Table 5.7
Results of Accrual-based Conservatism: Board Size using Binary Variables
Variables
Predicted sign
Coefficients
t-statistic
Constant
0.189
1.07
OCIN
-0.001
-2.73***
OCOUT
+
-0.001
-2.19**
BID
+
0.028
0.95
-0.001
-0.2
DUMMY_BS
BT
+
0.001
0.97
BF
+
0.015
0.61
BSHIP
-0.014
-0.96
BCD
-0.003
-0.11
ACID
+
-0.012
-0.77
ACF
+
0.004
0.33
ACM
+
0.002
1.36
BBR
0.095
2.06**
ACBR
-0.027
-0.76
BCR
+
0.068
1.57
ACCR
+
-0.023
-0.7
AUD
+
0.004
0.57
TA
-0.012
-1.3
PROF
+
0.178
7.14***
LEV
+
0.037
1.26
SGROW
0.000
-2.18**
F-value
4.54***
R2 within
.1102
N
2031
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID=
Board composition, DUMMY_BS= dummy equal 1 if board size equal and above 8; 0
otherwise, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple
directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-chairman combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit
committee independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM= Audit
committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit
committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee,
AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total
assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, SGROW= Sales growth.
Table 5.8
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness: Board Size using Binary Variables
Predicted Sign
Variables
Coefficients
t-statistic
OCIN*R
+
-0.002
-1.99**
OCIN*RD
-0.002
-0.75
OCOUT*R
-0.001
-1.34
OCOUT*RD
+
-0.002
-0.44
BID*R
-0.365
-6.25***
BID*RD
+
1.436
3.3***
DUMMY_BS*R
+
0.024
0.75
-0.048
-0.75
DUMMY_BS*RD
BT*R
0.006
1.85*
BT*RD
+
-0.001
-0.17
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Variables
BF*R
BF*RD
BSHIP*R
BSHIP*RD
BCD*R
BCD*RD
ACID*R
ACID*RD
ACF*R
ACF*RD
ACM*R
ACM*RD
BBR*R
BBR*RD
ACBR*R
ACBR*RD
BCR*R
BCR*RD
ACCR*R
ACCR*RD
AUD*R
AUD*RD
TA*R
TA*RD
PROF*R
PROF*RD
LEV*R
LEV*RD
MTB*R
MTB*RD
F- value
R2 within
N

Predicted Sign
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

Coefficients
-0.988
0.645
-0.036
-0.100
-0.089
0.061
0.107
-0.414
0.404
0.190
0.041
-0.043
-0.336
0.962
0.221
-0.841
-0.231
0.538
0.088
-0.679
-0.187
0.233
0.021
0.056
0.527
-0.529
-0.256
-0.661
0.079
-0.197

t-statistic
-9.1***
2.2**
-0.77
-1.4
-4.36***
0.68
1.35
-3.59***
4.38***
0.83
2.71***
-0.81
-1.54
7.01***
1.35
-2.28**
-1.27
3.06***
0.68
-2.2**
-2.69***
2.87***
1.14
1.17
1.93*
-0.66
-1.33
-4.24***
5.56***
-8.5***
25.50***
.2358
2012

***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside substantial
shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board independence, DUMMY_BS=
Dummy equals 1 if board size equal and above 8; 0 if otherwise, BT= Board tenure, BCD= Dummy
equal 1 if CEO-chairman combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF=
Audit committee members with financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio
Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board,
ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equals 1 if big four audit firm; 0
otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage,
MTB= Market to book value.
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5.5.2. Audit Committee Independence using binary variables
The measurement for audit committee composition (ACID) reported in the initial
analysis was treated as a linear variable. The initial result suggested that a higher
proportion of independent directors on the audit committee led to lower
conservatism. This finding contradicted the prediction that outside directors who
provide strong governance would employ more conservatism to monitor the
management.

In order to confirm the credibility of the results, this thesis repeated the regression
model with alternative measures of independence; using 100% threshold and
majority threshold. Similar measures were employed by A. Klein (2002) and Bedard
et al. (2004) and they found that one of the measures was significantly related to
effectiveness. The use of 100% threshold is consistent with the Deli and Gillan’s
(2000) argument that non existence of independent directors on audit committee
makes the whole process non-independent. Saleh et al. (2007) employed the 100%
threshold by using a dummy variable; 1 for all members are independent and 0
otherwise.

Results shown in Table 5.9 maintain the initial finding that ACID had no influence
on the CONACCR. Results shown in Table 5.10 maintain the initial result that
ACID reduced AT. Specifically, firms with 100% independent directors in its audit
committee produced less conservative reporting as reflected by positive coefficient
on good news (DUMMY_ACID*R) and negative coefficient on asymmetric
timeliness (DUMMY_ACID*RD), and both effects were significant at the 1% level.

The second measure for the dummy variable is from using a majority threshold
consistent with the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance that requires
independent directors to be the majority members of the audit committee. A dummy
variable was assigned as 1 for majority independence (equal and more than 51%) and
0 otherwise. Results in Table 5.10 revealed that no significance. The full list of the
AT results are shown in the Appendix C.
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Table 5.9
Results of Accrual-based Conservatism:
Audit Committee Composition using Binary Variables
(a) Dummy = 1
(b) Dummy = 1
All independent
Majority independent
Variables
Predicted sign Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic
constant
0.205
1.16
0.201
1.15
OCIN
-0.001
-0.001
-2.68***
-2.68***
OCOUT
+
-0.001
-0.001
-2.13**
-2.14**
BID
+
0.019
0.74
0.022
0.87
BS
-0.007
-0.54
-0.006
-0.49
BT
+
0.001
0.93
0.001
0.94
BF
+
0.014
0.59
0.014
0.56
BSHIP
-0.014
-0.99
-0.014
-1
BCD
-0.003
-0.11
-0.003
-0.13
+
0.002
0.25
-0.003
-0.68
DUMMY_ACID
ACF
+
0.004
0.28
0.005
0.38
ACM
+
0.002
1.34
0.002
1.36
BBR
0.092
0.093
2.05**
2.04**
ACBR
-0.028
-0.8
-0.027
-0.77
BCR
+
0.065
1.51
0.066
1.53
ACCR
+
-0.023
-0.68
-0.022
-0.68
AUD
+
0.003
0.5
0.003
0.53
TA
-0.012
-1.34
-0.012
-1.33
PROF
+
0.177
0.177
7.1***
7.15***
LEV
+
0.037
1.25
0.037
1.27
SGROW
0.000
0.000
-2.18**
-2.18**
F-value
4.39***
4.40***
R2 within
.1099
.1101
N
2031
2031
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID=
Board composition, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial expertise, BSHIP= Board
multiple directorships, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEOchairman combine; 0 otherwise, DUMMY_ACID (a)= Dummy equals 1 if all audit
committee members are independent; 0 otherwise, DUMMY_ACID (b)= Dummy equals 1 if
majority audit committee members are independent; 0 otherwise, ACF= Audit committee
financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board,
ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR=
Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0
otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV=
Leverage, SGROW= Sales growth.

OCIN*R
OCIN*RD
OCOUT*R

Table 5.10
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness:
Audit Committee Composition using Binary Variables
(a) Dummy = 1
(b) Dummy = 1
All independent
Majority independent
Predicted
Sign
Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients
t-statistic
+
-0.002
-1.58
-0.002
-1.64
-0.002
-0.71
-0.002
-0.65
-0.001
-1.23
-0.001
-1.21
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(a) Dummy = 1
All independent
Predicted
Sign
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

Coefficients
-0.002
-0.394
1.226
-0.099
-0.188
0.005
-0.001
-1.025
0.576
-0.053
-0.100
-0.118
0.055
1.160
-1.176
0.391
0.236
0.046
-0.041
-0.288
0.853
0.240
-0.874
-0.229
0.487
0.121
-0.717
-0.172
0.214
0.028
0.058
0.474
-0.402
-0.282
-0.604
0.079
-0.188

t-statistic
-0.39
-4.74***
2.94***
-3.11***
-0.87
1.7*
-0.1
-8.86***
2.04**
-1.24
-1.48
-5.12***
0.73
8.02***
-4.16***
4.25***
0.97
3.02***
-0.78
-1.38
5.6***
1.49
-2.37**
-1.38
3.1***
0.98
-2.42**
-2.76***
2.74***
1.49
1.22
1.99**
-0.54
-1.38
-3.9***
5.42***

(b) Dummy = 1
Majority independent
Coefficients
t-statistic
-0.001
-0.34
-0.400
-5.01***
1.167
2.58**
-0.088
-3.45***
-0.216
-1.09
0.006
1.77*
0.001
0.08
-1.011
-8.65***
0.595
2.08**
-0.052
-1.18
-0.117
-1.52
-0.088
-4.2***
0.000
0
0.050
1.47
0.054
0.88
0.404
4.15***
0.265
1.15
0.042
2.94***
-0.040
-0.75
-0.262
-1.18
0.771
3.97***
0.194
1.17
-0.818
-2.25**
-0.202
-1.15
0.424
2.23**
0.084
0.66
-0.656
-2.23**
-0.177
-2.87***
0.227
2.87***
0.031
1.73*
0.061
1.28
0.466
1.96*
-0.447
-0.59
-0.278
-1.42
-0.656
-3.79***
0.081
5.98***
-0.188
-11.31***
1.53***
.2411
2012

OCOUT*RD
BID*R
BID*RD
BS*R
BS*RD
BT*R
BT*RD
BF*R
BF*RD
BSHIP*R
BSHIP*RD
BCD*R
BCD*RD
DUMMY_ACID*R
DUMMY_ACID*RD
ACF*R
ACF*RD
ACM*R
ACM*RD
BBR*R
BBR*RD
ACBR*R
ACBR*RD
BCR*R
BCR*RD
ACCR*R
ACCR*RD
AUD*R
AUD*RD
TA*R
TA*RD
PROF*R
PROF*RD
LEV*R
LEV*RD
MTB*R
MTB*RD
-11.11***
F-value
9.53***
R2 within
.2384
N
2012
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board
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composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial
expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles,
DUMMY_ACID (a)= Dummy equals 1 if all audit committee members are independent, 0
otherwise, DUMMY_ACID (b)= Dummy equals 1 if majority audit committee members are
independent; 0 otherwise, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM= Audit
committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit
committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee,
AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total
assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to book value.

5.5.3. Financial Expertise on Audit Committee
The initial analysis reported that financial expertise on the audit committee (ACF)
was not significantly related to conservatism. This result is inconsistent with the
governance role of financial expertise. Also, it does not support the findings of
Bedard et al. (2004) and Rahmat et al.(2009) that ACF is an important governance
mechanism.

While this thesis examined both board financial expertise (BF) and ACF in one
model, it is important to note that Bedard et al. (2004) and Rahmat et al. (2009)
explored only ACF in their study. Insignificant findings in this thesis may possibly
be due to the fact that BF is stronger in explaining conservatism practices, hence
reducing the impact of ACF on conservatism. Analysis was repeated after excluding
BF from the regression model to confirm if ACF is an important mechanism.

As shown in Table 5.11, the significant positive effect of ACF on AT (ACF*RD)
affirmed that financial expertise is an important attribute to enhance the quality of the
financial reports. The results, therefore support the findings of Davidson et al.
(2004) that investors appreciate firms that appoint financial expertise in the audit
committees.

A similar test was carried out on CONACCR, but ACF was not

significant, similar to the earlier finding. The full list of the AT results are shown in
the Appendix D.
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Table 5.11
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness: Excluding Board Financial Expertise
Predicted signs
Coefficients
t-statistic
OCIN*R
+
-0.001
-1.02
OCIN*RD
-0.002
-0.94
OCOUT*R
-0.001
-0.98
OCOUT*RD
+
-0.002
-0.57
BID*R
-0.430
-5.65***
BID*RD
+
1.431
3.39***
BS*R
+
0.031
1.47
BS*RD
-0.191
-0.89
BT*R
0.008
2.1**
BT*RD
+
-0.002
-0.31
BSHIP*R
+
-0.056
-0.86
BSHIP*RD
-0.051
-0.56
BCD*R
+
-0.076
-5.32***
BCD*RD
0.006
0.09
ACID*R
0.125
0.88
ACID*RD
+
-0.397
-5.72***
ACF*R
-0.049
-0.54
+
0.435
ACF*RD
2.17**
ACM*R
0.005
0.38
ACM*RD
+
-0.012
-0.2
BBR*R
+
-0.225
-1.05
BBR*RD
0.899
6.31***
ACBR*R
+
0.200
1.31
ACBR*RD
-0.791
-2.18**
BCR*R
-0.148
-0.97
BCR*RD
+
0.488
2.13**
ACCR*R
0.026
0.22
ACCR*RD
+
-0.571
-1.84*
AUD*R
-0.179
-2.82***
AUD*RD
+
0.214
3.41***
TA*R
+
0.013
0.65
TA*RD
0.073
1.45
PROF*R
0.453
2.02**
PROF*RD
+
-0.429
-0.57
LEV*R
-0.286
-1.38
LEV*RD
+
-0.677
-3.09***
MTB*R
+
0.090
7.02***
MTB*RD
-0.196
-9.24***
F- value
2.33***
2
R within
.2156
N
2012
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative; 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board

133

composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BSHIP= Board
multiple directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-chairman combine; 0 otherwise,
ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM=
Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on
audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee,
AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total
assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to book value.

5.5.4. Audit Committee Meeting using binary variables
The initial analysis showed that audit committee meeting (ACM) had no significant
influence on the conservatism practices. The regression analysis was repeated using
a dummy variable to measure frequency of audit committee meeting held by firms.
This approach follows Bedard et al.’s (2004) suggestion that there may be a
threshold in the number of meeting for the audit committee to be efficient.

Following J. W. Lin et al. (2006), dummy 1 was assigned for four or more meetings
(>=4 meetings) and 0 otherwise; labelled as DUMMY_ACM. Table 5.12 presents
results for CONACCR but DUMMY_ACM remained insignificant.

Results

presented in Table 5.13 for asymmetric timeliness, indicate that a threshold of 4
meetings is indeed reflective of an effective number of meetings as the coefficient
now became significant at the 5% level. The results on other variables were similar
to the initial analysis. The full list of the AT results are shown in the Appendix E.

Variables
constant
OCIN
OCOUT
BID
BS
BT
BF
BSHIP
BCD
ACID
ACF
DUMMY_ACM
BBR
ACBR
BCR

Table 5.12
Results of Accrual-based Conservatism:
Audit Committee Meeting using Binary Variables
Predicted sign
Coefficients
0.207
-0.001
+
-0.001
+
0.026
-0.005
+
0.001
+
0.015
-0.014
-0.004
+
-0.011
+
0.005
+
0.005
0.095
-0.027
+
0.066
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t-statistic
1.16
-2.74***
-2.21**
0.91
-0.42
0.92
0.6
-1
-0.15
-0.68
0.37
0.67
2.09**
-0.77
1.54

Variables
ACCR
AUD
TA
PROF
LEV
SGROW
F-value
R2 within
N

Predicted sign
+
+
+
+
-

Coefficients
-0.022
0.004
-0.012
0.177
0.038
0.000

t-statistic
-0.66
0.56
-1.31
7.1***
1.28
-2.16**
4.37***
.1096
2031

***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial expertise,
BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-chairman combine; 0
otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise,
DUMMY_ACM= Dummy equals 1 if number of audit committee meetings held is four and more; 0
otherwise, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR=
Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big
four audit firm; 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability,
LEV= Leverage, SGROW= Sales growth.

Table 5.13
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness:
Audit Committee Meeting using Binary Variables
Predicted signs
Coefficients
OCIN*R
+
-0.002
OCIN*RD
-0.002
OCOUT*R
-0.001
OCOUT*RD
+
-0.002
BID*R
-0.396
BID*RD
+
1.309
BS*R
+
-0.075
BS*RD
-0.199
BT*R
0.006
BT*RD
+
-0.003
BF*R
-0.942
BF*RD
+
0.492
BSHIP*R
+
-0.067
BSHIP*RD
-0.055
BCD*R
+
-0.100
BCD*RD
0.025
ACID*R
0.165
ACID*RD
+
-0.414
ACF*R
0.399
ACF*RD
+
0.180
DUMMY_ACM*R
-0.036
+
0.260
DUMMY_ACM*RD
BBR*R
+
-0.254
BBR*RD
0.823
ACBR*R
+
0.219
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t-statistic
-1.68*
-1.13
-1.06
-0.55
-4.46***
3.42***
-2.27**
-1.02
1.77*
-0.43
-9.45***
1.46
-1.38
-0.77
-4.5***
0.35
1.9*
-4.09***
4.1***
0.86
-0.63
2.33**
-1.15
7.52***
1.33

Predicted signs
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

Coefficients
-0.794
-0.225
0.485
0.116
-0.690
-0.189
0.231
0.032
0.047
0.490
-0.421
-0.276
-0.598
0.086
-0.201

t-statistic
-2.25**
-1.36
3.29***
0.9
-2.27**
-2.85***
2.7***
1.58
0.89
1.95*
-0.55
-1.12
-2.87***
6.87***
-9.66***
16.23***
.2363
2012

ACBR*RD
BCR*R
BCR*RD
ACCR*R
ACCR*RD
AUD*R
AUD*RD
TA*R
TA*RD
PROF*R
PROF*RD
LEV*R
LEV*RD
MTB*R
MTB*RD
F- value
R2 within
N
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative; 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial
expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-chairman
combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee
financial expertise, DUMMY_ACM= Dummy equals 1 if number of audit committee meetings
held is four and more; 0 otherwise, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio
Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on
audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0 otherwise, TA= Natural
logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to
book value.

5.5.5. Leverage using binary variables
Initial results showed that leverage (LEV) significantly reduced AT. This effect is
contrary to previous evidence and inconsistent with the argument that a creditor, who
needs to secure the promised payment, will demand higher conservatism to control
unnecessary or excessive distribution of firm’s earnings to managers or shareholders.
Therefore, this thesis employed an alternative measure of leverage using a dummy
variable to distinguish levered firms and non-levered firms. A dummy was assigned
as 1 for levered firms and 0 for unlevered firms; labelled as DUMMY_LEV. The
results for CONACCR in Table 5.14 showed that the coefficient on LEV was
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positive but not significant. Thus, using a dummy variable did not change the initial
result on the effect of LEV on CONACCR.

The results presented in Table 5.15 showed that the debt holders demanded more
asymmetric timeliness as reflected by the positive coefficient between LEV and AT
(DUMMY_LEV*RD). This finding confirmed that debt holders demand higher
conservatism to reduce conflict between them and the shareholders. The full list of
the AT results are shown in the Appendix F.

Table 5.14
Results of Accrual-based Conservatism: Leverage using Binary Variables
Variables
Predicted sign
Coefficients
t-statistic
constant
0.162
0.94
OCIN
-0.001
-2.72***
OCOUT
+
-0.001
-2.18**
BID
+
0.024
0.85
BS
-0.006
-0.47
BT
+
0.001
0.84
BF
+
0.015
0.62
BSHIP
-0.015
-1.06
BCD
-0.004
-0.17
ACID
+
-0.010
-0.65
ACF
+
0.005
0.36
ACM
+
0.002
1.4
BBR
0.093
2.09**
ACBR
-0.027
-0.76
BCR
+
0.065
1.54
ACCR
+
-0.023
-0.71
AUD
+
0.003
0.53
TA
-0.010
-1.11
PROF
+
0.175
7.2***
+
0.006
1.51
DUMMY_LEV
SGROW
0.000
-2.25**
F-value
4.44***
R2 within
.1087
N
2031
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID=
Board composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board
financial expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEOchairman combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit
committee financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on
board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board,
ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0
otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability,
DUMMY_LEV= Dummy equals 1 for levered firms; 0 otherwise, SGROW= Sales growth.
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Table 5.15
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness: Leverage using Binary Variables
Variables
Predicted signs
Coefficients
t-statistic
OCIN*R
+
-0.002
-1.87*
OCIN*RD
0.000
-0.11
OCOUT*R
-0.001
-1.41
OCOUT*RD
+
-0.001
-0.25
BID*R
-0.533
-6.1***
BID*RD
+
1.399
2.92***
BS*R
+
-0.135
-3.94***
BS*RD
-0.133
-0.72
BT*R
0.005
1.75*
BT*RD
+
-0.005
-0.99
BF*R
-1.091
-8.55***
BF*RD
+
0.715
2.44**
BSHIP*R
+
-0.081
-1.87*
BSHIP*RD
-0.051
-0.75
BCD*R
+
-0.053
-2.04**
BCD*RD
-0.005
-0.06
ACID*R
0.228
2.22**
ACID*RD
+
-0.473
-5.69***
ACF*R
0.392
4.16***
ACF*RD
+
0.082
0.42
ACM*R
0.036
2.69***
ACM*RD
+
-0.031
-0.62
BBR*R
+
-0.236
-1.2
BBR*RD
0.708
4.43***
ACBR*R
+
0.224
1.41
ACBR*RD
-0.753
-2.06**
BCR*R
-0.276
-1.84*
BCR*RD
+
0.485
2.56**
ACCR*R
0.198
1.6
ACCR*RD
+
-0.732
-2.35**
AUD*R
-0.193
-3.16***
AUD*RD
+
0.245
3.36***
TA*R
+
0.045
2.82***
TA*RD
-0.002
-0.05
PROF*R
0.458
1.9*
PROF*RD
+
-0.350
-0.45
DUMMY_LEV*R
-0.175
-2.86***
+
0.191
DUMMY_LEV*RD
4.59***
MTB*R
+
0.075
5.17***
MTB*RD
-0.203
-13.35***
F- value
28.73***
2
R within
.2321
N
2012
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***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial
expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-chairman
combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee
financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board,
ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR=
Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0
otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability,
DUMMY_LEV= Dummy equals 1 for levered firms; 0 otherwise, MTB= Market to book
value.

5.6.

Moderating effect of Ownership Concentration (H11)

The following empirical model was employed to test the moderating effect of
concentrated ownership (OCIN and OCOUT) on the relationship between firms’
governance (GOV) and conservatism (CONACCR or AT).

Accrual-based Conservatism (CONACCR)
CONACCRit = β0 + β1OCINit + β2OCOUTit + β3GOVit + β4 OCINit*GOVit + β5
OCOUTit*GOVit + β6BTit + β7BSHIPit + β8BBRit + β9ACBRit +
β10BCRit + β11ACCRit + β12TAit + β13PROFit + β14LEVit +
β15SGROWit + εit
Asymmetric Timeliness (AT)
Eit/Pit – 1 = β0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3Rit*Dit + β4OCINit + β5OCIN it*Rit + β6OCINit*Dit
+ β7OCINit*Rit*Dit + β8OCOUTit + β9OCOUT it*Rit + β10OCOUT it*Dit +
β11OCOUTit*Rit*Dit + β12GOVit + β13GOVit*Rit + β14GOVit*Dit +
β15GOVit*Rit*Dit + β16GOVit*OCINit + β17GOVit*OCOUTit +
β18GOVit*OCINit*Rit + β19GOVit*OCINit*Dit + β20GOVit*OCINit*Rit*Dit +
β21GOVit*OCOUTit*Rit + β22GOVit*OCOUTit*Dit +
β23GOVit*OCOUTit*Rit*Dit + BT + BSHIP + Ethnicity & Control
Variablesit + εit
Table 5.16 presents the results for CONACCR model. Column (a) shows the results
on the main effect of GOV on CONACCR and column (b) shows the results on the
moderating relationship. In column (a), the main effect of GOV on CONACCR was
insignificant whilst OCIN and OCOUT significantly led to lower CONACCR. The
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insignificant coefficient on GOV could be due to the dominant power of the
concentrated owners.

Column (b) shows the influence of concentrated owners on firms’ governance; the
main focus is GOV, OCIN*GOV and OCOUT*GOV. The results suggest that when
GOV was not influenced by the concentrated owners, GOV had a positive but weak
effect on CONACCR.

However, when GOV was interacted with OCOUT

(GOV*OCOUT), the coefficient turned into negative. The finding implies that in
firms with outside concentrated owners, the firms’ governance led to lower
CONACCR. No significant finding was obtained on the effect of OCIN on GOV.

Table 5.16
Results of Accrual-based Conservatism:
Main Effect and Moderating Effect
(a) Main effect
(b) Moderating effect
Variables
Predicted sign
Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic
Constant
0.198
1.1
0.119
0.620
OCIN
-0.001
0.000
0.180
-2.87***
OCOUT
+
-0.001
0.001
1.470
-2.2**
+
0.023
1.12
0.148
GOV
1.930*
-0.002
-1.220
OCIN*GOV
-0.003
OCOUT*GOV
-2.330**
BT
+
0.001
1
0.001
1.030
BSHIP
-0.012
-0.83
-0.013
-0.950
BBR
0.099
0.085
2.19**
1.840*
ACBR
-0.028
-0.79
-0.028
-0.780
BCR
+
0.069
1.61
0.058
1.320
ACCR
+
-0.023
-0.71
-0.024
-0.740
TA
-0.012
-1.33
-0.011
-1.160
PROF
+
0.177
0.178
7.12***
7.120***
LEV
+
0.037
1.27
0.034
1.170
SGROW
0.000
0.000
-2.16**
-2.220**
F-value
6.04***
6.00***
R2 within
.1066
.1123
N
2031
2031
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, GOV=
Firms’ aggregate governance measure, BT= Board tenure, BSHIP= Board multiple
directorships, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit
committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, TA=
Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage,
SGROW= Sales growth.
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Table 5.17 presents the results for AT model. In column (a), GOV had a strong
positive association with AT whilst OCIN and OCOUT were not significant. The
findings suggest that firms’ governance had significant power to encourage early
recognition of bad news in relative to good news into earnings.

Further, interaction effect between GOV and both OCIN and OCOUT were made to
observe if the effect of GOV on AT changes with the influence of the concentrated
owners.

The main focus is OCIN*GOV*RD and OCOUT*GOV*RD for

asymmetric timeliness on the recognition of bad news into earnings, relative to good
news; and OCIN*GOV*R and OCOUT*GOV*R on the recognition of good news
into earnings.

Results in column (b) showed that without the influence of the

concentrated owners, GOV led to more conservatism.

Specifically, GOV

significantly led to slower recognition of good news into earnings (GOV*R) and
faster recognition of bad news relative to good news into earnings (GOV*RD). The
magnitude of the coefficients on GOV was bigger than those in the main effect in
column (a).

When GOV was interacted with OCIN and OCOUT, the firms’

conservatism

became

lower,

as

shown

OCIN*GOV*RD and OCOUT*GOV*RD.

by

the

negative

coefficient

on

The finding suggests that the

concentrated owners influenced the firms’ governance to employ lower
conservatism.

Overall, Hypothesis 11a was not supported in the CONACCR model but was
supported in the AT model. Hypothesis 11b was supported in the CONACCR and
AT models.
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OCIN*R
OCIN*RD
OCOUT*R
OCOUT*RD
GOV*R
GOV*RD
OCIN*GOV*R
OCIN *GOV*RD
OCOUT*GOV*R
OCOUT*GOV*RD
BT*R
BT*RD
BSHIP*R
BSHIP*RD
BBR*R
BBR*RD
ACBR*R
ACBR*RD
BCR*R
BCR*RD
ACCR*R
ACCR*RD
TA*R
TA*RD
PROF*R
PROF*RD
LEV*R
LEV*RD
MTB*R
MTB*RD
F- value
R2 within
N

Table 5.17
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness:
Main Effect and Moderating Effect
(a) Main effect
(b) Moderating effect
Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic
+
-0.001
-0.9
-0.033
-5.31***
-0.002
-1.19
0.047
4.34***
0.000
0.27
-0.023
-2.42**
+
-0.003
-0.77
0.027
1.63
-0.839
-3.717
-6.18***
-5.43***
+
1.666
5.524
3.93***
4.92***
+
0.065
5.31***
-0.097
-4.77***
+
0.047
2.54**
-0.058
-2.09**
0.001
0.34
-0.003
-0.71
+
0.005
0.65
0.010
1.26
+
-0.021
-0.24
0.046
0.47
-0.085
-0.58
-0.153
-1.16
+
-0.310
-1.43
-0.336
-2.23**
1.158
1.103
8.23***
6.03***
+
-0.059
-0.29
0.001
0
0.550
0.435
3.4***
2.23**
0.312
1.52
0.367
1.79*
+
-1.007
-1.054
-2.55**
-2.4**
0.062
0.39
0.037
0.22
+
-0.676
-0.636
-2.29**
-1.88*
+
0.011
0.51
-0.007
-0.33
0.061
1.33
0.071
1.68*
0.445
0.458
2.03**
2.3**
+
-0.386
-0.53
-0.360
-0.55
-0.264
-0.99
-0.086
-0.39
+
-0.681
-0.969
-3.18***
-4.04***
+
0.072
0.067
4.28***
5.21***
-0.163
-0.148
-4.81***
-8.2***
16.11***
176.60***
.2039
.2240
2012
2012

***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative; 0 otherwise, RD = R*D, OCIN=Inside substantial
shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, GOV= Firms’ aggregate governance
measure, BT= Board tenure, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on
board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio
Chinese on audit committee, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability,
LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to book value.
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5.7.

Summary

The earlier section of this chapter presented the descriptive statistics on the data used
in this thesis. The descriptive analysis showed that Malaysian listed firms had
successfully complied with the best practices of corporate governance recommended
in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance.

Figure 5.1 shows the lines

connecting variables that have significant effect on accounting conservatism.
Overall, results in this thesis showed that concentrated owners had a strong influence
on the accrual-based conservatism (CONACCR) relative to the asymmetric
timeliness (AT). None of the board and audit committee attributes had a significant
effect on CONACCR. However, BID, BF and ACID were significantly related to
AT.

These results suggest that internal governance mechanisms influenced

conservative accounting depending on whether conservatism is measured using an
accounting based or a market based approach.

Additional analysis was performed on BS, ACID, ACF, ACM and LEV to confirm
the initial results. Whilst BS remained insignificant in the additional analysis, the
strong negative coefficient on wholly independent directors on the audit committee
confirmed the earlier finding that independent directors on the audit committee led to
lower asymmetric timeliness. This thesis found that firms that held at least four
meetings a year were positively related to asymmetric timeliness, suggesting that use
of a dichotomous measure is better able to detect the importance of frequent meeting
in producing quality financial reports. Additional analysis on the proportion of
financial expertise on the audit committee suggests that it is not necessary to appoint
financial experts on audit committee if there was already financial expertise on the
board. The effect of LEV on conservatism is proven when LEV was measured as
dichotomous variable to classify levered and unlevered firms.

The result is

consistent with the previous evidence that debt holders would demand higher
conservatism to protect their interest. Mixed evidence on the relationship between
ethnic groups and conservatism seems to suggest that ethnicity is not the real
influence on conservatism.
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OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION
Inside Substantial Shareholders (H1a)
Outside Substantial Shareholders (H1b)
Accrual-based

BOARD OF DIRECTOR
CHARACTERISTICS

Conservatism

Board Composition (H2)

(CONACCR)

Board Size (H3)
Board Skill:
Board Tenure (H4a)
Board Financial Expertise (H4b)
Multiple Directorships (H4c)
CEO Duality (H5)
AUDIT COMMITTEE
CHARACTERISTICS
Audit Committee Composition (H6)
Asymmetric

Financial Expertise (H7)

Timeliness
Audit Committee Meeting (H8)

(AT)

ETHNICITY
Bumiputera Director on Board (H9a)
Bumiputera Director on
Audit Committee (H9b)
Chinese Director on Board (H10a)
Chinese Director on
Audit Committee (H10b)

Figure 5.1: Results Summary of Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 10

Results from testing Hypothesis 11 shown in Figure 5.2, indicated that firms’
governance had a weak positive effect on CONACCR; when it was not influenced by
the concentrated owners. However, the firms’ governance led to lower conservatism
when it was interacted with the outside substantial shareholders.
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The firms’

governance had a strong positive association on asymmetric timeliness but when it
was interacted with the inside substantial shareholders and outside substantial
shareholders, both led the firms’ governance to employ less asymmetric timeliness.
The results confirmed the argument that concentrated ownership constrains an
effective function of firms’ governance mechanisms.

(H11a)
Firm’s aggregate
measure of governance
(GOV)

*NS

Accrual-based
Conservatism
(CONACCR)

(H11b)
*NS

Negative

Inside Substantial
Shareholders
(OCIN)

Outside Substantial
Shareholders
(OCOUT)

(H11a)
Positive

Firm’s aggregate
measure of governance
(GOV)

Asymmetric
Timeliness
(AT)

(H11b)
Negative

Negative

Inside Substantial
Shareholders
(OCIN)

Outside Substantial
Shareholders
(OCOUT)

(* NS = Not significant)
Figure 5.2: Results Summary of Hypothesis 11(a) and 11(b)

Overall, most of the hypotheses are supported in the asymmetric timeliness as
compared to the accrual-based conservatism, supporting the Givoly et al.’s (2007)
claim that relying on only one measure of conservatism may lead to incorrect
conclusions.
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1.

Introduction

The previous chapter presented the results of the hypotheses testing and the summary
of the results is presented in Table 6.1. This chapter provides a more detailed
discussion of the findings and provides further insight into the effect of ownership
concentration, attributes of board of directors and audit committee; and ethnicity on
the conservatism practices. It is followed by discussion on the moderating effect of
ownership concentration on the relationship between firms’ governance and
conservatism.

The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the results on ownership
concentration, section 6.3 discusses the results on board of director’s characteristics
and section 6.4 discusses the findings on audit committee characteristics. Section 6.5
discusses findings on ethnicity. Section 6.6 discusses results on the moderating
effect of ownership concentration on the relationship between firms’ governance and
conservatism. Section 6.7 presents the conclusions of the findings and section 6.8
discusses the implications of this thesis. Section 6.9 presents the limitations of this
thesis. This chapter ends with section 6.10 on areas for future research.
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Hypotheses

H1a

H1b

H2

H3

H4a

H4b

Table 6.1
Summary of Hypotheses Testing
Predicted
Findings
Sign
CONACCR AT

Inside Substantial
Shareholders (OCIN)
Proportion
of
substantial
shareholding
by
insiders is inversely
related to conservative
accounting.
Outside
Substantial
Shareholders
(OCOUT)
Proportion
of
substantial
shareholding
by
outsiders is positively
related to conservative
accounting.
Board
Composition
(BID)
Proportion
of
independent directors
on the board is
positively related to
conservative
accounting.
Board Size (BS)
Board size is inversely
related to conservative
accounting.
Board Tenure (BT)
Directors’ tenure is
positively related to
conservative
accounting.
Board
Financial
Expertise (BF)
Proportion of financial
expertise on the board
is positively related to
conservative
accounting.

-

(S)

(NS)

+

(S)

(NS)

+

+
(NS)

+
(S)

-

(NS)

(NS)

+

+
(NS)

(NS)

+

+
(NS)

+
(S)
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Additional
analysis
CONACCR AT
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Multiple Directorships
(BSHIP)
Proportion of directors
with
multiple
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is
inversely related to
conservative
accounting.
CEO Duality (BCD)
CEO
Duality
is
inversely related to
conservative
accounting.
Audit Committee
Composition (ACID)
Proportion of
independent directors
on the audit committee
is positively related to
conservative
accounting.
Audit
Committee
Financial
Expertise
(ACF)
Proportion of financial
expertise on the audit
committee is positively
related to conservative
accounting.
Audit
Committee
Meeting (ACM)
Frequency of audit
committee meeting is
positively related to
conservative
accounting.
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on the board is
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Findings

Additional
analysis
CONACCR AT

CONACCR

AT

-

(NS)

(NS)

-

(NS)

+
(NS)

+

(NS)

(S)

(NS)

(S)

+

+
(NS)

+
(NS)

+
(NS)

+
(S)

+

+
(NS)

(NS)

+
(NS)

+
(S)

-

+
(S)

+
(S)

148

Predicted
Sign
Hypotheses

H9b

H10a

H10b

H11a

H11b
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+
(NS)

+
(S)

+

(NS)

(S)

+

+
(NS)

+
(S)

-

(S)

(S)

Bumiputera on Audit
Committee (ACBR)
Proportion
of
Bumiputera members
on the audit committee
is inversely related to
conservative
accounting.
Chinese on Board
(BCR)
Proportion of Chinese
members on the board
is positively related to
conservative
accounting.
Chinese on Audit
Committee (ACCR)
Proportion of Chinese
members on the audit
committee is positively
related to conservative
accounting.
Main effect of GOV
There is a positive
relationship between
firm’s governance and
conservatism.

Findings

Moderating effect of
ownership
concentration
The power of the
concentrated owners,
represented by the
percentage
of
ownership, negatively
moderates the positive
effect of the firms’
governance
on
conservatism.

S= Significant; NS= Not significant
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Additional
analysis
CONACCR AT

6.2.

Ownership Concentration (H1)

Following agency theory, managerial ownership is regarded as an effective tool to
reduce agency conflict between managers and shareholders.

Although it is a

beneficial tool in firms with diffused ownership, the same is not true if the firms’
ownership structure is concentrated to the large shareholders. In fact, evidence has
shown that managerial ownership exceeding a certain point would be detrimental to
the firms (Korczak & Korczak, 2009).

Literature documented the merit of accounting conservatism to reduce agency
conflict as its application can constrain opportunistic behaviour and increase firm
value that ultimately protects the interest of the minority shareholders (Watts, 2003).
As predicted, this thesis finds that an increase in the percentage of shareholding by
insiders leads to a decrease in accrual-based conservatism.

LaFond and

Roychowdhury (2008) who found similar relationship argued it as consistent with the
substitution effect. As managers become owners, their interest is aligned with the
shareholders, thus the demand for conservatism as a monitoring tool is reduced.
They made this contention on the grounds that US firms, having a dispersed
ownership structure, used managerial ownership to reduce high agency conflict
between the managers and shareholders. Arguably, the substitution effect may not
apply in firms with highly concentrated ownership because manager-shareholder
conflict is no longer apparent, and the more pronounced conflict is between the
majority and minority shareholders. The findings of Leuz et al. (2003) that Malaysia
is one of the three Southeast Asian countries in the common law group having the
worst earnings management ratings, is plausibly an indication of entrenchment
activities in Malaysian firms.

Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) suggested that high

managerial ownership is unsuitable in the Malaysian business environment due to the
risk of misallocation of firms’ resources at the expense of the minority shareholders.
Hence, an entrenchment effect is a possible explanation for the result obtained in this
thesis because insiders do not need a mechanism that constrains their behaviour, so
they can conceal their expropriation activities (Korczak & Korczak, 2009; Kothari et
al., 2009). Where controlling shareholders adopt less conservatism, this means that
they can conceal their behaviour, thus confirming the argument made by Bidin
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(2009) on the risk that controlling shareholders extract firms’ wealth for their own
interest. Consistent findings were presented by Hu, Tam and Tan (2010) for Chinese
companies as the concentrated owners significantly reduced firm performance. The
findings in this thesis strongly support Haniffa and Hudaib’s (2006) suggestion that
necessary actions need to be taken to ensure that insiders do not misappropriate firm
resources, thus damaging firm value.

The inverse relationship between outside substantial shareholders and accrual-based
conservatism found in this thesis is contrary to expectation. Outside substantial
shareholders are seen as an effective governance mechanism because they would
demand transparent and quality financial information to secure their huge investment
in the firm.

Previous studies also showed the governance role of outside

shareholders to improve earnings informativeness (Yeo et al., 2002) and employ
higher conservatism (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007). Further, Malaysian studies
showed that outside shareholders reduce managers’ remuneration (S. N. Abdullah,
2006c) and reduce occurrence of financial distress status (S. N. Abdullah, 2006b).
The results in this thesis however, suggest that they fail to promote better governance
through higher conservatism practices. Similar arguments were made by Ming and
Gee (2008) that outside majority shareholders are not effective in their monitoring
role.

Despite the contradictions apparent from the above empirical findings, the reverse
effect obtained in this thesis may be influenced by the use of different means of
measurement. This thesis uses substantial shareholding held by outsiders as the
proxy for outside concentrated ownership while the abovementioned studies
identified the outsiders from large shareholders and from directors’ ownerships. As
defined in section 4.5.1, substantial shareholders are those who hold more than 5%
equity including their indirect interest via nominees. Since this thesis focuses on
concentrated ownership, the use of large shareholders or directors’ shareholding may
understate the measure of concentration intended. Specifically, large shareholding is
ranked based on high to low percentage of shareholding, regardless of securities
accounts belonging to the same person. S. N. Abdullah (2006b) employed the same
measure used in this thesis but with a sample period from 1999 to 2001. Recovery
from financial crisis during that period may encourage the outside shareholders to
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play a more prominent role to avoid huge investment loss if firms are subject to
distress.

Despite the findings on the accrual-based measure, ownership concentration has no
effect on asymmetric timeliness. Similar findings were obtained by Haniffa and
Hudaib (2006) that ownership concentration increases accounting return but not the
market return.

This result is also consistent with Dalton and Dalton’s (2005)

argument that managers sometimes have less direct control on the market measure of
accounting.

6.3.

Board of Directors’ characteristics (H2 – H5)

6.3.1. Board Composition (H2)
Supporting the agency theory, this thesis found a significant positive association
between board composition and asymmetric timeliness. As a higher proportion of
independent directors leads to higher conservatism, this finding supports the claim
that outside directors significantly enhanced board effectiveness and reduced
uncertainty (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The results are
consistent with Beekes et al.’s (2004) and A. S. Ahmed and Duellman’s (2007)
evidence on UK and US firms respectively. It is also consistent with the results of
other accounting research, outside directors reduced financial statement fraud
(Beasley, 1996), reduced earnings management (Benkraiem, 2009; Peasnell et al.,
2006), improved audit quality (Salleh et al., 2006) and reduced abnormal accruals
(Koh et al., 2007).

Board composition had no influence on accrual-based conservatism. This finding
suggests that effectiveness depends on the measure of conservatism; market based or
income statement based. In other words, independent directors were effective to
monitor market based accounting but lack the power to impact on the income
statement base of accounting. Significant influence of independent directors on
market based measure was also reported by Ameer et al. (2010) for Malaysian
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sample as they showed that independent directors significantly increased Tobin’s Q,
which is a market based measure of firm value.

Although this thesis did not find an association between board composition and
accrual-based conservatism, thus conflicting with A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007)
and G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008), it is however, consistent with existing
evidence for Malaysian firms. Malaysian studies reported that independent directors
were not related to firm performance (S. N. Abdullah, 2004), financial distress status
(S. N. Abdullah, 2006b), earnings management (Rahman & Ali, 2006) and financial
restatements (S. N. Abdullah et al., 2010). Therefore, board independence may not
imply the board as expertise or diligence in monitoring management as argued in
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) rather is perceived as a provider of service
and ‘window to the world’ for the firm as argued in resource dependence theory
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

The effectiveness of independent directors in countries with a concentrated
ownership structure has been a focal discussion in Asian corporate governance
literature (see: Barton et al., 2004; P. Klein et al., 2005). Some evidence showed that
controlling owners simply chose a weak governance structure when they appointed
less independent directors to the board (Hu et al., 2010; Setia-Atmaja, 2009). In
Malaysian firms, the presence of independent directors on the board, although
reflecting good governance practice, may in fact reflect controlling shareholders
choosing directors that favour their interest. S. N. Abdullah et al. (2010) showed
that, for sample firms that restated the accounts, their nomination committee was less
independent with high managerial ownership.

If members in the nomination

committee are dominated by the insiders, more likely they will nominate and appoint
directors that can go along with them.

This thesis found that the majority of

Malaysian firms’ boards were dominated by inside shareholders who might use their
power as controlling owners to overrule board decisions. Since managers have more
control over accounting-based measures than the market-based measures (Dalton &
Dalton, 2005), plausibly shareholders controlling power on accrual-based
conservatism reported earlier in this thesis dominated power of the independent
directors.

As a result, independent directors become ineffective because their

monitoring role is jeopardised by the interference of the management (S. N.
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Abdullah, 2004; Rahman & Ali, 2006). This may explain why independent directors
were not effective in influencing accrual-based conservatism relative to asymmetric
timeliness.

6.3.2. Board Size (H3)
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and Bursa Malaysia Listing
requirements are silent on the number of directors that should sit on the board.
However, they encourage firms to evaluate the board size to allow active and
effective participation from the board members. The result in this thesis showed that
board size did not determine conservatism practices in Malaysian firms. This finding
is not consistent with previous evidence that board size was related to earnings
management (Rahman & Ali, 2006), firm performance (Cheng, 2008; Guest, 2009),
voluntary disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009) or financial distress status (Chang,
2009).

Results in this thesis however, are consistent with Bonn et al. (2004) who found
insignificant association between board size and firm performance. Bonn et al.
(2004) recognised that board size is only a factual number of directors, and do not
reflect the directors’ skill and knowledge that are more valuable for a board to
function effectively. This thesis observed that financial expertise on the board is the
factor that had a strong positive impact on asymmetric timeliness. Hence, size of the
board is not an issue if the board members possessed the relevant skill to monitor the
financial reporting process.

6.3.3. Board Skill (H4a – H4c)
This thesis examined board tenure, board financial expertise and multiple
directorships to proxy for board skill. This thesis found that financial expertise was
the only skill that enhanced the accounting conservatism.

This thesis found that directors with longer tenure were faster in recognising good
news which will be turned into earnings. Longer tenure did not significantly affect
154

asymmetric timeliness, but the negative coefficient provided a hint that it reduced
conservatism. This finding implies that independent directors who stayed on the
firm’s board for too long did not enhance their ability to monitor. Previous research
had questioned the independence of the outside directors in Malaysia; since their
appointment was made by the owners, which in Malaysia’s case means the
controlling shareholders; or their appointment dependent on the availability of
talented individuals. (S. N. Abdullah, 2004).

Firms may decide to hold the

independent directors for a longer term because talented persons are not easily
available or the management has established a good relationship with the directors so
does not want to let them go. This phenomena is consistent with the expertise
hypothesis, that longer tenure enhanced directors’ experience and competency, but
the management-friendliness hypothesis suggests that the risk may outweigh the
benefit when the independence of the senior directors is impaired, as they become
too close to the executive directors (Vafeas, 2003). Independent directors who have
been serving on the board for a longer period may be influenced by the management,
especially when a Malaysian firms’ board is dominated by the inside controlling
shareholders.

Possibly, the directors’ long service itself helps the controlling

shareholders to pursue their own agenda and does not relate firm-specific knowledge
to the provision of quality financial reports.

A significant relationship between financial expertise and asymmetric timeliness
signifies the importance of accounting knowledge for directors to control
manipulation or produce transparent financial information.

This result supports

previous studies that highlighted the importance of financial experts (e.g.: Rahmat et
al., 2009; Rose & Rose, 2008). This finding also indicated that to achieve quality
financial reports, financial expertise is the relevant skill, relative to longer tenure and
multiple directorships. Directors that are equipped with financial knowledge can
understand and detect any irregular issues in overseeing the preparation of the
financial statements. A finding consistent with Lanfranconi and Robertson (2002)
who noted that lack of accounting knowledge would lead to financial failure of the
firm. The results in this thesis suggest that longer tenure and multiple directorships
are obscure in providing better monitoring, especially in observing matters relating to
the financial reports.
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This thesis found that multiple directorships had no significant influence on
conservatism, but the direction of the relationship suggests that multiple directorships
adversely affected the quality of the financial reports. Arguments on the benefit of
multiple directorships is essentially mixed, one suggests that participating in many
boards makes directors busy and less effective in monitoring the management (Ferris
et al., 2003) whilst others argue that it broadens the directors’ knowledge (Schnake et
al., 2005). However, Schnake and Williams (2008) later argued that when directors
were busy serving on many boards, they could not deliver their knowledge
effectively. Empirical evidence mostly supports the latter argument, with multiple
directorships found to be associated with lower conservatism (A. S. Ahmed &
Duellman, 2007) and higher earnings management (Sarkar et al., 2008). Similarly,
evidence in Malaysia showed that multiple directorships are not a healthy practice as
they reduced market performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Saleh et al. (2005)
reported that multiple directorships detected earnings management but only in firms
with negative earnings. The direction of the relationship found in this thesis is
consistent with the above evidence but it was not a vital factor that could affect the
incidence of accounting conservatism in Malaysian firms.

6.3.4. CEO Duality (H5)
This thesis identified that the board leadership structure of Malaysian listed firms
follows agency theory rather than stewardship theory. As reflected by almost 95% of
the sample, the separate roles adopted for CEO and chairman indicated that
Malaysian firms emphasized effective monitoring rather than effective leadership as
discussed by Daily and Dalton (1997). The separate structure is also favourable to
the practitioner and financial communities (Daily & Dalton, 1997). Separating the
CEO-chairman roles is not mandated by the Malaysian Code on Corporate
Governance, but if the roles are combined there should be a strong independent
element on the board and the decision to combine should be publicly explained. The
concern that CEO may dominate the board as argued by Jensen (1993) was not
prominent in Malaysian listed firms, as compared to firms in other countries like US,
where almost 80% of firms combined the roles of CEO and chairman.
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As predicted, the result shows that the coefficient on CEO duality was negative and
consistent in accrual-based conservatism and asymmetric timeliness models, but
none of them were statistically significant. The results suggest that conservatism
practices in Malaysian firms were not determined by the CEO or/and chairman
leadership structure. This result is not surprising because empirical evidence on the
CEO duality effect is indeed mixed. Some studies supported the agency theory
(Dechow et al., 1995; A. Klein, 2002; G. V. Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008; Rahman
& Haniffa, 2005), while others supported the stewardship theory (Brickley et al.,
1997; Farooque et al., 2007). There are also studies that failed to support either
theory; for instance, CEO duality was insignificant with accounting conservatism (A.
S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007) and earnings management (Cornett et al., 2008). This
suggests that no one theory is superior in all circumstances.

The results from this thesis supported the findings of Dahya, Garcia et al. (2009) and
affirmed that though separating the two roles had been a major practice in Malaysian
firms, it did not have a demonstrably favourable effect on the financial reports. S. N.
Abdullah (2004, 2006a) and S. N. Abdullah et al. (2010) who examined Malaysian
firms also obtained similar outcome. Some studies argued that CEO duality does not
produce the expected result because it was affected by other factors. For instance,
the structure was influenced by the complexity of firms’ operation and governance
characteristics of the individual firm (Faleye, 2007), firms decision to separate or
combine the roles was determined by family controlled factors (Lam & Lee, 2008)
and the effect of CEO duality on performance dependent on the firms’ performance
level (Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010).

In the Malaysian context, a separate

leadership structure does not promise board independence because the board is still
influenced by the inside controlling shareholders who are sitting on the board.
Coombes and Wong (2004) suggested that the chairman must be able to challenge
the CEO without fear of giving offence but this is unlikely to happen in Malaysian
firms as inside controlling shareholders are dominant on the board of Malaysian
firms. As discussed in Horner (2010), the board has a certain amount of ownership
power when the members of the board hold equity shares of the firm. In Malaysian
firms’ board, the power of the inside directors must be excessive because they hold
substantial ownership in the firms.

Hence, their controlling power may have

superseded the merit of separating the board leadership structure. Although the
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insiders chose to apply separate board leadership structure in the firms, they still
have the power to appoint the board’s chairman and may choose a person who is
within their circle of trust. As a result, separate leadership structure has no influence
on conservatism.

6.4.

Audit Committee characteristics (H6 – H8)

6.4.1. Audit Committee Composition (H6)
This thesis found that the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee
and wholly independent audit committees were inversely related to asymmetric
timeliness. An audit committee represented by a majority of independent directors
showed a positive sign but the effect was not significant.

Hence, the

recommendation of the best practice guideline to have a majority of independent
directors on the audit committee did not improve accounting conservatism. Also,
results in this thesis indicated that increasing the number of independent directors on
the audit committee led to lower conservatism.

Although outside directors are associated with strong governance, the findings in this
thesis suggest that independent directors on the audit committee were ineffective.
This result is consistent with S. N. Abdullah et al.’s (2010) findings that an increase
in the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee led to a higher
probability of financial misstatement.

Contradicting results between board

composition and audit committee composition suggest that these two mechanisms
reacted differently towards conservatism practices. This result is puzzling because
independent directors on the audit committee were also independent directors on the
board.

The result could be driven by the nature of the job undertaken by the

independent directors in respect to the committee they served.

Based on

responsibility, directors on the board have wider roles within the operation of the
business, in addition to just monitoring the financial reporting process. The roles of
directors on the audit committee are limited to the financial statement matters
including reviewing the outcome from the audits.

In this context, independent

directors on the board possessed more knowledge about the firm which then led to
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higher conservatism.

According to Zain and Subramaniam (2007), independent

directors who have limited knowledge about the firms’ business are not effective
unless the resource person who is the head of the internal audit function is strong and
well-resourced. Based on this point, it raises concerns whether independent directors
appointed to the audit committee were those having a good understanding about the
business or were merely selected randomly; or maybe directors that had not been a
good fit for other committees. If this is true, directors who were appointed to the
audit committee might not have the competency to monitor the financial statements.
This is an alarm to the relevant authorities that the status of being independent from
the management is not a guarantee of better monitoring. Consistent with DeZoort
and Steven (2001), this thesis believes that the competency of the independent
directors should be assessed based on the committee they serve, as roles of the
committees vary.

Since the audit committee is responsible for monitoring the

process of the financial reports, having outside directors with financial expertise
would enhance their governance role, as evident from Mustafa and Youssef (2010).
The independent audit committee members lead to lower conservatism could also be
driven by the influence of the inside concentrated owners, as reported by Zain and
Subramaniam (2007) that independent audit committee members were not free from
management influence. Other possible explanation is taken from the finding of
Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) that independent directors of the audit committee
were effective only in improving audit quality, but not financial statement quality;
and thus explain the lower conservatism practices of the independent directors on
audit committees reported in this thesis.

6.4.2. Audit Committee Financial Expertise (H7)
Financial expertise measures in this thesis followed G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan
(2008) who defined financial experts as directors who have qualification or
experience in accounting or finance.

Initially, financial expertise on the audit

committee was not significantly associated with asymmetric timeliness. However,
after excluding board financial expertise from the regression model, the coefficient
on audit committee financial expertise became significant. This change in result is
not likely to be due to a multicollinearity problem as the correlation between
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financial expertise on the board and those on the audit committee as shown in Table
5.4 was less than 0.9. The result suggests that board financial expertise was stronger
in determining the conservatism practices, than the financial expertise on the audit
committee. However, when board financial expertise was excluded from the model,
financial expertise on the audit committee effectively performed a governance role
leading to more conservatism practices. Excluding board financial expertise from
the model was intended to facilitate the observation of the effect of audit committee
financial expertise on conservatism. The results imply that financial expertise on the
board and audit committee are two important mechanisms for effective monitoring of
the financial reporting. However, when firms appointed financial expertise to both
board and audit committee, those that represent the board show an outstanding role.
It is presumed that being financial experts is an added bonus to the board members as
they already have wider knowledge about the firm’s business. This finding also
implied that board financial expertise is enough to promote quality financial reports,
even when there is no financial expertise on the audit committee.

The results in this thesis are consistent with McMullen and Raghunandan (1996),
Rose and Rose (2008), Dickins et al. (2009) and Rahmat et al.(2009) that knowledge
or experience in accounting among the audit committee members enhances the
quality of the financial statements.

6.4.3. Audit Committee Meeting (H8)
Initially, this thesis did not find any association between frequency of audit
committee meetings and conservatism practices when it is treated as a linear variable.
However, when audit committee meeting was assigned the status of dummy variable,
using a threshold of 4 meetings, it was significantly related to asymmetric timeliness.
This finding is consistent with evidence reported by Anderson et al. (2004), Abbott et
al. (2004) and Owens-Jackson et al. (2009), and hence showing that frequent
meetings improved the quality of the financial statements. On the flip side, G. V.
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) and Rahmat et al. (2009) failed to find significance
in the frequency of meetings, perhaps because they did not identify the threshold of
meeting frequency to detect efficiency.
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Findings in this thesis showed that the minimum number of 4 meetings per year is a
useful recommendation to improve accounting conservatism.

This thesis also

highlighted the importance of correct measurement in the analysis to ensure that the
contribution of a particular factor is appreciated. Although mixed evidence obtained
by previous studies were based on a similar measures i.e. total number of meetings
held per year, this thesis considers variation in the data distributions of respective
studies might be sensitive to one selected measure, so that changing it to a stronger
proxy would improve its predictive ability.

6.5.

Ethnicity (H9 – H10)

Gray (1988) proposed that the individualism concept relates to conservatism
practices. A review on Malaysian studies showed no uniform evidence to suggest
the individualism level of the Bumiputera and Chinese ethnic groups. Hence, on the
basis of individualism, it is difficult to predict the effect of the ethnic groups on
conservatism. However, the political hypothesis argued by Ball et al. (2003) and the
compensation incentive hypothesis evidence by Yen et al. (2007) led to the
prediction that Bumiputera directors adopt lower conservative accounting whilst the
Chinese directors adopt higher conservative accounting.

Results from this thesis, however indicated that the effects of Bumiputera directors
and Chinese directors on conservatism were similar.

However, the two ethnic

groups’ attitudes towards conservatism differed depending on whether they served
on the board or audit committee.

Specifically, this thesis showed that higher

proportion of Bumiputera directors or Chinese directors on the board led to higher
asymmetric timeliness. In contrast, a higher proportion of Bumiputera directors or
Chinese directors on the audit committee led to lower asymmetric timeliness.
Contrasting results on the ethnic groups between the board and audit committee
implies that ethnicity per se did not determine conservatism; and the results are
inconsistent with the individualism concept. Also, the results did not support the
political hypothesis and compensation or tax incentives hypothesis.
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Haniffa and Cooke (2002) also found contradictory results when they developed their
prediction based on the individualism concept. They argued that the result could be
influenced by other intervening factors, such as government policy, economic
incentives and religion. Tsakumis (2007) noted that the individualism concept may
be flawed because the direction of conservatism in his study was not consistent with
the level of individualism showed on his sample study. Mixed results from this
thesis suggest that the level of individualism, political and compensation or tax
incentives did not explain the conservatism practices of the ethnic groups. Instead of
ethnicity per se, plausibly other factors could explain directors’ attitude on
conservatism. A. Abdullah (2001) and Fontaine and Richardson (2005) found that
Bumiputera and Chinese ethnic groups did not differ except in terms of religiosity;
and this factor is yet to be explored on its relation with conservatism.

6.6.

Moderating effect of ownership concentration on the
relationship between firms’ governance and conservatism
(H11)

The results show that firms’ governance is effective when there is no interference
from the concentrated owners. However, as evident in the CONACCR and AT
models, the firms’ governance led to lower conservatism when it is interacted with
the concentrated owners. Inside substantial shareholders did not moderate the effect
of firms’ governance on CONACCR possibly because they have a strong direct
impact on the CONACCR, regardless of the firms’ governance. In contrast, the
inside and outside substantial shareholders had no direct impact on asymmetric
timeliness, therefore they used their controlling power to influence the firms’
governance to speed up the recognition of good news into earnings; and delay the
recognition of bad news into earnings.

The outcome is advantageous to the

concentrated owners because they are less restricted from pursuing personal agenda
and their expropriation activities are conceal from the financial reports.

This findings are consistent with Dahya, Dimitrov et al. (2009) who reported that
firm value was higher when the firms’ board were independent of controlling
shareholders. Further, the results of this thesis support Cho and Kim (2007) and V.
162

Z. Chen et al. (2011) that concentrated owners hinder the firms’ governance from
function effectively.

Also, confirms the argument that corporate governance in

Asian countries is ineffective due to their high concentrated ownership (Allen, 2000;
Globerman et al., 2011) and the copying of best practices from the developed
countries does not work in countries where firms’ ownership is highly concentrated.
(V. Z. Chen et al., 2011).

This thesis affirmed that although Malaysian listed firms are seen adopting good
governance structure, it is however, only in appearance. For instance, Allen (2000)
pointed out that independent directors who are being appointed by the controlling
shareholders may not be independent in fact. The mechanisms employed are in fact
ineffective because they are subject to the control of the concentrated owners.

6.7.

Conclusions

Concentrated ownership has remained in Malaysia for quite a long time.

The

literature has discussed this issue since M. H. Lim (1981) and it continues to be a
focal issue until the present time (see: Tam & Tan, 2007). This condition implies
that it is quite impossible, to suggest these controlling owners should sell their shares
in the market, and to apply dispersed ownership in practice. There is a lack of
supporting mechanisms such as takeover markets, effective board of directors, laws
and enforcement that will left managerial opportunism unchecked (Young et al.,
2008).

The controlling owners are “immortal” as a result of weak investor

protection, poor monitoring from the debt holders, ineffective governance
mechanisms and also the lower accounting conservatism found in this thesis.
Previous studies documented that accounting conservatism is effective to reduce
managerial opportunistic behaviours. However, this thesis found that accounting
conservatism was not a useful tool in monitoring the controlling shareholders
because they would choose to apply less conservative financial reports. Based on the
two measures of conservatism; accrual-based conservatism and asymmetric
timeliness, it was revealed that inside and outside substantial shareholders employed
lower conservatism. However, the controlling shareholders had a significant effect
only on accrual-based conservatism. Since accrual-based conservatism is an income
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statement measure as opposed to asymmetric timeliness, which is a market-based
measure, this finding is consistent with Dalton and Dalton’s (2005) argument that
managers have more control over accounting measures than the market measures.

This thesis found that good governance practices did not improve the quality of the
financial statements as none of the board of directors and audit committee attributes
influenced accrual-based conservatism.

The direction of relationship on the

attributes however, signalled that they influenced conservatism but were not strong
enough to challenge the power of the controlling shareholders. Significant effects of
board composition, board financial expertise, audit committee composition, audit
committee financial expertise and frequent audit committee meetings on asymmetric
timeliness proved that these structures could function effectively when there were
less influenced from the controlling shareholders. These findings provided evidence
to the argument made by Vichitsarawong et al. (2010) that corporate governance
reforms in Malaysia improved conservatism as measured by asymmetric timeliness.

The insignificant findings on the attributes of board of directors and audit committee
in the accrual-based conservatism model suggest that the power of the controlling
shareholders on the financial reporting process superseded the monitoring capability
of the board and audit committee. These results are not consistent with the US and
UK evidence due to the interference of controlling shareholders on the Malaysian
firms’ board. The results of this thesis showed that concentrated owners had no
direct impact on asymmetric timeliness; but the results from the moderating effect
suggest that they influence firms’ governance so that it leads to lower conservatism.
The results provide a clear indication that a good internal governance structure is not
effective to monitor the controlling shareholders because these shareholders
determine the performance of the governance mechanisms in the firms. The results
support Singam (2003) who claimed that, high concentrated ownership make it
difficult to achieve sound corporate governance systems in Malaysia. Evidence in
this thesis therefore, confirms the Cohen et al.’s (2004) argument that in some
cultures, corporate governance mechanisms are not effective tools to control
management opportunistic behaviour; and they suggested the court and legal systems
as effective governance tools.
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In respect to the separate board leadership structure, there was no evidence to suggest
that the split structure increased conservatism. However, the negative coefficient on
CEO duality signalled that combining the roles was damaging especially in firms
where insiders dominate the board. In respect to director’s skill, directors who had
financial expertise will enhance the quality of the financial statements relative to
longer tenure and multiple directorships.

Additionally, this thesis showed that

financial expertise on the board strongly led to more conservatism, while financial
expertise on the audit committee had no influence on conservatism. It may imply
that financial expertise on the board is more important than having it on the audit
committee.

Hence, the adverse effect of independent directors on the audit

committee on conservatism may not be caused by their lack of financial expertise but
other factors that impede them from performing their oversight role. This thesis
highlighted that having majority independent directors on the audit committee did
not result in quality financial reports. This result contradicts evidence reported for
the US and UK studies on the positive effect of audit committee independence on its
effectiveness, but it is supporting Bedard and Gendron’s (2010) suggestion that the
effectiveness of governance mechanism varies between countries due to their
different environments.

Further, this thesis concludes that ethnicity per se did not explain accounting
conservatism in Malaysian firms.

The results showed that an increase in the

proportion of Bumiputera and Chinese directors on the board led to higher
accounting conservatism but led to lower conservatism if they were on the audit
committee. Hence, the ethnic effects on accounting conservatism neither support the
individualism concept nor was it consistent with the political and compensation or
tax incentive hypotheses.

This evidence indicated that comparing Malaysian

financial reports with other countries may be possible, evidence that is favourable to
the proponents of harmonisation.
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6.8.

Implications of this thesis

6.8.1. Implications for Theory
The findings of this thesis imply that there is no one superior theory to support the
behaviour of the governance practices in Malaysian firms. Generally, the ownership
structure in Malaysian firms follows the agency theory on the use of managerial
ownership to reduce agency conflict. Also following agency theory, the structure of
the board of directors and audit committee are designed to be consistent with their
ability to monitor management.

Results from this thesis showed that the board of directors and audit committee did
not determine accrual-based conservatism; while inside and outside substantial
shareholders had strong negative effect on accrual-based conservatism. Positive
accounting theory suggests firms to employ accounting conservatism to reduce
agency conflict; but results in this thesis indicate that the decision to apply
conservatism is in the hands of the controlling shareholders.

The findings are

consistent with managerial hegemony theory that a board dominated by management
is not effective to reduce agency conflict; and thus does not employ more
conservatism.

The significant effect of some of the board and audit committee attributes on
asymmetric timeliness suggests that the internal governance mechanisms have some
control over measures that are beyond the discretion of the controlling shareholders.
It seems that the recommendation of good practice by the agency theory and resource
dependence theory are applicable to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the presence of
ownership concentration in Malaysian firms impede an effective role of firms’
governance as this thesis showed that concentrated owners influenced firms’
governance to employ less conservatism.

Results in this thesis further suggest that, to make good governance structure and
conservatism workable, they should be accompanied by an effective market
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mechanism. That may be an effective method to reduce the total power of the
controlling shareholders.

6.8.2. Implications for Policy Makers and Regulatory Agencies
The adverse effect of outside substantial shareholders on conservative accounting
suggests that outside investors do not play an active role in improving the quality of
financial statements. In fact, their high investment in firms reduced conservatism.
The Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance or Bursa Malaysia must educate
and provide awareness to the substantial outside shareholders on their importance to
demand for better financial reports. Outsiders who are not involved with the firm’s
management have no access to managers’ private information but have to rely on the
financial reports to make investment decisions. Since their wealth depends on the
accuracy of the information in the financial reports, they should demand more
conservative accounting to ensure that the reported figures reflect the true value of
the firm.

In respect of directors’ competency, this thesis found that only financial expertise led
to more conservatism although previous studies reported the advantage of longer
tenure and multiple directorships.

Hence, Malaysian Institute of Corporate

Governance and Bursa Malaysia should strictly emphasise a balance of the skills of
the board members.

The Mandatory Accreditation Programme and continuing

education program organised by the Bursa Malaysia are good channels for directors
to enhance their competencies, but components of the program must be revised
regularly to reflect existing condition in Malaysia as reported by empirical evidence.

The effect of the controlling shareholders is huge because they can conceal their
opportunistic behaviour from the financial reports by adopting less conservatism.
Or, if they have no direct impact on conservatism, the controlling shareholders can
influence governance mechanisms in the firm to adopt lower conservatism. Results
from this thesis suggest that the regulators must first emphasise the market tools to
control agency conflicts in Malaysian firms before strengthening the internal
governance structure. According to Thillainathan (1999), limited power of the Bursa
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Malaysia listing rules to only suspend or delist firms for breaking its rules, will only
compound the damage already suffered by the minority shareholders. The insiders
who are the actual offenders remain safe. Evidence in this thesis suggests that the
authorities should consider refining the law to increase the punishment of controlling
shareholders who violate their fair share of wealth relative to minority shareholders.
The regulators should strengthen the enforcement of legal protection of shareholders
as its poor enforcement is one of the reasons for highly concentrated ownerships in
Asian countries (La Porta et al., 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Leuz et al.’s (2003)
findings show that the legal system can be effective in reducing earnings
management because insiders enjoy less personal control benefits which then reduce
their incentive to mask firm performance. Learning from their evidence, this thesis
urges the relevant authority to focus on strengthening the law, a system that already
exists in Malaysia, rather than implementing mechanisms that can be manipulated by
the controlling shareholders.

6.8.3. Implications for the Researchers
Several previous studies on Malaysian firms concluded that ownership concentration
and strong governance attributes do not determine the financial reports. However,
the outcome from this thesis highlights that using alternative measures for the
variables of interest can change our results. This thesis adds to the understanding
that concentrated owners had a strong influence on the accrual based measure of
accounting but not the market measure of accounting. Firms’ governance however,
did not determine the accrual based measure of accounting but had a strong influence
on the market measure of accounting.

The significant effect of concentrated owners on accrual-based conservatism
indicates that closely held firms do not encourage better governance via conservative
accounting, and ultimately produce lower quality financial reports. This outcome
should encourage researchers to use an appropriate proxy to measure the ownership
concentration; otherwise they will draw an incorrect conclusion about the ownership
concentration. Researchers should also be aware that financial expertise should
include directors having qualifications and experiences in accounting and finance
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and not merely focusing on directors who are members of a professional accounting
body. This thesis proves that financial expertise by this definition can lead to more
conservatism. Nevertheless, the negative effect of independent directors on the audit
committee on conservatism requires further investigation. It is unlikely that the
finding is caused by the members’ lack of expertise in accounting as financial
expertise on the audit committee does not influence conservatism when there is
financial expertise on the board. Other factors not explored in this thesis may
influence their behaviour.

Since this thesis shows that conservatism is not a useful tool to control the behaviour
of the controlling shareholders; it should encourage researchers to investigate other
mechanisms that can overcome the power of the controlling shareholders. Also, the
area of this thesis is worth extending to other emerging markets and transition
economies.

6.8.4. Implications for Users of financial statements
The adverse effect of concentrated owners on accrual-based conservatism indicates
that the users should apply caution when relying on the financial statements. The
financial analyst in Malaysia may need to perform an outstanding role in monitoring
the firms consistent with the Sun and Liu’s (2011) findings that firms employed more
conservative financial reports when they were closely monitored by the financial
analyst. Otherwise, financial analysts may need to apply higher conservatism when
assessing the financial position of firms with high concentrated ownership. This
thesis also acknowledges for investors that Malaysian financial reports are
comparable with those in other countries because ethnicity per se does not appear to
explain the conservatism practices of the directors.

Creditors will also benefit from the findings in this thesis because they have better
understanding of how characteristics of firms, concentration of the ownership
structure and attributes of internal governance affect conservatism. Based on result
of this thesis, the creditors must be aware that they cannot simply rely on the
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reported financial statements but may demand additional information to assist them
in making appropriate decisions.

Auditors should learn from the finding that, internal governance mechanisms in firms
with concentrated ownership are not effective in monitoring management. Hence,
the auditors should not assume that the reported financial statements to have been
closely monitored by the board and audit committee. The auditors should demand
more information and perform independent audit tasks to ensure that they enhance
the quality of the financial reports. The auditors should also identify what possible
factors cause the independent directors on the audit committee to employ less
conservatism.

6.9.

Limitations of this thesis

This thesis has significantly contributed to our understanding that concentrated
owners reduce conservatism practices and they also influence firms’ governance to
employ less conservatism. However, as with any research, this thesis is subject to a
number of limitations as listed below:

1.

The sample in this thesis excludes all financial related firms as they are
regulated by a different act. Hence, the outcomes from this thesis cannot be
generalised to these institutions.

2.

This thesis explores three important governance mechanisms namely,
ownership concentration, board of directors and audit committee. While this
thesis only examined internal governance mechanisms, it is possible that
external governance factors not explored in this thesis also determined the
conservatism practices.

3.

Data used in this thesis were extracted from the annual reports, and hence
qualitative nature of the board of directors and audit committee characteristics
are not examined. For instance, the relationship between members of the board
with those of the audit committee or shareholders is not explored. As such, the
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effectiveness of their activities, the scope of reference for the audit committee
or support given by the internal auditor on the audit committee, which may
have impact on the conservatism practices, are not included in this thesis.

4.

This thesis does not explore the possibility of endogeneity between ownership
structure and internal governance structures. Similar limitations were also
acknowledged by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Korczak and Korczak
(2009). However, it is believed that the panel data methodology employed in
this thesis mitigates the concerns of an endogeneity problem as the standard
errors are corrected for cross sectional dependence, heterogeneity and
autocorrelation. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) pointed out that panel
data with a fixed effect effectively eliminates potential bias caused by
endogeneity. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) further noted that if the standard errors
are corrected for the presence of cross sectional dependence, heterogeneity and
autocorrelation, the coefficient estimates will not be affected by the
endogeneity problem.

5.

Research and development and advertising expenditure (R & D) capture
economic rent generated by assets in place, growth opportunities and GAAP
mandated conservatism (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007). This thesis does
not control for the effect of R & D on conservatism because there are very few
companies in the sample with such expenditures.

Out of 2031 firm-year

observations, 83.65% of the sample have zero R & D.

Low innovation

expenses in Asia generally and Malaysia in particular were acknowledged in
Othman and Ameer (2009). However, it is believed that results in this thesis
are not affected by this shortcoming because this thesis employs a firm fixed
effects method; notably A. S. Ahmed et al. (2002) showed that using firm fixed
effects controls for the effects of GAAP mandated conservatism.

6.

As there are various alternative mechanisms to compute an aggregate measure
of governance, mechanisms considered in this thesis are limited to the firms’
internal governance mechanisms. Whilst this thesis found that concentrated
owners have strong negative influence on the internal governance, their control
over external mechanisms are open to future research.
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Despite the above-mentioned limitations, findings from this thesis have deepened our
understanding of the impact of ownership concentration on financial reporting and
provided awareness of the effectiveness of internal governance in Malaysian firms.
The limitations outlined above both acknowledge their existence, and encourage the
need for future research.

6.10.

Future Research

Extension of this thesis is possible in the following areas:

1.

This thesis provides a clear understanding of how the controlling shareholders,
both insiders and outsiders, influence accounting conservatism. This thesis
identified that outside controlling shareholders employed lower conservatism
but the identity of who these shareholders are, is beyond the scope of this
thesis. Further research needs to be undertaken to identify the identity of those
shareholders that have a significant negative influence on conservatism.
Exploring this issue will help to answer why these outsiders, who are supposed
to demand strong governance, lead to lower conservatism.

2.

This thesis found that audit committee composition is associated with lower
conservatism. This finding is inconsistent with agency theory and resource
dependence theory, where outside directors who provide independent
judgement are perceived as an effective monitor. Results from this thesis
however are limited to the quantitative aspect of the audit committee structure.
Applying conservatism requires judgement; hence qualitative factors such as
perception or behaviour of the directors or shareholders are relevant. Future
studies can complement this result to obtain further insight in this area. For
instance, a behavioural study is suitable to investigate factors that influence
directors conservative reporting.

Additionally, an experimental study to

explore the relationship between independent directors and the management
will provide an interesting input if their judgement is influenced by
management.
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3.

Mixed findings on ethnicity are not consistent with the individualism concept,
and fail to support the political hypothesis and compensation incentive
hypothesis. The results from this thesis imply that there could be other factors
that influence the directors instead of their ethnicity per se. Ball et al. (2003)
stated that the political factors influence the Chinese to report lower earnings
but influence Bumiputera to report higher earnings.

Future studies may

explore this issue further by focusing on government related firms and nongovernment related firms and examine if their conservatism practices differ.
Additionally, future studies may examine if religiosity factors determine
conservative reporting as none currently exist in the literature. The findings
will provide an understanding to achieve harmonisation of financial reporting.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness
Eit/Pit – 1 = α0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3RDit + β4 OCINit + β5 Rit OCINit + β6 Dit * OCINit
+ β7 RDit * OCINit + β8 OCOUTit + β9 Rit OCOUT it + β10 Dit * OCOUT it
+ β11 RDit t * OCOUTit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes,
Ethnicity & Control Variables it + εit
(a) One-year estimate
(b) Three-year estimate
Predicted
Coefficient
signs
Coefficients t-statistic
s
t-statistic
constant
-1.307 -8.89***
-0.937
-0.55
R
0.034
0.16
0.050
0.13
D
-0.056
-0.46
-0.306
-1.02
RD
-0.734 -2.72***
-0.829
-1.21
OCIN
0.002
0.007
4.2***
4.93***
OCIN*R
+
0.000
-0.6
-0.002
-1.76*
OCIN*D
-0.001
-1.35
-0.004
-8.49***
OCIN*RD
-0.002
-0.001
-0.7
-1.82*
OCOUT
0.002
0.004
3.57***
3.92***
OCOUT*R
-0.001
-1.56
-0.001
-1.34
OCOUT*D
-0.001
-0.003
-1.85*
-3.2***
OCOUT*RD
+
-0.001
-0.83
-0.002
-0.4
BID
-0.087
-1.36
-0.133
-2.14**
BID*R
-0.020
-0.15
-0.421
-4.96***
BID*D
-0.021
-0.52
0.058
0.32
BID*RD
+
-0.124
-0.32
1.351
3.23***
BS
0.004
0.08
-0.055
-0.98
BS*R
+
0.009
0.16
-0.089
-2.83***
BS*D
0.016
0.63
-0.160
-2.73***
BS*RD
0.041
0.29
-0.169
-0.83
BT
-0.002
-0.001
-0.47
-1.89*
BT*R
0.010
0.006
2.56**
1.92*
BT*D
0.003
0.001
0.45
1.88*
BT*RD
+
-0.007
-1.32
-0.002
-0.31
BF
-0.043
-0.6
0.211
2.13**
BF*R
-0.139
-0.88
-1.017
-8.31***
BF*D
0.100
0.86
-0.607
-2.37**
BF*RD
+
0.310
0.571
4.08***
2.07**
BSHIP
0.048
0.91
0.180
3.74***
BSHIP*R
+
-0.090
-1.59
-0.058
-1.29
BSHIP*D
0.010
0.54
-0.024
-0.65
BSHIP*RD
0.207
-0.075
-1.1
3.72***
BCD
0.026
0.71
0.230
2**
BCD*R
+
0.017
0.42
-0.101
-4.87***
BCD*D
-0.027
-1.61
-0.120
-3.68***
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(a) One-year estimate

BCD*RD
ACID
ACID*R
ACID*D
ACID*RD
ACF
ACF*R
ACF*D
ACF*RD
ACM
ACM*R
ACM*D
ACM*RD
BBR
BBR*R
BBR*D
BBR*RD
ACBR
ACBR*R
ACBR*D
ACBR*RD
BCR
BCR*R
BCR*D
BCR*RD
ACCR
ACCR*R
ACCR*D
ACCR*RD
AUD
AUD*R
AUD*D
AUD*RD
TA
TA*R
TA*D
TA*RD
PROF
PROF*R
PROF*D
PROF*RD
LEV
LEV*R

Predicted
signs
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

Coefficients
-0.043
0.009
-0.084
-0.081
0.053
-0.067
0.356
0.028
-0.540
-0.003
0.006
0.005
0.007
-0.192
0.117
0.078
0.075
0.102
-0.179
-0.139
-0.005
0.002
-0.123
0.008
0.320
0.038
-0.076
-0.038
0.055
0.003
-0.084
-0.063
0.071
0.069
0.008
0.005
0.025
0.342
-0.165
0.068
0.449
-0.324
0.319
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t-statistic
-0.61
0.18
-0.8
-1.83*
0.28
-1.38
5.26***
0.53
-2.81***
-0.89
0.76
0.75
0.18
-2.23**
0.99
1.02
0.51
4.81***
-1.35
-1.84*
-0.03
0.02
-0.93
0.11
3.07***
0.85
-0.47
-0.52
0.38
0.21
-2.46**
-3.53***
1.4
5.16***
0.6
1.66*
1.01
7.1***
-0.84
1.26
1.77*
-3.47***
1.45

(b) Three-year estimate
Coefficient
s
t-statistic
0.038
0.51
-0.207
-3.83***
0.130
1.73*
0.048
0.49
-0.355
-4.12***
-0.095
-1.68*
0.412
4.25***
0.377
2.46**
0.199
0.88
-0.031
-4.15***
0.043
2.87***
0.011
0.51
-0.042
-0.82
-0.061
-0.37
-0.283
-1.35
-0.166
-1.41
0.848
5.88***
0.020
0.13
0.211
1.35
0.064
0.36
-0.803
-2.14**
-0.225
-2.83***
-0.224
-1.33
0.004
0.03
0.461
2.71***
0.067
0.53
0.100
0.81
-0.142
-0.71
-0.664
-2.18**
0.054
1.05
-0.172
-2.69***
-0.072
-2.42**
0.218
2.85***
0.066
0.73
0.028
1.46
0.045
3.12***
0.056
1.15
0.155
0.88
0.474
1.91*
-0.005
-0.02
-0.392
-0.53
-0.313
-2.65***
-0.265
-1.34

(a) One-year estimate
Predicted
signs

Coefficients
0.008
-0.778
-0.031
0.013
0.020

t-statistic
0.1
-3.32***
-7.37***
0.5
1.37
8.25***
.1472
2002

(b) Three-year estimate
Coefficient
s
t-statistic
-0.556
-3.14***
-0.639
-3.89***
-0.162
-3.88***
0.082
6.35***
0.040
1.77*
27.02***
.2374
2012

LEV*D
LEV*RD
+
MTB
MTB*R
+
MTB*D
F- value
R2 within
N
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial
expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles,
ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM=
Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, BCR= Ratio Chinese on
board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit
committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural
logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to
book value.
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APPENDIX B
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness: Board Size using Binary Variables
Eit/Pit – 1 = α0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3RDit + β4 OCINit + β5 Rit OCINit + β6 Dit * OCINit
+ β7 RDit * OCINit + β8 OCOUTit + β9 Rit OCOUT it + β10 Dit * OCOUTit
+ β11 RDit t * OCOUTit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes,
Ethnicity & Control Variables it + εit
Predicted Sign
Variables
Coefficients
t-statistic
constant
-1.138
-0.7
R
0.019
0.06
D
-0.465
-1.68*
RD
-1.189
-1.35
OCIN
0.007
5.1***
OCIN*R
+
-0.002
-1.99**
OCIN*D
-0.004
-10.24***
OCIN*RD
-0.002
-0.75
OCOUT
0.004
3.99***
OCOUT*R
-0.001
-1.34
OCOUT*D
-0.003
-3.51***
OCOUT*RD
+
-0.002
-0.44
BID
-0.134
-1.9*
BID*R
-0.365
-6.25***
BID*D
0.152
0.63
BID*RD
+
1.436
3.3***
DUMMY_BS
-0.044
-1.6
DUMMY_BS*R
+
0.024
0.75
DUMMY_BS*D
0.000
0.01
-0.048
-0.75
DUMMY_BS*RD
BT
-0.001
-0.44
BT*R
0.006
1.85*
BT*D
0.001
0.47
BT*RD
+
-0.001
-0.17
BF
0.204
2.25**
BF*R
-0.988
-9.1***
BF*D
-0.550
-2.27**
BF*RD
+
0.645
2.2**
BSHIP
0.171
3.9***
BSHIP*R
+
-0.036
-0.77
BSHIP*D
-0.010
-0.24
BSHIP*RD
-0.100
-1.4
BCD
0.235
2.05**
BCD*R
+
-0.089
-4.36***
BCD*D
-0.100
-3.36***
BCD*RD
0.061
0.68
ACID
-0.214
-3.6***
ACID*R
0.107
1.35
ACID*D
0.005
0.05
ACID*RD
+
-0.414
-3.59***
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Variables
ACF
ACF*R
ACF*D
ACF*RD
ACM
ACM*R
ACM*D
ACM*RD
BBR
BBR*R
BBR*D
BBR*RD
ACBR
ACBR*R
ACBR*D
ACBR*RD
BCR
BCR*R
BCR*D
BCR*RD
ACCR
ACCR*R
ACCR*D
ACCR*RD
AUD
AUD*R
AUD*D
AUD*RD
TA
TA*R
TA*D
TA*RD
PROF
PROF*R
PROF*D
PROF*RD
LEV
LEV*R
LEV*D
LEV*RD
MTB
MTB*R
MTB*D
MTB*RD
F- value

Predicted Sign
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
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Coefficients
-0.099
0.404
0.365
0.190
-0.028
0.041
0.009
-0.043
-0.035
-0.336
-0.160
0.962
0.034
0.221
0.061
-0.841
-0.209
-0.231
0.022
0.538
0.085
0.088
-0.153
-0.679
0.062
-0.187
-0.081
0.233
0.070
0.021
0.037
0.056
0.136
0.527
-0.031
-0.529
-0.320
-0.256
-0.564
-0.661
-0.161
0.079
0.040
-0.197

t-statistic
-2.09**
4.38***
2.34**
0.83
-4.01***
2.71***
0.37
-0.81
-0.21
-1.54
-1.24
7.01***
0.22
1.35
0.32
-2.28**
-2.11**
-1.27
0.13
3.06***
0.64
0.68
-0.73
-2.2**
1.08
-2.69***
-2.45**
2.87***
0.8
1.14
3.49***
1.17
0.8
1.93*
-0.09
-0.66
-2.68***
-1.33
-3.1***
-4.24***
-3.96***
5.56***
1.69*
-8.5***
25.50***

Predicted Sign
Variables
Coefficients
t-statistic
R within
.2358
N
2012
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board
independence, DUMMY_BS= Dummy equals 1 if board size more and equal 8, 0 if
otherwise, BT= Board tenure, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles, ACID= Audit
committee independence, ACF= Audit committee members with financial expertise, ACM=
Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, BCR= Ratio Chinese on
board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit
committee, AUD= Dummy equals 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural
logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to
book value.
2
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APPENDIX C
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness:
Audit Committee Composition using Binary Variables
Eit/Pit – 1 = α0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3RDit + β4 OCINit + β5 Rit OCINit + β6 Dit * OCINit
+ β7 RDit * OCINit + β8 OCOUTit + β9 Rit OCOUT it + β10 Dit * OCOUT it
+ β11 RDit t * OCOUTit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes,
Ethnicity & Control Variables it + εit
Dummy1=
Dummy1=
All independent
Majority independent
Predicted
Sign
Coefficients
t-statistic
Coefficients t-statistic
constant
-0.052
-0.03
-0.910
-0.56
R
-1.020
0.045
0.13
-2.68***
D
-1.037
-0.335
-1.2
-2.51**
RD
0.158
0.19
-1.041
-1.46
OCIN
0.007
0.007
4.78***
4.85***
OCIN*R
+
-0.002
-1.58
-0.002
-1.64
OCIN*D
-0.004
-0.004
-6.62***
-9.99***
OCIN*RD
-0.002
-0.71
-0.002
-0.65
OCOUT
0.004
0.004
3.84***
3.87***
OCOUT*R
-0.001
-1.23
-0.001
-1.21
OCOUT*D
-0.003
-0.003
-2.68***
-3.14***
OCOUT*RD
+
-0.002
-0.39
-0.001
-0.34
BID
-0.240
-0.105
-1.08
-3.12***
BID*R
-0.394
-0.400
-4.74***
-5.01***
BID*D
0.097
0.56
-0.018
-0.11
BID*RD
+
1.226
1.167
2.94***
2.58**
BS
-0.067
-1.2
-0.052
-0.95
BS*R
+
-0.099
-0.088
-3.11***
-3.45***
BS*D
-0.166
-0.175
-2.77***
-2.78***
BS*RD
-0.188
-0.87
-0.216
-1.09
BT
-0.001
-0.37
-0.001
-0.39
BT*R
0.005
0.006
1.7*
1.77*
BT*D
0.001
0.46
0.002
0.64
BT*RD
+
-0.001
-0.1
0.001
0.08
BF
0.223
0.190
2.4**
2.17**
BF*R
-1.025
-1.011
-8.86***
-8.65***
BF*D
-0.614
-0.598
-2.45**
-2.35**
BF*RD
+
0.576
0.595
2.04**
2.08**
BSHIP
0.182
0.164
3.62***
3.31***
BSHIP*R
+
-0.053
-1.24
-0.052
-1.18
BSHIP*D
-0.032
-0.9
-0.026
-0.71
BSHIP*RD
-0.100
-1.48
-0.117
-1.52
BCD
0.251
0.217
2.15**
2.06**
BCD*R
+
-0.118
-0.088
-5.12***
-4.2***
BCD*D
-0.132
-0.127
-4.02***
-4.05***
BCD*RD
0.055
0.73
0.000
0
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Dummy1=
All independent
Predicted
Sign
DUMMY_ACID
DUMMY_ACID*R
DUMMY_ACID*D
DUMMY_ACID*RD
ACF
ACF*R
ACF*D
ACF*RD
ACM
ACM*R
ACM*D
ACM*RD
BBR
BBR*R
BBR*D
BBR*RD
ACBR
ACBR*R
ACBR*D
ACBR*RD
BCR
BCR*R
BCR*D
BCR*RD
ACCR
ACCR*R
ACCR*D
ACCR*RD
AUD
AUD*R
AUD*D
AUD*RD
TA
TA*R
TA*D
TA*RD
PROF
PROF*R
PROF*D
PROF*RD
LEV
LEV*R
LEV*D

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

Coefficients
-0.780
1.160
0.716
-1.176
-0.106
0.391
0.382
0.236
-0.034
0.046
0.015
-0.041
-0.091
-0.288
-0.153
0.853
0.014
0.240
0.055
-0.874
-0.219
-0.229
0.020
0.487
0.055
0.121
-0.149
-0.717
0.051
-0.172
-0.074
0.214
0.058
0.028
0.046
0.058
0.143
0.474
-0.013
-0.402
-0.317
-0.282
-0.543
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t-statistic
-6.23***
8.02***
3.85***
-4.16***
-2.1**
4.25***
2.51**
0.97
-4.45***
3.02***
0.64
-0.78
-0.53
-1.38
-1.21
5.6***
0.09
1.49
0.29
-2.37**
-3.06***
-1.38
0.14
3.1***
0.44
0.98
-0.74
-2.42**
1.05
-2.76***
-2.57**
2.74***
0.65
1.49
3.08***
1.22
0.82
1.99**
-0.04
-0.54
-3.13***
-1.38
-3.05***

Dummy1=
Majority independent
Coefficients
-0.159
0.050
0.124
0.054
-0.065
0.404
0.376
0.265
-0.030
0.042
0.012
-0.040
-0.062
-0.262
-0.178
0.771
0.019
0.194
0.054
-0.818
-0.185
-0.202
0.003
0.424
0.044
0.084
-0.147
-0.656
0.057
-0.177
-0.071
0.227
0.063
0.031
0.046
0.061
0.145
0.466
-0.016
-0.447
-0.299
-0.278
-0.569

t-statistic
-5.15***
1.47
3.12***
0.88
-1.1
4.15***
2.62***
1.15
-4.49***
2.94***
0.54
-0.75
-0.38
-1.18
-1.54
3.97***
0.13
1.17
0.3
-2.25**
-2.9***
-1.15
0.02
2.23**
0.4
0.66
-0.77
-2.23**
1.14
-2.87***
-2.52**
2.87***
0.73
1.73*
3.47***
1.28
0.87
1.96*
-0.05
-0.59
-2.71***
-1.42
-3.04***

Dummy1=
All independent

LEV*RD
MTB
MTB*R
MTB*D
MTB*RD
F-value
R2 within
N

Predicted
Sign
+
+
-

Coefficients
-0.604
-0.159
0.079
0.046
-0.188

t-statistic
-3.9***
-3.72***
5.42***
2.19**
-11.11***
9.53***
.2384
2012

Dummy1=
Majority independent
Coefficients
-0.656
-0.163
0.081
0.047
-0.188

t-statistic
-3.79***
-3.85***
5.98***
2.07**
-11.31***

1.53***
.2411
2012

***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside substantial
shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board composition, BS= Natural
logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple
directorships, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles, DUMMY_ACID= Dummy equals 1 if all audit
committee members are independent, 0 otherwise, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM=
Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACBR=
Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy
equal 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF=
Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to book value.
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APPENDIX D
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness: Excluding Board Financial Expertise
Eit/Pit – 1 = α0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3RDit + β4 OCINit + β5 Rit OCINit + β6 Dit * OCINit
+ β7 RDit * OCINit + β8 OCOUTit + β9 Rit OCOUT it + β10 Dit * OCOUT it
+ β11 RDit t * OCOUTit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes,
Ethnicity & Control Variables it + εit
Predicted signs
Coefficients
t-statistic
constant
-0.860
-0.48
R
0.111
0.24
D
-0.423
-1.16
RD
-1.248
-1.52
OCIN
0.007
4.95***
OCIN*R
+
-0.001
-1.02
OCIN*D
-0.003
-8.18***
OCIN*RD
-0.002
-0.94
OCOUT
0.004
4.21***
OCOUT*R
-0.001
-0.98
OCOUT*D
-0.003
-3.08***
OCOUT*RD
+
-0.002
-0.57
BID
-0.153
-3.14***
BID*R
-0.430
-5.65***
BID*D
0.055
0.29
BID*RD
+
1.431
3.39***
BS
-0.098
-2.05**
BS*R
+
0.031
1.47
BS*D
-0.073
-1.47
BS*RD
-0.191
-0.89
BT
-0.004
-1.36
BT*R
0.008
2.1**
BT*D
0.002
0.73
BT*RD
+
-0.002
-0.31
BSHIP
0.165
3.28***
BSHIP*R
+
-0.056
-0.86
BSHIP*D
-0.019
-0.42
BSHIP*RD
-0.051
-0.56
BCD
0.202
1.75*
BCD*R
+
-0.076
-5.32***
BCD*D
-0.111
-3.49***
BCD*RD
0.006
0.09
ACID
-0.227
-2.96***
ACID*R
0.125
0.88
ACID*D
0.043
0.32
ACID*RD
+
-0.397
-5.72***
ACF
0.020
0.39
ACF*R
-0.049
-0.54
ACF*D
0.083
1.27
+
0.435
ACF*RD
2.17**
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Predicted signs
ACM
ACM*R
ACM*D
ACM*RD
BBR
BBR*R
BBR*D
BBR*RD
ACBR
ACBR*R
ACBR*D
ACBR*RD
BCR
BCR*R
BCR*D
BCR*RD
ACCR
ACCR*R
ACCR*D
ACCR*RD
AUD
AUD*R
AUD*D
AUD*RD
TA
TA*R
TA*D
TA*RD
PROF
PROF*R
PROF*D
PROF*RD
LEV
LEV*R
LEV*D
LEV*RD
MTB
MTB*R
MTB*D
MTB*RD
F- value
R2 within
N
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
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Coefficients
-0.014
0.005
-0.008
-0.012
-0.146
-0.225
-0.116
0.899
0.051
0.200
0.071
-0.791
-0.312
-0.148
0.050
0.488
0.132
0.026
-0.133
-0.571
0.061
-0.179
-0.085
0.214
0.068
0.013
0.040
0.073
0.184
0.453
-0.046
-0.429
-0.331
-0.286
-0.564
-0.677
-0.164
0.090
0.044
-0.196

t-statistic
-2.48**
0.38
-0.39
-0.2
-0.7
-1.05
-0.87
6.31***
0.28
1.31
0.35
-2.18**
-3.32***
-0.97
0.3
2.13**
0.85
0.22
-0.64
-1.84*
1.17
-2.82***
-2.22**
3.41***
0.73
0.65
3.68***
1.45
1.18
2.02**
-0.15
-0.57
-2.16**
-1.38
-3.56***
-3.09***
-3.88***
7.02***
1.73*
-9.24***
2.33***
.2156
2012

R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BSHIP= Board
multiple directorships, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles, ACID= Audit committee
independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting,
BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACBR= Ratio
Bumiputera on audit committee, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy
equal 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size),
PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to book value.
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APPENDIX E
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness:
Audit Committee Meeting using Binary Variables
Eit/Pit – 1 = α0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3RDit + β4 OCINit + β5 Rit OCINit + β6 Dit * OCINit
+ β7 RDit * OCINit + β8 OCOUTit + β9 Rit OCOUT it + β10 Dit * OCOUT it
+ β11 RDit t * OCOUTit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes,
Ethnicity & Control Variables it + εit
Predicted signs
Coefficients
t-statistic
constant
-1.012
-0.58
R
0.113
0.26
D
-0.228
-0.71
RD
-0.918
-1.25
OCIN
0.007
5.14***
OCIN*R
+
-0.002
-1.68*
OCIN*D
-0.004
-7.63***
OCIN*RD
-0.002
-1.13
OCOUT
0.004
3.88***
OCOUT*R
-0.001
-1.06
OCOUT*D
-0.003
-2.68***
OCOUT*RD
+
-0.002
-0.55
BID
-0.148
-2.67***
BID*R
-0.396
-4.46***
BID*D
0.071
0.38
BID*RD
+
1.309
3.42***
BS
-0.065
-1.17
BS*R
+
-0.075
-2.27**
BS*D
-0.152
-2.59**
BS*RD
-0.199
-1.02
BT
-0.001
-0.54
BT*R
0.006
1.77*
BT*D
0.001
0.29
BT*RD
+
-0.003
-0.43
BF
0.164
1.92*
BF*R
-0.942
-9.45***
BF*D
-0.569
-2.16**
BF*RD
+
0.492
1.46
BSHIP
0.181
3.75***
BSHIP*R
+
-0.067
-1.38
BSHIP*D
-0.029
-0.79
BSHIP*RD
-0.055
-0.77
BCD
0.227
1.96*
BCD*R
+
-0.100
-4.5***
BCD*D
-0.119
-3.37***
BCD*RD
0.025
0.35
ACID
-0.234
-4.3***
ACID*R
0.165
1.9*
ACID*D
0.063
0.5
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ACID*RD
ACF
ACF*R
ACF*D
ACF*RD
DUMMY_ACM
DUMMY_ACM*R
DUMMY_ACM*D
DUMMY_ACM*RD
BBR
BBR*R
BBR*D
BBR*RD
ACBR
ACBR*R
ACBR*D
ACBR*RD
BCR
BCR*R
BCR*D
BCR*RD
ACCR
ACCR*R
ACCR*D
ACCR*RD
AUD
AUD*R
AUD*D
AUD*RD
TA
TA*R
TA*D
TA*RD
PROF
PROF*R
PROF*D
PROF*RD
LEV
LEV*R
LEV*D
LEV*RD
MTB
MTB*R
MTB*D
MTB*RD

Predicted signs
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

211

Coefficients
-0.414
-0.092
0.399
0.363
0.180
0.072
-0.036
-0.040
0.260
-0.081
-0.254
-0.162
0.823
0.008
0.219
0.074
-0.794
-0.208
-0.225
-0.006
0.485
0.032
0.116
-0.124
-0.690
0.064
-0.189
-0.081
0.231
0.063
0.032
0.044
0.047
0.154
0.490
0.006
-0.421
-0.321
-0.276
-0.539
-0.598
-0.165
0.086
0.044
-0.201

t-statistic
-4.09***
-2.08**
4.1***
2.28**
0.86
1.08
-0.63
-1.18
2.33**
-0.48
-1.15
-1.15
7.52***
0.05
1.33
0.4
-2.25**
-2.64***
-1.36
-0.04
3.29***
0.26
0.9
-0.62
-2.27**
1.3
-2.85***
-2.94***
2.7***
0.7
1.58
3.92***
0.89
0.86
1.95*
0.02
-0.55
-2.42**
-1.12
-2.94***
-2.87***
-3.64***
6.87***
1.64
-9.66***

Predicted signs

Coefficients

t-statistic
16.23***
.2363
2012

F- value
R2 within
N
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial
expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles,
ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise,
DUMMY_ACM= Dummy equals 1 if audit committee meeting is four and more, 0
otherwise, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACBR= Ratio
Bumiputera on audit committee, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy
equal 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size),
PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to book value.
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APPENDIX F
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness: Leverage using Binary Variables
Eit/Pit – 1 = α0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3RDit + β4 OCINit + β5 Rit OCINit + β6 Dit * OCINit
+ β7 RDit * OCINit + β8 OCOUTit + β9 Rit OCOUT it + β10 Dit * OCOUT it
+ β11 RDit t * OCOUTit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes,
Ethnicity & Control Variables it + εit
Predicted signs
Coefficients
t-statistic
constant
-0.279
-0.17
R
-0.015
-0.05
D
0.031
0.15
RD
0.035
0.05
OCIN
0.007
4.7***
OCIN*R
+
-0.002
-1.87*
OCIN*D
-0.003
-6.13***
OCIN*RD
0.000
-0.11
OCOUT
0.004
3.29***
OCOUT*R
-0.001
-1.41
OCOUT*D
-0.003
-2.46**
OCOUT*RD
+
-0.001
-0.25
BID
-0.110
-1.43
BID*R
-0.533
-6.1***
BID*D
0.036
0.22
BID*RD
+
1.399
2.92***
BS
-0.033
-0.58
BS*R
+
-0.135
-3.94***
BS*D
-0.192
-3.07***
BS*RD
-0.133
-0.72
BT
0.001
0.32
BT*R
0.005
1.75*
BT*D
-0.001
-0.2
BT*RD
+
-0.005
-0.99
BF
0.246
2.54**
BF*R
-1.091
-8.55***
BF*D
-0.616
-2.32**
BF*RD
+
0.715
2.44**
BSHIP
0.201
4.58***
BSHIP*R
+
-0.081
-1.87*
BSHIP*D
-0.031
-0.72
BSHIP*RD
-0.051
-0.75
BCD
0.211
1.91*
BCD*R
+
-0.053
-2.04**
BCD*D
-0.093
-2.64***
BCD*RD
-0.005
-0.06
ACID
-0.238
-4.03***
ACID*R
0.228
2.22**
ACID*D
0.057
0.57
ACID*RD
+
-0.473
-5.69***
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Predicted signs
ACF
ACF*R
ACF*D
ACF*RD
ACM
ACM*R
ACM*D
ACM*RD
BBR
BBR*R
BBR*D
BBR*RD
ACBR
ACBR*R
ACBR*D
ACBR*RD
BCR
BCR*R
BCR*D
BCR*RD
ACCR
ACCR*R
ACCR*D
ACCR*RD
AUD
AUD*R
AUD*D
AUD*RD
TA
TA*R
TA*D
TA*RD
PROF
PROF*R
PROF*D
PROF*RD
DUMMY_LEV
DUMMY_LEV*R
DUMMY_LEV*D
DUMMY_LEV*RD
MTB
MTB*R
MTB*D
MTB*RD
F- value

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
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Coefficients
-0.084
0.392
0.314
0.082
-0.028
0.036
0.013
-0.031
-0.100
-0.236
-0.173
0.708
0.029
0.224
0.079
-0.753
-0.228
-0.276
0.000
0.485
0.046
0.198
-0.104
-0.732
0.066
-0.193
-0.073
0.245
0.025
0.045
0.032
-0.002
0.177
0.458
0.015
-0.350
0.051
-0.175
-0.071
0.191
-0.155
0.075
0.029
-0.203

t-statistic
-1.51
4.16***
2.28**
0.42
-3.76***
2.69***
0.55
-0.62
-0.67
-1.2
-1.58
4.43***
0.22
1.41
0.47
-2.06**
-4.78***
-1.84*
0
2.56**
0.42
1.6
-0.53
-2.35**
1.3
-3.16***
-3.01***
3.36***
0.29
2.82***
2.68***
-0.05
1.05
1.9*
0.04
-0.45
2.07**
-2.86***
-2.25**
4.59***
-4.14***
5.17***
1.37
-13.35***
28.73***

Predicted signs
2

Coefficients

t-statistic
.2321
2012

R within
N
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial
expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles,
ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM=
Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, BCR= Ratio Chinese on
board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit
committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural
logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, DUMMY_LEV= Dummy equals
1 for levered firms, 0 otherwise, MTB= Market to book value.
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